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SINO-INDIAN WAR-
1962:
CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES
One of the most unwarranted happenings in the international history of
India was India-China war. China and India the two Asian giants, went to war in
the fag end days of October 1962.
The main cause of the war was the
competing interests of India and China which took the form of sharp differences
over the border. These were most acute in the western and eastern extremities
of the Himalayas separated by over thousand miles. As the border dispute was
the immediate cause of the war, it is essential to understand how it arose.
At the very first instance, it is important to examine the view that
both countries have enjoyed friendly relations for over two thousand years and
the problems between them have arisen only during the last five decades since
India became independent and the People’s Republic of China had emerged out
of Chairman Mao’s Revolution.
To a great extent, this euphoric view had been sanctified by the
writings and speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru even before he assumed the mantle
as India’s first Prime Minister.
Nehru had a grand vision of India and China
working together and contributing to the cause of peace and development in Asia
and the world.1
Speaking in a Radio Broadcast on September 7, 1946 Jawaharial
Nehru, Vice-President of the Interim National Government of India stated “China
that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour, has been our friend
through the ages and that friendship will endure and given.2 However, this vision
was obviously not shared by the Chinese leadership, which considered India as
being still under the influence of Great Britain and the west generally. That view
had been reinforced when India close to remain with the Commonwealth.3
K.M.Panikker quotes “Mao opened the conversation by saying that
in China there was an old belief that if a man lived a good life he would be reborn
in India”.4 This relations between China and India during the first ten years of the
existence of the People’s Republic of China which came into existence on 1
October 1949 were amicable. This friendship between the two countries became
a matter of envy for the imperialists. The reasons were obvious. India, after a
long struggle and enormous sacrifices, was able to throw off the yoke of
imperialism.
The anti-imperialist struggle of the Indian people and their final
victory paved the way for the liberation of many countries in Asia. Two years
after the independence of India, the people of China succeeded in their
revolution which had its genesis in the anti-imperialist movement.
The two
countries, therefore, had a common basis for their friendship.
The populations of both countries constitute about one-third of the
world population. Both the countries suffered under those rulers who exploited
59
the vast resources of these countries for their vested interests and made the
people economically backward.
Both needed development to reconstruct their
economy and usher a new era of peace and prosperity for their people.
India signed the Panchsheela agreement with China on 29th April
1954, with the hope that the friendship between these two countries based on the
‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ would herald a new era of friendship
and cooperation in Asia in spite of their different social systems and forms of
government.5
In the communique, reaffirming their faith in Panchsheela, both
Chou En-lai and Jawaharlal Nehru declared that ‘this friendship would help the
cause of world peace and peaceful development of the two countries as well as
other countries in Asia. Chou En-lai, during his visit to India, in a broadcast at
Delhi, said that “countless centuries of cultural and economic interchange
between China and India has never been marred by conflict or animosity”. It was
true that both the countries never had any confrontation with each other. There
were no disputes or differences between the two countries on any matter
including the boundary question.
When Jawaharlal Nehru visited Peking in October 1954, where he
was astonished to see an official Chinese map showing 50,000 sq. miles of
Indian territory as forming part of China. It was shocking to learn that a country
60
which had signed the Panchsheela agreement could be so naive to commit
cartographic aggression on a friendly country like India.
The territorial claims
were certainly unfounded and when this was brought to the notice of the Chinese
leaders, they explained that ‘they were old maps and need not be taken
seriously'.
Then came the Bandung conference, co-sponsored by India. The
idea was that the resurgent nations of Asia and Africa must build up unity of mind
and purpose and uphold the spirit of peaceful co-existence which was vital for the
development of the newly independent countries as also for peace and progress
of this region which had suffered for long under colonial domination.
India
pleaded with other sponsoring countries to bring China to Bandung. China by
then had not been recognized by most of the western countries and also not
admitted to the United Nations and other international forums. India thought that
China being the largest Asian country, without her the conference could not be
fully represented.
Chou En-lai attended the Bandung conference and enthusiastically
subscribed to the principles enunciated in the conference.
Chou En-lai was
aware to the border incidents on the Sino-lndian border and the intrusion of the
Chinese army into Indian territory at Barahoti. But he sought to allay the fear of
the neighbouring countries with a promise of “non-interference in the internal
affairs of others and peaceful settlement of disputes without any use of force”.
61
Chou En-lai declared at the Bandung conference that “China would not
transgress the territorial integrity of any country, not even by one inch”. He was
so categorical in his expression that he went further and said that “if by mistake,
the Chinese people crossed the frontier of neighbours, the government of China
will bring them back”.
The neighbouring countries including India had, therefore, reasons
to believe that China had no wayward intentions or territorial claims against her
neighbours. Twenty-nine countries which took part in the Bandung conference
pledged themselves to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one
another as good neighbours. China was one of them.
But soon it became clear that the Panchshila and the Bandung
declaration which became articles of faith for India in international affairs, were
mere slogans for China to cover its real intentions and so China repeatedly
declared its adherence to these principles while at the same time preparing
herself for further intrusions into Indian territory.
