China and the United States in the Korean
Reunification Process
Samuel S. Kim
Columbia University
The Reunification-cum-ColIapse Scenario Revisited
F o r the first time since the K o r e a n War, and particularly in the
w a k e of G e r m a n reunification, the question of K o r e a n reunification has
generated a flurry of debate both inside and outside Korea, but usually
with m o r e heat than light. With N o r t h K o r e a constantly back in the
n e w s as East A s i a ' s t i m e - b o m b , seemingly ripe for implosion or
explosion, prospects for K o r e a n reunification have quickly b e c o m e
conflated w i t h the question of the future of N o r t h K o r e a — w h e t h e r it
will survive or will collapse, slowly or suddenly.
T h e popularity of this reunification-cum-collapse scenario has been
evident not o n l y in a c a d e m i c circles but also in the policy c o m m u n i t i e s
of s o m e neighboring states. W h e n N o r t h Korean Leader K i m II Sung
died in July 1994, m a n y predicted that the hermit k i n g d o m w o u l d
collapse within six m o n t h s or in no m o r e than three years, a c c o m p a n i e d
by a German-style reunification by absorption. South Korean President
K i m Y o u n g Sam j u m p e d on the collapsist b a n d w a g o n w h e n he depicted
N o r t h K o r e a as a "broken a i r p l a n e " headed for a crash landing that
w o u l d be followed by a quick reunification. T h e specter of collapse has
even p r o m p t e d behind-the-scenes efforts by the U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of
Defense to coordinate contingency planning with South K o r e a n and
Japanese allies. At a s u m m i t m e e t i n g held on Cheju Island in April
1996, leaders of South K o r e a and t h e United States j o i n t l y agreed to
p r o m o t e a two-plus-two formula—the Four-Party Peace Talks, with the
t w o K o r e a s , China, and the United States—even as they privately
predicted that the collapse in the N o r t h could c o m e as soon as t w o or
three years. Indeed, such a dichotomist endism debate, with m a n y
pundits selecting "soft" or " h a r d " landings and "collapse" or " m u d d l i n g
t h r o u g h " as quick and easy choices in the forum on the future of N o r t h
Korea, has b e c o m e a favorite sport that almost anyone, including N o r t h
K o r e a ' s elite defectors in South Korea, can play.
1
2
Despite the h y p e about an impending collapse, the shape of things
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
29
to c o m e in post-Kim II Sung N o r t h Korea is far from certain or
predetermined. M u c h of the collapsist debate has been m a r r e d by
tenuous on-the-fly speculation, by ideological p o l e m i c s and
presuppositions, by inattention to the full range of available empirical
evidence and policy options, and above all by the "level of a n a l y s i s "
problem. There has been too m u c h undisciplined speculation about the
collapse, without prior delineation of any specifics such as w h a t will
actually collapse, w h e n , how, and with w h a t consequences. T h e s e
speculations have erred in (1) treating "state," " s y s t e m , " and " r e g i m e "
synonymously, (2) overstating the importance of domestic factors at the
e x p e n s e of external factors, (3) confusing underlying causes with
surface symptoms, and (4) underplaying crucial "intervening variables"
b e t w e e n system inputs and system outputs.
3
M o s t collapsist a r g u m e n t s c o m m i t the fallacy of premature
e c o n o m i c reductionism, based on the misleading equation of e c o n o m i c
b r e a k d o w n with system collapse or with the collapse of the N o r t h
K o r e a n state itself. T h e m u c h publicized collapse of the Soviet U n i o n
w a s simply its collapse as a s u p e r p o w e r and as a system, not its
d i s a p p e a r a n c e as a "state-turned-into Russia." As R o b e r t Legvold
argues, the collapse of the Soviet U n i o n " w a s less the disintegration of
a state than the decolonization of the last e m p i r e . " Furthermore, m a n y
e x t r e m e l y poor developing (Fourth W o r l d ) countries limp through
sluggish or even negative rates of e c o n o m i c growth despite r a m p a n t
bureaucratic corruption, ineffective or divided leadership, and e n d e m i c
social unrest, without the kind of totalitarian control m e c h a n i s m s N o r t h
K o r e a e m p l o y s . Despite these failings, these countries do not collapse,
let alone disappear, because social unrest and political opposition do
not o v e r w h e l m the repressive forces of the state or its coping
m e c h a n i s m s . Of course, the collapse of the N o r t h K o r e a n e c o n o m y
could trigger the demise or replacement of the regime, w h i c h could in
turn trigger the demise and replacement of the system. B u t both in
theory and practice, collapse at the highest level entails the collapse of
the state. The state is m o s t resilient, however, often surviving the
collapse of the e c o n o m y , the regime, and even the system.
