Chapter 14
Strategy
Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game
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Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483)
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Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent
Pays to Prevent Entry
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Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat
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Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred
Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria
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Table 14.2
Entrant’s Best Response and Profit
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Figure 14.4
Cournot and
Stackelberg
Equilibria
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Figure 14.5
Incumbent
Commits to a
Large Quantity
to Deter Entry
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Figure 14.6
Incumbent
Loss if it Deters
Entry
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Solved Problem 14.3 (Page 496)
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Figure 14.7
Investment Game Tree
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Figure 14.8
Raising-Costs Game Tree
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Application (Page 503) Evidence
on Strategic Entry Deterrence
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Figure 14.9 Advertising
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Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal
Benefit of Advertising
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Table 14.3 Advertising Game
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Cross-Chapter Analysis (Page 515)
Magazine Subscriptions
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