Before the ink of the ‘Bandung’ declaration could dry, China under
Mao Tse-tung re-discovered the Great Han foreign policy of expansionism. So
when Chou En-lai was speaking about ‘no disputes between China and India’, he
was only referring to the past. He knew that what he was talking about was a
mere exercise of diplomatic rhetoric by China to begin an era of tension and
62
conflicts between the two ancient countries. So, the professed adherence to the
principles of Panchshila and Bandung was deceptive and a time-gaining device
to prepare for a major conflict with India under the garb of a ‘border dispute’.6
Difference in approach
The Indian approach to life is different from that of China in many
ways. The two have opted for different forms of government. In the legislative
field, the National People’s Congress in China is the supreme legislative body but
it seldom decides.
The decisions are taken by a coterie which controls the
National People’s Congress. India is a democratic country where the Parliament
is supreme and decides on all issues of national and international importance
after fair and free discussion.
In its judiciary, China has established people’s courts which are
directly responsible to the National People’s Congress. There are no courts of
appeal except for a very limited specified cases.
The Indian judiciary is
independent and the law provides checks and balances against misuse of
authority by the government.
The social life of the Chinese people is regulated by the rules laid
down by the party posses. There is no respect for man’s privacy and the party
workers can enter any home to search, to browbeat and seize anything without
slightest pretence of legality. China is the only country where religion has been
63
suppressed. India, on the other hand, is a secular state which means that there
is no state's patronage to any particular religion but the people have the right to
profess their own faith.
The Chinese Constitution which has undergone many changes in
the past to suit the whims of the ruling group, believes in friendship between the
Chinese and the “people’s democracies” in their struggle against imperialism.
India is opposed to imperialism in all its manifestation.
India has been
consistently supporting national liberation movements against colonialism, neo­
colonialism and imperialism. India opposes racism and racial discrimination and
had no diplomatic relations with the apartheid regime of the Union of South
Africa 7
When the government of China was told about the rough sketch
map showing the development of railways and trunk roads in China during the
First Five Year Plan period published in China Pictorial in its July issue of 1954,
the Chinese government explained its position as under:
“In the maps currently published in China, the boundary line between
China and its neighbouring countries, including India, is drawn on the
basis of maps published in China before liberation. This was made clear
to His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru by Prime Minister Chou En-lai
when the former visited China in October 1954. Premier Chou En-lai
explained then to Prime Minsiter Nehru that the reason why the boundary
in Chinese maps is drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese
government has not yet undertaken a survey of China’s boundary, nor
consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make any
changes in the boundary of its own. The Chinese government believes
64
that with the elapse of time, and after consultations with the various
neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of
drawing the boundary of China will be decided in accordance with the
results of the consultations and the survey.’8
When Chou En-lai paid his first visit to India in June 1954, he said:
“The Chinese people feel very happy that such a neighbour as India is
devoted to the cause of peace. India has made valuable contributions to
the efforts of bringing about an armistice in Korea. India has constantly
been interested in striving for the termination of Indo-China war, and has
untiringly supported efforts made at the Geneva conference to restore
peace in Indo-China. It is very obvious that this position of India is of great
significance for safeguarding peace in Asia.9
From Bandung to Bomdi
The story of friendship between India and China from Bandung to
Bomdi, ranging over a period of 15 years, is a story of faith demolished as a
result of the hegemonistic designs of the Peking leadership. India tried to build
up faith in her bona-fides as a member of the Afro-Asian community. India was
the first to plead for the inclusion of the People’s Republic of China into the
United Nations. India took up the cause of China’s inclusion in the UN because it
believed that without China the world body could not function realistically. But
China betrayed this confidence.
On 15 September 1955, a detachment from
Hoti plain in India, approaching Damzan which is 10 miles south of Niti Pass and
lies in the Indian territory, was stopped by a group of Chinese soldiers who had
trespassed into the Indian territory.
The Chinese soldiers told the Indian
detachment not to go via Damzan without getting the permission from the
65
Chinese authorities at Gartok. The Government of India, in its note given to the
Chinese Counsellor in New Delhi on 5 November 1955, said:10
“We must point out that Damzan is clearly within Indian territory. It is
situated at longitude 79.61°, latitude 30.49° and is 10 miles south of the
Niti Pass which has been recognised by the Sino-lndian agreement of 29
April 1954 as the border pass between the two countries of this region.
The unauthorised presence of the Chinese soldiers at Damzan in Indian
territory, therefore, amounts to trespass."
On 1 September 1956, a party of 10 Chinese army personnel
entered and took up positions about two furlongs from Hupsong Khad on the
Indian side of Shipki La Pass. A note handed by the Ministry of External Affairs
of the Government of India to the Chinese Counsellor in India on 2 July 1958,
said:
“We have received information that the Chinese troops crossed into Indian
territory and visited the Khurnak Fort which lies within the Indian frontiers
of the Ladakh region of Kashmir and occupied it.”
The Chinese built a motor-road across the eastern part of Ladakh
which formed a part of the Chinese road known as Ychcheng-Gartok Road or
Sinkiang-Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September
1957.
The road entered Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, running
north-west in Amtogar through Yangpa, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langar which are
all indisputably in Indian territory. Near the Amtogar lake, several branch tracks
were also made motorable. The territory through which the road traversed has
been part of the Ladakh region of India and the old established frontiers had
been accepted by the Chinese in a Treaty of 1842 as the international boundary.