4
W h a t is needed here is a m o r e d y n a m i c , process-oriented
conception of several possible future scenarios, including (1) status quo
of neither peace nor war, (2) peaceful coexistence, (3) collapse-cumabsorption, (4) conflict escalation, and (5) reunification. In this essay
I take as a point of departure that there are a variety of w h a t French
futurist Bertrand de Jouvenal calls "futuribles" (possible futures), each
of which seems compelling without being c o m p r e h e n s i v e from a
particular perspective, and furthermore that the either/or endism debate
needs to be enriched by the appreciation that the future of K o r e a n
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International Journal of K o r e a n Studies • Volume VI, Number 1
reunification is not providentially predetermined but rather a product of
selective h u m a n behavior. There are at least four futurible reunification
scenarios—reunification via force, via negotiations, via capitulation,
and via collapse. These futurible scenarios should not be viewed as
m u t u a l l y exclusive, as one can flow into another.
6
T h e difficulties of predicting K o r e a n reunification as a single event
rather than as a long-term process are directly connected to the
challenge of prognosticating the future of the post-Kim II Sung system,
since any c o u n t r y ' s future will be significantly affected by the
structures of regional and global politics that prevail. This is especially
the case for N o r t h Korea, as a small state sandwiched in the strategic
N o r t h e a s t A s i a n crossroads w h e r e the United States, China, Russia, and
Japan uneasily meet and interact. Paradoxically, the uncertainty of
N o r t h K o r e a ' s future permits s o m e h o p e and s o m e room for alternative
policy choices in Seoul, Washington, T o k y o , Beijing, and M o s c o w that
w o u l d steer t h e post-Kim II Sung system and its future in a preferred
direction.
T h e roles of C h i n a and the United States are of crucial importance
in this respect. W h i l e the reunification process is for the t w o K o r e a s to
m a k e or u n m a k e , China and the United States by dint of w h a t they are
and w h a t they do can transform both the context and the conditions
under w h i c h any given reunification scenario can be impeded or
facilitated. T h e K o r e a n Peninsula is w i d e l y regarded as the last
r e m a i n i n g Cold W a r glacier. E v e n today, almost half a century after the
K o r e a n W a r " e n d e d " with an armistice accord, the so-called
demilitarized zone ( D M Z ) remains the m o s t heavily fortified conflict
z o n e in t h e post-Cold W a r world, w h e r e m o r e than 1.8 million military
personnel confront each other, a r m e d to t h e teeth with the latest
w e a p o n s systems. Consider as well the continuing, if s o m e w h a t
dilapidated, Cold W a r alliance systems linking the t w o Koreas, China,
and the United States in the bilateralized regional security complex.
T h e Korean Peninsula has the dubious distinction of being t h e only
conflict zone buttressed by the t w o c o m p e t i n g Cold W a r alliance
systems. N o r t h K o r e a is the one and only country with which China
" m a i n t a i n s " its 1961 C o l d - W a r alliance p a c t — w h e t h e r in n a m e or in
p r a c t i c e — w h i l e the U . S . - R O K alliance codified through the 1953
M u t u a l Defense Treaty seems to have stood the test of time. As a result,
t h e shape of inter-Korean life to c o m e is closely keyed to the state of
S i n o - A m e r i c a n relations, which will in turn impact upon and shape the
future of the e m e r g i n g Northeast Asian order. A n d yet, in the absence
of the East-West conflict, the relations between the world's lone
superpower, with its c r e e p i n g unilateralism, and the world's m o s t
p o p u l o u s country, with its rooted exceptionalism, have b e c o m e the
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
31
single greatest source of uncertainty in the shaping of the future of the
Korean Peninsula.
The Shifting Role of China
Despite the lack of consensus on C h i n a ' s great p o w e r status or on
the feasibility and desirability of various e n g a g e m e n t or c o n t a i n m e n t
strategies to m a n a g e the rise of C h i n e s e p o w e r through balancing,
b a n d w a g o n i n g , capitulating, or ignoring, there is no m i s t a k i n g the
importance of the P e o p l e ' s Republic of C h i n a ( P R C ) in post-Cold W a r
K o r e a n Peninsula affairs. Even s o m e of the harshest critics of the riseof-China thesis admit that "only on the Korean Peninsula do C h i n a ' s
capacities seriously affect U . S . p o l i c y . "
7
8
Consider C h i n a ' s sources of p o w e r and influence in Korean affairs:
1) d e m o g r a p h i c weight: it is the w o r l d ' s m o s t populous country (fiftynine t i m e s the population of N o r t h K o r e a and nineteen t i m e s the
population of the t w o Koreas); 2) continental size (the w o r l d ' s second
largest, and forty-four times the size of the Korean Peninsula) and
territorial contiguity, sharing with N o r t h K o r e a a border s o m e 1,416
kilometers long, across almost the entire northern stretch of the K o r e a n
Peninsula; 3) military capability that is steadily being modernized, with
the w o r l d ' s largest armed forces (2.94 million troops in active service)
and the w o r l d ' s third-largest nuclear w e a p o n s arsenal after the United
States and Russia; 4) veto p o w e r in the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Security
Council; 5) new economic status as the w o r l d ' s second-largest e c o n o m y
(with 2 0 0 0 gross national income at $4,966 billion, m e a s u r e d at
purchasing-power parity); and 6) traditional Confucian cultural
influence with strong historical roots.
9
N o t surprisingly, Chinese strategic thinkers and analysts regard the
K o r e a n Peninsula as a vital strategic shield as well as t h e "core
p r o b l e m " (hexin wenti) of Northeast Asian s e c u r i t y . Chinese leaders,
including President Jiang Z e m i n , have stated on m a n y occasions that
without peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula there can be no
genuine p e a c e and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. E v e n the
looming conflicts in the South China S e a — a flashpoint in the AsiaPacific region w h e r e no less than six states including C h i n a h a v e
c o m p e t i n g jurisdictional claims over the potentially oil-rich Spratly
I s l a n d s — p a l e in comparison to the potential escalation of military
tensions and political instability on the K o r e a n Peninsula.
The
d y n a m i c Northeast Asian political e c o n o m y and an imploding N o r t h
Korean e c o n o m y have also c o m b i n e d to m a k e the Korean P e n i n s u l a
one of the central g e o e c o n o m i c concerns of Chinese foreign policy.
B e c a u s e the Korean Peninsula is also generally perceived as one of
the persistently dangerous flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region,
10
11
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International Journal of K o r e a n Studies • Volume VI, Number 1
China's K o r e a policy is closely intertwined with its regional and global
policy. W i t h o u t Chinese support or at least acquiescence, the c o m b i n e d
i m p a c t of policy initiatives s t e m m i n g from President Kim D a e J u n g ' s
" s u n s h i n e p o l i c y " and the currently stalled Four-Party Talks in G e n e v a
is likely to r e m a i n rather m i n i m a l . Of the four major p o w e r s that h a v e
b e e n entangled in K o r e a n affairs during and since the C o l d W a r era,
Beijing t o d a y is the only p o w e r with a full-fledged and
m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l t w o - K o r e a policy.
T h e w i d e n i n g and deepening systemic crisis that reflects and
amplifies the G D P decline since 1990 and the critical shortages of food,
energy, hard currency, and n e w i d e a s has had far-reaching ramifications
for political stability and even r e g i m e survival. As a result, the
possibility of K o r e a n reunification by Southern absorption or by system
collapse in the N o r t h h a s found its w a y into C h i n a ' s foreign policy
approach.
N o n e t h e l e s s , it is important to recognize that China's thinking on
K o r e a n reunification, far from b e i n g cast in stone, evolves with the
C h i n e s e domestic, N o r t h e a s t A s i a n regional, and global situation,
including perhaps m o s t importantly a n y changes in S i n o - A m e r i c a n
relations. In 1993 C h e n Q i m a o , a leading scholar and former president
of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, stated C h i n a ' s
position on the K o r e a n unification issue in the following t e r m s :
C h i n a supports President K i m II Sung's plan to reunify
N o r t h and South K o r e a in a Confederal R e p u b l i c of K o r y o
u n d e r the principle o f "one country, o n e nation; t w o
systems, t w o g o v e r n m e n t s . " T h i s is n o t only b e c a u s e of
China's traditional friendship with N o r t h K o r e a but also
b e c a u s e the C h i n e s e leadership believes this policy m e e t s
the current situation of K o r e a a n d supports K o r e a ' s national
interest as well as t h e p e a c e a n d stability of the region. By
contrast, a dramatic change—which w o u l d be v e r y
d a n g e r o u s a n d c o u l d easily turn into a conflict, even a
' w a r — w o u l d be a disaster for t h e K o r e a n nation. Further, it
w o u l d threaten n o t only China's security but t h e security of
t h e entire Asia-Pacific region a n d even the w o r l d as w e l l .