66
In an official communication, a Chinese member of the Boundary Commission of
1847-49 accepted the boundary as “sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it will
be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more
convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them”.
The
travellers to this area have referred to it as part of Ladakh and atlases like the
Johnston’s Atlas of India (edition: 1894), and maps published by the Survey of
India, unmistakably as part of Ladakh.
The border provacations by China were totally uncalled for.
Wherever the Chinese incursions took place, the Peking rulers tried to blame the
Indian side by making false accusations.
Replying to such an allegation, the
Government of India, in its note on 26 June 1979, wrote to the Chinese
Government.11
“The Government of India has scrupulously observed the traditional border
between India and the Tibet region of China along the entire India-China
frontier. This traditional international frontier coincides with the so-called
MacMahon Line. The Government of India regrets that the Government of
the People’s Republic of China should have believed the allegations that
their forces could in any way be in collusion with Tibetan rebels. The
Government of India have no information about any rebel activities in this
area, and if there are any, they are in no way responsible for them.”
Border Maps
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in his letter dated 14th December
1958 to the Chinese Premier pointed out that during his visit to China in October
1954, he had briefly mentioned some maps recently published in China which
67
depicted wrong by the border-line between the two countries, Chou En-lai had
assured him that so far as India was concerned, they were not much worried
about the matter because their boundaries were quite clear and not a matter of
agreement and, further, that those maps were really reproductions of old pre­
liberation maps and that China had no time to revise them. During Chou En-lai’s
visit to India towards the end of 1956, the Chinese Premier had referred to the
Sino-Burmese border and his desire to settle the problem with the Burmese
government.
It was in this connection that Chou En-lai had mentioned to the
Prime Minister of India the Sino-lndian border and more especially about the socalled MacMahon Line because the MacMahon Line covered a part of SinoBurmese border and a large part of the Chinese border with India. Chou En-lai
had said that he did not approve of this border being called the MacMahon Line
and Jawaharlal Nehru had replied that he too did not like that name either but for
facility of reference they referred to it as such.
Jawaharlal Nehru in his letter of 14th December 1958 wrote to the
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai :12
’’You told me then that you had accepted this MacMahon Line border with
Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the
friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to
recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to
consult the authorities of the Tibet region of China and you proposed to do
_ _
SO.
H
“I remember discussing this matter with you at some considerable length.
The Chinese government came to Delhi and discussed one of these petty
issues for some time. Unfortunately, no settlement about this matter was
68
arrived at then and it was decided to continue the talks later. I was sorry
that these talks had not resulted in satisfactory agreement so far."
“A few months ago our attention was drawn to a map of China published
in the magazine “China Pictorial” which indicated the border with India.
This map was also not very clearly defined. But even the rough border
lines appeared to us to be wrongly placed. A large part of our North-East
Frontier Agency as well as some other parts of India had been
administered by India in the same way as other parts of our country, were
shown to be part of Chinese territory.”
Regarding this cartographic aggression on the territory of India, the
Indian side repeatedly told the Chinese government that these distortions would
affect the relationship between the two countries. Jawaharial Nehru, continuing
his letter, further wrote:
“The magazine containing this map was widely distributed and questions
were asked in our Parliament about this. I gave answers to the effect that
these maps were merely reproductions of old ones and did not represent
the actual facts of the situation. “We drew your government’s attention to
this map some time ago this year. “I was puzzled by this reply because
there was no major boundary dispute between China and India. There
never has been such a dispute so far as we are concerned. But you will
appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People’s Republic came into
power, the continued issue of these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us
as to others. There can be no question of large parts of India being
anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what
kind of surveys can effect these well-known and fixed boundaries.”
Sino-lndian boundary
Premier Chou En-lai replied on 23rd January 1959 explaining the
stand of the Chinese government on the crucial question of Sino-lndian
boundary.
It showed a marked deviation from the position explained by the
69
Chinese leader earlier during the exchange of notes between the two sides. In
his letter, Chou En-lai wrote:13
“I wish to point out that the Sino-lndian boundary has never been formally
delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-lndian boundary
has been concluded between the Chinese central government and the
Indian government. So far as the actual situation is concerned, there are
certain differences between the two sides over the border question. In the
past few years, question as to which side certain areas on the Sino-lndian
border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the
Chinese and the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. Recently the
Indian government claimed that southern part of China’s Sinkiang Uighur
Autonomous Region was Indian territory.
All this shows that border
disputes do exist between China and India."
“An important question concerning the Sino-lndian boundary is the
question of the so-called MacMahon Line. I discussed this with Your
Excellency as well as with Prime Minister U Nu. I would now like to
explain again the Chinese government’s attitude. As you are aware, the
MacMahon line was a product on the British policy of aggression against
the Tibet region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese
people. And I have also told you formally about their dissatisfaction. In
view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese
government, on the one hand finds it necessary to make a more or less
realistic attitude towards the MacMahon Line and, on the other hand,
cannot, but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. As
a matter of fact, our people have expressed surprise at the way the Sinolndian boundary, particularly its western section, is drawn on maps
published in India. They have asked our government to take up the matter
with the Indian government.