12
C h i n a n o w w a n t e d t o h a v e K o r e a n unification both w a y s ,
supporting the peaceful coexistence of the t w o Koreas u n d e r K i m II
Sung's "Confederal" formula but also opposing a n y "dramatic c h a n g e "
(i.e., G e r m a n - s t y l e reunification). This w a s seen as the m o s t feasible
w a y to m a i n t a i n p e a c e and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
A major 1995 survey of fifty K o r e a n i s t s — f i v e each from the
U n i t e d States, Japan, China, Russia, and G e r m a n y , and twenty-five
International J o u r n a l of K o r e a n Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
33
from South K o r e a — s h o w e d there w a s general agreement that K o r e a n
reunification w o u l d eventually occur, with 2.1 p e r c e n t of the
respondents predicting that it w o u l d occur within one year ( 1 9 9 6 ) ; 8.3
percent before 2 0 0 0 ; 29.2 percent in 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 5 ; 20.8 percent in 2 0 0 6 2 0 1 0 ; 16.7 percent in 2 0 1 1 - 2 0 1 0 ; and 16.3 percent after 2 0 1 5 . T h a t is,
half predicted that Korean reunification w o u l d occur during the first
decade of the twenty-first century. Tellingly, as shown in T a b l e 1
below, the United States and C h i n a occupy opposite extremes on
Korean reunification with 66 percent of A m e r i c a n respondents
expressing support for Korean reunification c o m p a r e d to o n l y 22
percent of Chinese r e s p o n d e n t s . A m o r e recent survey found that "the
Chinese tended to be m o s t conservative about [Korean] unification, in
the h o p e that the status quo could be m a i n t a i n e d for a considerable
period o f t i m e . "
13
14
Table 1. Experts' Views of Where the Big Four Stand on
Korean Reunification
Slight
Support
Slight
Objection
Strong
Objection
Neutral
Strong
Support
38%
28%
12%
22%
0%
Japan
8%
18%
28%
36%
10%
China
8%
14%
22%
32%
24%
Russia
14%
12%
40%
30%
4%
United
States
Source: Lee Young-sun, "Is Korean Reunification Possible?" Korea Focus 3:3 (May-June 1995):
13.
Despite C h i n a ' s lip service to reunification, the central challenge
of p o s t - M a o foreign policy w a s and remains creation of a congenial
external environment, especially in Northeast Asia, for its accelerated
m a r c h to great-powerdom. By m i d - 1 9 9 4 , w h e n K i m II Sung suddenly
died, P y o n g y a n g ' s reunification policy had turned into a kind of habitdriven trumpery, devoid of substantive r e l e v a n c e . T h e real issue for
P y o n g y a n g — a n d for Beij i n g — w a s h o w to avert system collapse, which
would threaten not only the survival of the N o r t h K o r e a n state but also
C h i n a ' s security environment. With the balance of national strength
having already shifted decisively in favor of South Korea, thus
enhancing the prospects for reunification by absorption, one of
B e i j i n g ' s central strategic goals has b e c o m e strengthening its ties with
15
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International Journal of K o r e a n Studies • Volume VI, Number 1
t h e w e a k e r North, albeit in a cost-effective way.
B e i j i n g ' s opposition to the reunification-by-absorption scenario has
also b e e n heightened by its perception of U . S . strategy. " T o put it
bluntly," o n e pro-China n e w s p a p e r in H o n g K o n g wrote, "the United
States w a n t s to use this chance to t o p p l e the D P R K , and this is a
c o m p o n e n t of U . S . strategy to carry out peaceful evolution [heping
yanbian] in the socialist countries." Accordingly, t h e United States
"will practice a strategy of destruction against N o r t h K o r e a . . . with the
aim of enabling South K o r e a to g o b b l e up N o r t h Korea, like W e s t
G e r m a n y gobbling up East G e r m a n y . " Such a perceived strategy posed
not only an ideological challenge to C h i n a but, m o r e importantly, a
strategic threat since " C h i n a regards the Korean region as an important
buffer z o n e b e t w e e n C h i n a and t h e United S t a t e s . "
16
Given its realpolitik perspective and security concerns, there are
other reasons Beijing takes a skeptical v i e w of Korean reunification. It
is hardly surprising that p o s t - T i a n a n m e n China assesses the global and
regional situation in t e r m s of impact on threats to the regime, both
internal and from the near abroad. Of particular concern to C h i n a is that
local and ethnonational conflicts, previously o v e r s h a d o w e d by
s u p e r p o w e r rivalry, are breaking out throughout the world. N o w that
the threat of direct military invasion has subsided, C h i n a too is plagued
by ethnic separatism and b o r d e r disputes, and " h y p e r n a t i o n a l i s m "
(jiduan minzuzhuyi) has m a d e extensive inroads a m o n g China's
s e p a r a t i s t s . F r o m t h e perspective of Beijing, a "concerted W e s t e r n
plot to w e a k e n C h i n a " is said to be another w a y of playing upon such
internal divisions and serves as a m o r e serious challenge to t h e P R C
t h a n does global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
The point here is that a united
K o r e a w o u l d add m o r e Chosunjok (ethnic K o r e a n ) fuel to C h i n a ' s
ethnonational conflict, especially in the Yanbian K o r e a n A u t o n o m o u s
Prefecture {Yanbian Chaoxian Zizhiqu) in Jilin Province, w h i c h
constitutes K o r e a ' s largest Diaspora.
17
18
F r o m 1995 to 1997, a n e w round of Sino-American conflict
introduced a highly charged nationalistic prism through which to
redefine both the evolving security situation on the Korean Peninsula
and A m e r i c a ' s K o r e a policy. Situated at the center of N o r t h e a s t Asia,
t h e K o r e a n Peninsula w a s seen as the site w h e r e the four Great P o w e r s
w e r e aggressively p u s h i n g their contending strategic plans. F r o m t h e
Chinese standpoint, Japan viewed a unified K o r e a as a great threat to
its o w n military and e c o n o m i c security and w a s therefore aggressively
involving itself in the K o r e a n question in order to arrest t h e continuing
strategic imbalance b e t w e e n the t w o Koreas. Russia, too, w a s trying
hard to get b a c k into the g a m e in order to curb the growing influence
of the other major p o w e r s , n a m e l y the United States, C h i n a , and
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
35
especially Japan. T h e United States w a s singled out as e y e i n g the other
three p o w e r s as threats to its h e g e m o n i c position. T h e importance that
the United States had attached to the K o r e a n Peninsula had to do w i t h
containing China, Russia, and Japan by gearing up its military presence
and strengthening its security ties with South Korea. T h e ultimate goal
w o u l d be to put N o r t h K o r e a on America's strategic track in order to
create a united K o r e a with an American-style political system.
C o n s e q u e n t l y China, faute de mieux, had to r e s p o n d to this o m i n o u s
situation by stepping up its influence on the K o r e a n Peninsula. C h i n a
and N o r t h Korea are said to be t w o good neighbors w h o still enjoy
strategic relations as close as "lips and teeth," in contrast to S i n o - R O K
e c o n o m i c relations. H e n c e China saw itself in a u n i q u e position to
check the Great Powers' expansionism and A m e r i c a n h e g e m o n i s m in
this region, considered to be China's vital strategic shield, and to
safeguard effectively the peace and stability in Northeast A s i a .
19
With the i m p r o v e m e n t of Sino-American relations since 1997, such
anti-American assessments of the K o r e a n situation have subsided,
especially in the w a k e of President Jiang Z e m i n ' s state visit to the
United States. C h a n g e s also occurred in the policies of all peripheral
players in 1996 and 1997, especially on the part of the United States.
Probably reflecting a shift in A m e r i c a ' s N o r t h K o r e a policy from
deterrence to "deterrence plus"—a policy of conditional
e n g a g e m e n t — t h e United States w a s said to h a v e adopted a
"coordinating and mediating attitude" instead of taking a concerted
united-front position with its South Korean a l l y .
20
T h e K o s o v o w a r m a r k e d another turning point in S i n o - A m e r i c a n
relations, serving this t i m e as the p r o x i m a t e catalyst for setting in
m o t i o n the process of repairing the strained relationship with N o r t h
Korea. In the w a k e of a rapid succession of seemingly threatening
d e v e l o p m e n t s in the late 1990s—the n e w Guidelines for U.S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation and the growing U.S.-Japan cooperation in t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t of the theater missile defense ( T M D ) system, the
U . S . / N A T O air w a r against Yugoslavia, and the accidental A m e r i c a n
b o m b i n g of the Chinese e m b a s s y in B e l g r a d e — C h i n a ' s relations with
the United States in the military and security realm have been fraught
once again with w o r s e n i n g threat perceptions, giving rise in C h i n a to
images of an A m e r i c a bent on global h e g e m o n y through the
c o n t a i n m e n t of China. For m a n y Chinese strategic analysts, the K o s o v o
w a r w o u l d establish dangerous precedents of bypassing the UN
Security Council for A m e r i c a n neointerventionism, of lowering the
threshold for the use of force, and of replacing or trampling state
sovereignty as the core principle of international relations. W o r s e yet,
for s o m e Chinese analysts, K o s o v o served as a w a r n i n g that the
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International J o u r n a l of K o r e a n Studies • Volume VI, Number I
struggle for a multipolar world order would n o w last far longer than
previously t h o u g h t — s o m e twenty to thirty years longer—and that
America-led w a r disguised as humanitarian intervention might not be
as r e m o t e from C h i n a ' s h o m e turf as they had previously a s s u m e d .