On receipt of the letter of Chou En-lai, the Indian Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru replied on 22 March 1959, mentioning therein:14
“It is true that the frontier has not been demarcated on the ground in all the
sectors but I am somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not
accepted at any time by the Government of China. The traditional frontier,
as you may be aware, follows the geographical principle of watershed on
the crest of the High Himalayan Range, but apart from this the then
70
Government of India and the Central Government of China. It may
perhaps be useful if I draw your attention to some of these agreements:”
(i)
Sikkim: The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with the
Tibet region of China was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention
1890 and jointly demanded on the ground in 1895.
(ii)
The Ladakh Region of the State of Jammu & Kashmir: A treaty of
1842 between Kashmir on one hand and the Emperor of China and
the Lama Guru of Lhasa on the other, mentions the India-China
boundary in the Ladakh region. In 1847, the Chinese government
admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed.
The area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part
of India official maps, has been surveyed by Indian officials and
even a Chinese map of 1893 shows it as Indian territory.
(iii)
The MacMahon Line: As you are aware, the so-called MacMahon
Line runs East Wards from the eastern borders of Bhutan and
defines the boundary of China on one hand and India and Burma
on the other.
The line was drawn after full discussion and was
confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters; and there
is nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way
dissatisfied with the agreed boundary.
Chinese
Plenipotentiary at the
Moreover, although the
Conference
objected
to the
boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and China, there is no
7l
mention of any Chinese reservation in respect to the India-Tibet
frontier either during the discussions or at the time of their initiating
the Convention.
I hope that we shall reach an understanding on
this issue.
Treaties bypassed
From these letters exchanged between India and China, it is clear
that the Chinese government adopted a bellicose attitude to brush aside the
treaties and conventions to lay illegal claim on Indian territory. It was surprising
that an authoritarian government of China acted in an illogical manner and further
aggravated the problem by its repeated incursions into the Indian territory by
violating Indian air space.
During October and November 1958, a Chinese
aircraft unauthorisedly flew over the Spiti valley in Himachal Pradesh. It flew in
from western Tibet and returned towards Gartok.
Chinese aircraft repeatedly
violated air space over Chini in Himachal Pradesh, entering from the north and
north-east.
Chinese
soldiers
structures in Hoti during winter.
started
camping
and
erecting
permanent
As regards Barahoti, Indian Prime Minister
Nehru, during his talks with Premier Chou En-lai had made it clear that the Indian
government had extensive proof that this area had been under Indian jurisdiction
and lies well within the frontier of India.
An on-the-spot investigation was
suggested by China, though the stand taken by India was that investigation could
72
hardly throw any light until proofs to the contrary could be adduced.
Nevertheless, India expressed its willingness to the suggestion that both sides
should not send their civil and military officials to that area but the Chinese
delegation did not agree to this suggestion.
In the meantime, China tried to
manufacture false evidence in support of its contention, and thus stated making a
material change in the situation by despatching civil and military detachments,
equipped with arms, to camp in that area, after the Indian civil party had
withdrawn at the beginning of winter in 1958.
The Government of China took an obstinate attitude to precipitate a
crisis and started nibbling at Indian territory in assertion of its claim to the
disputed area.
When the Government of India protested against the flight of
Chinese aircraft into Indian air space, the Chinese government made counter­
allegations, knowing it to be fabricated, that during October and November 1958,
the Peking government had received reports to the effect that foreign aircraft
intruding into Chinese air space were observed at Gargunsa, Gartok, Gyantima
and other places in the western part of Tibet region of China.
Some of these
aircrafts, it was alleged, flew from the direction of India which others flew towards.
India.
However, the Chinese government admitted that the Chinese border
troops were not able to identify the nationality of these planes.
It added that
considering the direction of their flights and the fact that the places where thy
appeared were close to India, the Chinese government, in a spirit of friendship
73
and cooperation, would like to draw the attention of the Indian government in the
above mentioned circumstances.
If these were Indian planes, the note of the
Chinese government dated 12 January 1959 said, the Indian government should
take necessary measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents.15
Beginning of Aggression
In 1959, Chinese soldiers made incursions into Indian territory in
Ladakh and killed Indian policemen inside Indian territory. Police official Karam
Singh became the first victim of Chinese aggression. He became a martyr in the
cause of defending the territorial integrity of India.
It was not a mere border
incident which could go unnoticed. It was the beginning of aggression which had
its roots in the expansionist policy of the Chinese leaders towards a neighbouring
country.
Had India wanted to precipitate a crisis, it would have retaliated by
ambushing the Chinese intruders. India only reconciled itself to this incident by
lodging a protest with the Chinese government through diplomatic channels to
persuade China to abandon its policy of confrontation with India.
Jawaharlal Nehru wrote:17
“I had never known that there was such a thing as Sino-lndian border. I refuse to
consider that large areas in question (shown in the Chinese maps and atlases)
could belong to any country but India."
74
The
Chinese
Government disregarding
all
the
facts
and
circumstances, embarked upon a highly provocative action which naturally
caused deep concern for peoples all over the world. Future historians may differ
as to the course adopted by India in not taking a tough line against China on the
border problem, but they will be unanimous to assert that India chose to be
peaceful because of its adherence to the Five Principles of Peace and Peaceful
coexistence. India wanted settlement of all disputes by mutual negotiations and
not by use of force.
During 1960-62, Chinese soldiers made repeated incursions into
Indian territory and clashed with Indian border guards. China used its infantry,
artillery and tank units on the Indian border in preparation for a large-scale
aggression on India in the year 1962. The Chinese leadership was only trying to
gain time to prepare itself and, therefore, Chinese leadership used all methods to
make false accusations against India so as to find a pretext to justify its later
actions.
If the world had joined in unequivocally condemning Chinese
invasion of Tibet and stopped the hands of the aggressor, the course of history
would have been different. Unfortunately there was no united concerted move to
contain China from committing aggression. India accepted China’s suzerainty
over Tibet and recognised Tibet as a Chinese region. This was an unfortunate
stand taken by India which affected the future course of events in the world.
75
China adopted an aggressive posture and continued to pursue a highly
provocative and dangerous policy.
The year 1962 will go down in the history of India-China relations
as a period of great betrayal by China.
aggression on Indian territory.
The Chinese committed large scale
In a broadcast to the Indian people on 22nd
October 1962, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said:18
“A grave situation has arisen on our frontiers because of continuing and
unabashed aggression by the Chinese forces. A .situation has arisen
which calls upon all of us to meet it effectively. We are men and women
of peace in this country conditioned to the ways of peace. We are unused
to the necessities of war. Because of this, we endeavoured to follow a
policy of peace even when aggression took place on our territory in
Ladakh five years ago.
We explored avenues for an honourable
settlement by peaceful methods. That was our policy all over the world,
and we tried to apply it even in our own country. We know the horrors of
war in this age today, and we have done our utmost to prevent war from
engulfing the world.”
“But all our efforts have been in vain in so far as our own frontier is
concerned where a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for
peace of peaceful methods, has continuously threatened us and even
carried these threats into action.”
“There have been five years of continuous aggression on the Ladakh
frontier. Our other frontier at NEFA remained largely free from this
aggression. Just when we were discussing ways and means of reducing
tension, and there was even some chance of representatives of the two
countries meeting to consider this matter, a new and fresh aggression
took place on the NEFA border. This began on the 8th September last.
This was a curious way of lessening tension. It is typical of the way of
Chinese government has treated us.”
“Our border with China in the NEFA region is well known and well
established from ages past. It is sometimes called the MacMahon Line.
But this line which separates India from Tibet was the high ridges which
divides the water sheds. This has been acknowledged as the border by
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history, tradition and treaties long before it was called the MacMahon Line.
The Chinese have in many ways acknoweldged it as the border, even
though they have called the MacMahon Line illegal. The Chinese laid
claims in their maps, to a large part of the NEFA which has been under
our administration for a long time. The present Chinese regime was
established about 12 years ago.
Before that the Tibetans did not
challenge it.
Even the maps that the Chinese produced were
acknowledged by them repeatedly to be old and out of date maps which
had little relevance today.”
India in
her fight against the Chinese aggression
received
sympathy and support from most of the countries of the world. Till July 11, 1963
the countries which had conveyed their support and sympathy to the government
of India included Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Columbia, Congo (Leopoldville), Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
France,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Gautemala, Haiti, Iceland,
Iran, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea (South), Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg,
Malagasy, Malaya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic,
United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam (South), Yemen and
Yugoslavia. Among those countries who sent their message of concern and who
made suggestions for a peaceful solution of the border conflict included Algeria,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Mali, Mongolia, Nepal, Poland,
Rumania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika and the USSR. Messages
77
of sympathy and concern were also received from Burma, Israel, Laos, Libya and
Vatican.
Unilateral Ceasefire
On November 20, 1962, China unilaterally declared a three-point
ceasefire proposal. An acceptance of these proposals would have meant:19
1.
India should not dispute Chinese occupation of 14,000 square
miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh area.
2.
Chinese claims should be fully satisfied as far as physical
occupation is concerned in the middle sector.
3.
In the eastern sector, the accepted
boundary, the highest
Himalayan ridge, should be given up in favour of whatever
interpretation the government of China decided to put on the
MacMahon Line and the Chinese should be left in possession of
the vital mountain passes which hold the key to India.
The Government of India obviously could not submit to this demand
of surrender.
A three-day conference of six non-aligned nations, namely Ceylon,
UAE, Ghana, Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia discussed in Colombo in
December 1962, the situation arising out of the Sino-lndian conflict,
the
proposals emanating from this conference were taken by the Chairman of the
conference, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaaranaike, to China.
78
She was joined in her
discussions with the Chinese government by Dr. Subanrio, Indonesian foreign
minister. Thereafter, Mrs. Bandaranaike brought these proposals to India where
she was joined during the discussions by the delegation from UAK and Ghana.
Dr. Subandrio and Prince Nordom Sihanouk came to India and had discussions
with the Indian Prime Minister.20
Analysing the proposals along with their clarifications, the broad
deal that emerged were the following:
Western Sector: The Colombo conference appealed to the Chinese government
to carry out the 20-kilometre withdrawal of their military posts. This is from the
line of ‘actual control’ between the two sides as of ‘November 7, 1959, as defined
in maps III and V circulated by the government of China’. The existing military
posts which the forces of the government of India would keep should be on and
up to the above line of actual control.
Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the areas vacated by
the Chinese military withdrawals would be demilitarised zone to be administered
by civilian posts of both sides.