Moreover, K o s o v o w a s a turning point, according to one Chinese
security analyst, causing "a shift in Chinese thinking on the matter of
tolerance for U . S . forces in Asia. China n o w [felt] surrounded by the
U.S.-Japan and U . S . - R O K a l l i a n c e s . "
21
22
By the same token, K o s o v o triggered alarm in P y o n g y a n g , filling
the N o r t h Korean leadership with a sense of crisis that it, too, could
b e c o m e another Yugoslavia. With the w o r s e n i n g external security
environment, P y o n g y a n g was n o w m o r e determined to build up its
military m u s c l e . K o s o v o also p r o m p t e d P y o n g y a n g to feel the urgent
need to restore and improve its peripheral diplomacy, especially with
Beijing and M o s c o w .
23
With such shared security concerns and fears, C h i n a ' s K o r e a policy
m a d e a subtle readjustment at a t i m e w h e n P y o n g y a n g w a s launching
an unprecedented diplomatic outreach. As a result, Beijing's
displeasure with its unruly socialist ally in the strategic buffer zone w a s
largely put aside as the Chinese leadership began to see the United
States as the m o r e clear and present threat to its own interests in
N o r t h e a s t Asia. In short, both Beijing and P y o n g y a n g w e r e sufficiently
alarmed by A m e r i c a ' s military operation in K o s o v o to bring back the
allied relationship of strategic convenience.
There is far m o r e than meets the public eye in Beijing's status q u o
policy anti-unification stance. Although C h i n a v i e w s N o r t h K o r e a as
maximizing the P R C ' s leverage as a balancer in Northeast Asia politics;
it also genuinely fears that North K o r e a could c o m e to feel cornered
and see no choice but to fight back, triggering a regional war, at
m i n i m u m . Beijing does not doubt that P y o n g y a n g would fight rather
than s u c c u m b to German-style h e g e m o n i c unification. Even if the
system in the North simply collapses, the result is likely to be bloody,
triggering a civil war rather than immediate absorption by the South.
Until at least 1996, unification by Southern absorption w a s
regarded by m a n y Chinese scholars and policymakers as wishful
thinking on the part of Western analysts. With the e c o n o m i c crisis in
North Korea further reflecting and effecting the structural
contradictions within the system, an increasing n u m b e r of Chinese
analysts began to a c k n o w l e d g e the possibility of system collapse, even
if they doubted such a collapse w a s i m m i n e n t . In other w o r d s , not to
think about the unthinkable c a m e to be viewed in 1997 as an exercise
of Chinese wishful thinking. In late October 1997, the Beijing Review,
which toes the party line on every issue, published an unsigned article
24
International Journal of K o r e a n Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
37
in which it offered an unprecedented analysis (and rebuke) of the root
causes of North K o r e a ' s food crisis:
What's more, a heavy military burden is using up much
needed resources. . . . The present military expenditure of
DPRK is US$6 billion, bringing a huge burden to its
economy. For the time being, the U.S., Japan and Republic
of Korea (ROK) are three main forces in the aid of DPRK.
Due to conflicting points of view, however, many political
conditions are attached to the aid process. . . . Ultimately,
it's up to the [North] Korean people themselves to resolve
the grain crisis. It requires spirit and will power to meet the
challenge of such reforms as introducing foreign investment
and opening up, while maintaining a stable political
situation. And Korea needs to be flexible while carrying out
diplomatic policies.
25
Even if we accept the heroic assumption that Korean reunification
will c o m e about peacefully, without igniting a civil war or generating
a massive refugee population, Beijing would still face a w i d e range of
territorial disputes over fisheries and over mineral, oil, and gas deposits
in the Y e l l o w Sea. C h i n a ' s security d i l e m m a today is largely shaped by
the 80 million minorities in the strategically sensitive " a u t o n o m o u s "
regions that comprise roughly 64 percent of Chinese territory. In this
regard, w h a t would a united and nationalistic Korea do about its
territorial claims along the Sino-Korean border and in C h i n a ' s
northeastern provinces, inhabited by the w o r l d ' s largest concentration
of ethnic K o r e a n s ?
Despite the widely shared belief that system collapse in N o r t h
K o r e a is not imminent, s o m e Chinese analysts have given thought to
various futurible scenarios. A c c o r d i n g to one scholar, China's ultimate
concern is not w h o will be the next "Great L e a d e r " in P y o n g y a n g , but
" w h e t h e r the D P R K will remain as a stable and friendly buffer s t a t e . . . .
F r o m Beijing's point of view, although Kim Jr. m a y lose the internal
p o w e r struggle [if it occurs], there should be no reason w h y C h i n a
cannot c o m e out a w i n n e r . "
Another scenario envisions factional infighting in a collapsed North
Korea, with one factional group seeking help from the United States
and/or South K o r e a and another seeking help from China. In such an
event, Eric M c V a d o n writes, based on extensive interviews with
Chinese military officers, "Beijing would reject the appeal and urge
W a s h i n g t o n and Seoul to do the s a m e . "
26
27
As the w o r l d ' s seventh largest e c o n o m y — o r the second-largest
e c o n o m y on a purchasing-power parity basis—with a strong sense of
38
International Journal of Korean Studies • Volume VI, Number I
assertive nationalism, Beijing's fears of a unified Korea b e c o m i n g an
assertive "regional p o w e r " in Northeast Asia are reflected in its
realpolitik approach t o w a r d s the Peninsula. The n e w unified K o r e a
w o u l d lead to a n e w geostrategic landscape in the region, we are told,
fundamentally changing K o r e a ' s foreign relations with the four major
p o w e r s and m a k i n g the " p o w e r struggle and e c o n o m i c competition in
the region m o r e apparent and m o r e i n t e n s e . " S o m e Chinese analysts
h a v e even c o m p a r e d the nationalism of a rising Korea with that of
Japan m o r e than a half century a g o .
28
29
As long as Beijing has profound concerns about the strategic
orientation of a united Korea, particularly as it relates to the U n i t e d
States, m a i n t e n a n c e of the status quo of the t w o Koreas m e a n s
continued Chinese support of the w e a k e r D P R K no matter w h a t the
cost. T h e tradeoff here is that P y o n g y a n g provides an opportunity for
C h i n a to project its great-power identity. As Campbell and Reiss aptly
put it, "if t h e road to P y o n g y a n g r u n s through Beijing, Washington
should expect to be charged a toll. This toll could be quite h i g h . "
30
Ultimately, China is not opposed to Korean reunification, we are
told, p r o v i d e d (1) it c o m e s about gradually and peacefully; (2) it is a
negotiated unification between the t w o Koreas, not a h e g e m o n i c
unification by absorption; and (3) a unified K o r e a does not harm or
threaten China's security or national interests. "China will use her
influence to strive for the peaceful unification of Korea, and to k e e p
unified K o r e a as a friendly, or at best, neutral n e i g h b o r . "
A united
K o r e a w o u l d be expected, moreover, to be drawn within C h i n a ' s
e c o n o m i c and military sphere; China should help shape d e v e l o p m e n t s
in Korea, not m e r e l y follow the lead of the United States and J a p a n . "
In short, C h i n a has b e c o m e and will r e m a i n a critical factor in N o r t h
K o r e a ' s future—whether it will survive or collapse, or, m o r e
accurately, w h e t h e r the trajectory it takes from here to there will be
system-maintaining, system-reforming, system-decaying, or systemcollapsing.
31
32
The Shifting Role of the United States
It is of some historical significance that the U . S . diplomatic
p r e s e n c e on the Korean Peninsula, which started in 1882 with the
signing of a friendship and c o m m e r c e treaty, w a s terminated in 1905 by
a classical imperialistic d e a l — t h e Taft-Katsura a g r e e m e n t — u n d e r
which Japan recognized A m e r i c a ' s dominant interests in the Philippines
in return for U . S . recognition of J a p a n ' s dominant interests in Korea.
Five years later, w h e n Japan transformed its protectorate over Korea
into c o m p l e t e annexation, the United States did not even bother to
protest.
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
39
United States involvement in Korean affairs w a s r e s u m e d in 1945
with the m o s t auspicious set of expectations on the part of the K o r e a n
people. First, the United States w a s perceived as having had no colonial
or imperialistic involvement in K o r e a or elsewhere. Second, the
traditional American values as e m b o d i e d in the Declaration of
I n d e p e n d e n c e and the Wilsonian principle of national selfdetermination captured the national imagination of Koreans and b e c a m e
a legitimizing symbolism for m a n y Korean nationalists. Finally and
m o s t importantly, the United States w a s the leader of the Allied P o w e r s
which had defeated the hatred e n e m y state, Japan. H e n c e , the U n i t e d
States w a s pictured by m a n y Koreans as the national savior with all t h e
goodwill, responsibility, and p r o m i s e that such symbolism entails.