Eastern Sector: The conference considered that the line of actual control in the
areas recognised by both the governments could serve as a ceasefire line to
their respective positions. The clarification said that Indian forces can move right
up to south of the line of actual control, i.e,, the MacMahon Line, except for the
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two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the governments of
China and India. The Chinese forces could similarly move right up to the north of
the MacMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas mentioned were
Chedong or Thagia Ridge area and the Longju area.
Middle Sector: The conference suggested that the dispute should be solved by
peaceful means without resorting to force. The status quo in this sector should
be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the status quo.
While the Government of India accepted these proposals in the
light of the clarifications given to them, the Chinese government did not accept
the proposals. Their so-called acceptance ‘in principle’ contained reservations,
for example:
1.
The Chinese government wanted that the demilitarised zone resulting
from Chinese withdrawal by 20 kilometers should be administered
only by Chinese civil posts. This was contrary to the proposal of the
Colombo conference which said that the demilitarised zone should be
administered by civilian posts of both sides i.e., India and China.
2.
In the eastern sector, the Chinese government said that the Indian
military force should not enter the areas evacuated by the Chinese
withdrawing forces in NEFA. The Colombo conference proposal was
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that the Indian armed forces could go right up to the MacMahon Line
except in the two areas of Thagla Ridge and Longju.
Even after the much publicised unilateral ceasefire and Chinese
pronouncement of accepting the Colombo proposals “in principle” the Chinese
government continued its army build-up on a massive scale on the northern
border of India.
Peking also deployed, after the ceasefire, sixteen Divisions in
Tibet, thirteen of them being deployed along the border. In addition these troops
were backed by a labour force of considerable number. They also started largescale building of roads leading right up to the Indian border.
In March 1963, Peking sought to cover up its build-up in the
Chumbey valley by an expression of mock indignation over alleged violation of
Tibetan territory.
On 27 April, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in a broadcast to the nation,
warned the Indian people:
“Let our enthusiasm not be unreliable and transient as a monsoon stream,
flooding over briefly and then drying up, but like the deep and constant
Ganga whose flow has sustained and inspired our peoples through the
ages. The spark of patriotic nationalism, which burst into flame at the
news of the Chinese invasion captured for a movement, the true face of
India; the pettiness and weakness of some, the greatness and strength of
others. Against the darkness of disaster, it outlined and highlighted the
unity and quality of the Indian people. The Chinese invasion was not
merely for the purpose of territorial gains, but reflects a basic conflict of
ideology. In the eyes of the world, India stands for certain values and
ideals.
India and China have opted opposite paths to solve their
problems. India has chosen the way of persuasion, cooperation and the
active participation of her people. By contrast, China’s path is one of
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compulsion and coercion where all activities, even in the literary and
artistic fields, is directed and controlled by the State.”
Sino-Pak Agreement
Chinese leadership knew that the western part of Pak-held Kashmir
provided an outlet to the border with the Chinese province of Sinkiang along a
strip, about 500 km. long.
Pakistan had no common border with China till it
forcibly occupied the western part of Kashmir. The Peking leadership entered
into a vicious understanding with the leadership of Pakistan.
In January 1961,
the foreign minister of Pakistan announced that his country had proposed to
China to draw a line of demarcation between the two countries because the
Chinese maps had shown 4,000 to 6,000 sq. miles of territory in Kashmir within
the bounds of China.
In May 1962, China and Pakistan simultaneously
announced the forthcoming talks between the two countries on the question of
the demarcation of boundary through Pak-held Kashmir.
The Government of India lodged its protest on 10th May 1962 and
said that these bilateral talks were ill-motivated because there was no existing
common frontier between the two. What was being negotiated by Pakistan was
Indian territory in Kashmir which was under illegal occupation of Pakistan. India
also objected to the interference by China into the sovereignty of India.21
On 3rd May 1962, the Governments of Pakistan and China issued a
joint communique to carry on mutual negotiations. Negotiations for what? Not to
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settle any territorial dispute as there was none but to change the status of
Jammu & Kashmir with a view to submit certain parts of Pak-held Kashmir to
China. The two aggressors - China and Pakistan - had agreed to enter into
bilateral talks over a territory over which none of them had any right to negotiate.
Neither China nor Pakistan had any right to negotiate Indian
territory in Kashmir as none of them had any locus standi in the matter. Both
were aliens to this territory.
It is a fact that Pakistan is an aggressor in the
Kashmir territory held by it by force since 1947. This position is too well-known
to be elaborated but what surprised everybody was the attitude of China to
extend its support to Pakistan on the question of Kashmir knowing it fully well
that its stand on Kashmir had no judicial basis nor it could be supported by facts
but since China itself is an aggressor on the Indian territory, its support to
another aggressor meets the common intentions of both of them.
India’s representative in the Security Council, V.K.Krishna Menon,
told the Security Council on 3 May 1962:
“Pakistan has nevertheless sought to negotiate Kashmir’s border
with Siakiang with the Government of China. We say categorically
that Pakistan has no authority to barter away or negotiate any part
of Indian territory and any agreement Pakistan may reach with
anybody else would have no value in our eyes”.
On 2nd March 1963, a Sino-Pak agreement was concluded and
Pakistan handed over to China 2,100 sq. miles of Indian territory in Pak held
83
Kashmir.
This was not only a highly provocative action but also a hostile act
which was blatantly aggressive and condemnable.
In this way, China illegally occupied 14,100 sq. miles of Indian
territory both by means of aggression in 1962 and as a result of the Sino-Pak
agreement of 1963.
In all the joint communiques issued by China and Pakistan at the
conclusion of their ‘friendly visits' to either country, there has been a pointed
reference always to the question of Kashmir, with China’s support of Pakistan’s
claim over Kashmir. China also did not recognise Sikkim as a part of India and in
the earlier maps published by China, Sikkim was shown to be an area outside
the territorial jurisdiction of India while Jammu & Kashmir was shown as ‘disputed
area’. The Chinese maps also showed many parts of India forming part of the
Chinese territory.
The 2,100 sq. miles territory in Pak held Kashmir which was ceded
by Pakistan to China in 1963 lies in the strategic area near USSR, Afghanistan
and China.
The Chinese have built a network of strategic roads in this area
linking China directly with Pakistan. Pakistan has ceded this territory to China as
a result of a tacit understanding between the two that China will support
Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir in lieu of China’s ‘occupations’ over the ceded
territory.
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China supports Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir for another reason.
Kashmir lies close to the international boundary of China, USSR, Afghanistan
and Pakistan. In 1959, the Chinese ambassador in New Delhi told the foreign
secretary of India: “India could not afford to have two fronts against China.”
Obviously, the Chinese ambassador was hinting at the collusion between China
and Pakistan against India.
In a note on 31st May 1962, Peking went to the extent of telling a
blatant lie that China had never recognised Indian sovereignty over Kashmir.
The note also said that the preliminary agreement with Pakistan in no way
affected the question as to whom Kashmir belonged to.
The Sino-Pak talks began on 12th October 1962. At the beginning
of the talks, the territory claimed by the two sides was 3,400 sq. miles which, at
the time of concluding the talks, was reduced to 2,100 sq. miles, including the
Shakegan Muztag valley area.
On 22nd February 1963, the Joint Boundary Commission reported
complete agreement between China and Pakistan on the location and course of
the frontier between the two countries. On 2nd March 1963, the Sino-Pak frontier
agreement was signed.22
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Strategic Roads
Having entered into a frontier agreement with Pakistan, the Peking
government started building strategic roads in the high mountainous regions
such as the Karakoram Road linking Siakiang with Pak-held Kashmir.
In 1968, China built a link road through Gilgit and Hunza connecting
Kashgar in China with Muzaffarabad in Pakistan.
The Chinese have built
another link road through the Khunjerab pass in the Himalayan ranges which
passes along Qila Nabi and joins at Morkhun and then goes along Hunza and
Gilgit down to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan.
Another link-road measuring 800 km. was built by China in 1978,
linking western Tibet with Islamabad in Pakistan through the Karakoram pass.
This road also extends upto Kashgar through the Havelian rail road which
reaches 60 km. north of Islamabad.
The Chinese had concentrated their military activities in the territory
which they have illegally occupied after the Sino-Pak agreement on the ceded
territory in Pak-held Kashmir.
The Aksai-chin area over which Chinese
aggression is still continuing since 1962, has been linked up with the ceded
territory through the Karakoram pass.
The building of these strategic roads was not meant to improve
civilian transport system and land communication between them because the
86
population of this area is very sparse and requires practically very little
movement.
These areas have no industrial complex nor any trading activity is
possible which may require an extensive transport system. In spite of this, China
has spent hundred of crores of dollars on the construction of these roads at the
expense of the already poor economic conditions of its own people. Why had
China chosen to be so liberal to the Himalayan ranges by making them
accessible by road links everywhere?
It is clear that the Chinese have
developed an important military base at Kashgar which was the feeding centre
for Chinese military manoeuvers against neighbouring countries like India,
Afghanistan and the erstwhile USSR.
China also wants to perpetuate its
aggression on Indian territory through a network of roads which are a vital part of
the logistical support system of arms and transportation. In addition, the Chinese
were maintaining regular army units all along these strategic roads under the
garb of ‘road maintenance workers’, who, in fact, are enlisted in the regular
Chinese army.
China also made it possible for itself to have an access to the
Indian ocean ports. US warships are already prowling in the Indian Ocean and
one cannot rule out the possibility of Chinese military assistance to American
moves in case of any flare-up involving the littoral states around the Indian
Ocean who have refused to line up with the Sino-US policy in Asia.
There is not a single incident which can prove that the policy of the
Peking leadership has not been based on sheer opportunism and opportunistic
87
alliances. The Government of India made its stand clear in Parliament on 22nd
June 1969:
“The entire alignment of the road runs in the Indian territory which is
presently under the illegal and forcible occupation of Pakistan. We have
lodged emphatic protests with Pakistan and China over the building of this
military road in Indian territory and pointed out that it is a threat to peace
and tranquility of the region.
Throughout the last two decades, Peking’s attitude had been to
incite Pakistan to wage a war against India.
That Peking's non-recognition of
Sikkim as a part of India was evident from Chinese maps showing Sikkim as
Chinese territory.
The Peking leadership was talking about a package deal to settle
the ‘border-dispute’ with India.
Although no official Chinese version was
available on this point, the package deal came to light when Subramaniam
Swamy, an emissary of the Janata Party, visited China during the Janata regime.
His visit was followed by an official mission to China by the then Foreign Minister,
Atal Behari Vajpayee. Subramaniam Swamy said that China was prepared for a
negotiated settlement with India in which China would agree to ‘hand over
Chumbey valley to India in lieu of the Aksai-chin area which China was
occupying since 1962’. This ‘package deal’ was an absurd idea which did not
have the support of the Indian people. The people asserted that the sovereignty
of India was not negotiable and that no government had the right to cede any
territory of the Indian Union.
There is no doubt that the Chumbey valley has
88
great strategic importance for the defence of India as it lies between Sikkim and
Bhutan but the question of bartering away Indian territory would be treacherous
in as much as the territory being negotiated also forms part of India and has been
illegally and forcibly occupied by China.
Subramaniam Swamy went on a ‘holy mission’ to Kailash and
Manasasarovar, the ancient places of pilgrimage for the Hindus. The mere fact
that the Chinese government has agreed to allow Indian pilgrims to visit these
places does not mean that China has vacated aggression from Indian soil. A few
visits of pilgrims does not indicate any marked change in China’s foreign policy
towards India. Although Kailash and Mansarovar are holy places for the Hindus,
India has not made any territorial claims on these areas.
Overview
The foreign policy of China is to be seen in the context of its
permanent attitude towards its neighbours. What China claims to be its policy of
‘liberalization’ is in fact nothing more than rope-dancing.
towards China is very clear.
The Indian attitude
India has no territorial claims against it.
It has
neither interfered nor has any intention to interfere in the internal affairs of China.
India is not opposed to the normalization of relations between the two countries
but China must respect India’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. It is
the Peking leadership that has to assure good conduct and, as a first step, to
unconditionally vacate its aggression from Indian territory. It has also to reverse
89
its hostile policy against India and to accept the reality that Kashmir and Sikkim
are integral parts of India.
After paying glowing tributes to the role of India for peace, the
Chinese leadership did a quick political somersault and became hostile to India.
The Chinese attack on India did not come all of a sudden. Behind it, there was
thirteen years of aggressive activity of China in which the Chinese government
was fully involved. It began with the publication of wrong maps in which China
laid territorial claims against India.
On 24th August 1960, China accused India of using Sikkimese
territory for alleged violation of Chinese territory.
On 16 January 1961, China
alleged encroachment into Chinese territory by Indian troops near Nathu La. It
was an imaginary charge and a pretext to justify the deployment of large
segments of the Chinese army all along the Sikkim border.
It was the Chinese leadership that caused this breach. The Indian
leadership throughout remained sincere in its efforts to have peace with China.
The people of India were hopeful that better sense would prevail upon the
Chinese leadership to change its attitude of hostility and belligerence towards
India.
The
Chinese
attitude
towards
its
neighbour
caused
great
disillusionment. The Peking leadership maintained its aggressive posture on one
90
side and, on the other, continued to cover their designs under the cloak of
diplomacy and deception. The new leadership of China, instead of devoting itself
to the urgent task of solving the economic problems of its people, diverted a
major part of its national resources to militarise the country.
Thus, it was the story of the great betrayal by China in shattering
the hopes of millions of people who had hoped that after the emergence of the
People’s Republic of China, its leaders - who claimed to be the revolutionary would choose a path that would be a departure from theGreat Han chauvinistic
and obscurantist attitude.
But this hope was belied. The consequence of the
Sino-lndian war of 1962 and the stalemate in Sino-lndian dialogue is discussed
in the next chapter.
91
References:
1) Jain R.K.(ed.) China- South Asian Relations 1947-1980, Vol.l, New Delhi:
Radiant, 1981, P.3.
2)
Ibid.
3)
Ibid.
4) John Lail, Aksai Chin and Sino-lndian Conflict. New Delhi: Allied, 1988,
P.232.
5) Jain R.K., Op.cit., P.61, Ratified by both the Governments on June 3, 1954.
6)
Chakravorthy P.C., India-China Relations, Calcutta: 1961, P.56.
7)
Daljit Sen Adel; ‘China and Her Neighbours’, New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1984,
PP.22-23.
8)
Bajpai V.S., ‘India and its Neighbourhood’ New Delhi: Lancer, 1986, P.113.
9)
Extracts of Chou En-lai’s Statement at a Press Conference in New Delhi on
June 27, 1954, Jain R.K., Op.cit., P.72.
10) Daljit Sen Adel., Op.cit., P.26.
11)Dalvi, J.P., Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to Sino-lndian War of
1962. New Delhi: Thacker, 1969, P.115.
12) India, Ministry of External Affairs, Notes, Memorandum and Letters
Exchanged between Government of India and China, White paper - I, P.51.
13) Ibid., PP.52-4.
14) Ibid., PP.55-7.
15) John W. Garner, Protracted contest: Sino-lndian Rivalry in the Twentieth
Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001, P.42.
16) Daljit Sen, Op.cit., p.261.
17) Ibid., p.261.
92
18) Hoffman Steven, India and the China crisis, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1980, p.14.
19) Ibid., p.28.
20) Daljit Sen., Op.cit., P.39.
21) Ibid., p.42.
22) Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, China and India Cooperation or conflict. New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003, PP. 19-20.
23) Daljit Sen, Op.cit., p.47.
93