A n d yet, as some argue, the United States bears the h e a v y historical
burden of having engineered the Korean division in 1945. W i t h his eyes
partially shut to the rapidly changing reality on the ground (i.e., Soviet
troops entering and rapidly a d v a n c i n g d o w n the Korean Peninsula in
early A u g u s t 1945) and using Churchillian language, the late G r e g o r y
Henderson wrote in 1974: " N o division of a nation in the present is so
astonishing in its origin as the division of Korea; n o n e is so unrelated
to conditions or sentiment within the nation itself at the t i m e the
division w a s effected; n o n e is to this day so unexplained; in n o n e does
blunder and planning oversight appear to have played so large a role.
Finally, there is no division for w h i c h t h e U . S . g o v e r n m e n t bears so
h e a v y a share of the responsibility as it bears for the division of
K o r e a . " "In North K o r e a and South K o r e a a l i k e , " as Selig Harrison
argues in a similar vein, "it is an article of faith that the United States
deserves the principal b l a m e for the division of the peninsula and thus
has a special responsibility for helping to restore national u n i t y . "
33
34
Herein lies a double paradox. On the one hand, the United States is
perceived and acted upon by m a n y as deserving the principal b l a m e for
the Korean division. On the other hand, as shown in table 1, the United
States stands at the opposite extreme in expressing "strong support" for
Korean reunification. Despite the on-again, off-again, situation-specific
anti-American demonstrations in South Korea, the United States
elicited the highest positive public perception of a national sample of
2,000 South Korean respondents (30.7 percent, c o m p a r e d to 11.0
percent for Russia, 22.6 percent for China, and 17.1 percent for Japan)
in a major multinational citizens' opinion survey that w a s j o i n t l y
sponsored by Tong-a Ilbo (Seoul) and Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo) in late
2 0 0 0 . W h a t the survey shows with disturbing clarity is w h y N o r t h e a s t
Asia has little if any social and psychological foundation to forge truly
cooperative multilateral security institutions. In addition, antiA m e r i c a n i s m in South K o r e a is not as w i d e or deep as s o m e w o u l d
40
International J o u r n a l of K o r e a n Studies • Volume VI, Number I
33
have us b e l i e v e .
During the Cold War, W a s h i n g t o n ' s overall foreign policy as well
as its policy in this important region reflected A m e r i c a ' s antic o m m u n i s m and its focus on "the Soviet threat." The impact of the
Korean W a r ( 1 9 5 0 - 5 3 ) upon national, regional, and global systems
cannot be overemphasized. M o r e than any other postwar international
event, the Korean W a r enacted the rules of the Cold W a r g a m e and
congealed patterns of East-West conflict across East A s i a and b e y o n d .
T h e Korean W a r seems to have crystallized East-West conflict into a
rigid strategic culture dependent on a Manichean vision of stark
bipolarity, the same vision that w a s m a d e evident most recently in
President B u s h ' s triangulation of Iraq, Iran, and North K o r e a as the
charter m e m b e r s of the "axis of evil." It w a s this creed of global antic o m m u n i s m that formed the postwar national symbol system, which in
turn provided the ark and anchor of America's postwar national identity.
It w a s this creed that imposed a m e a s u r e of unity and coherence upon
this region, without any sense of shared cultures and ideologies, via a
series of geopolitical and g e o e c o n o m i c ties stretching from Japan and
South K o r e a to the A S E A N (Association of South East Asian N a t i o n s )
states, Australia, and N e w Zealand.
36
With the end of the Cold W a r and the demise of the Soviet threat,
the United States too had to reformulate its role in the n e w but
uncertain security environment in East Asia. During the first half of the
1990s, the U . S . East Asian security strategy w a s revised three times: in
1990, 1992, and 1995. A 1990 Department of Defense report defined
A m e r i c a ' s role as that of the "regional balancer, honest broker, and
ultimate security guarantor." Even if the Soviet threat w e r e to decline
substantially, the A m e r i c a n military presence in East Asia w o u l d
continue to check the "expansionist regional aspirations" of "second
tier" s t a t e s .
The 1995 report, entitled United States Security Strategy
for the East Asia-Pacific Region, is said to h a v e been designed to
rejuvenate America's leadership strategy, halting the planned reductions
in the region through the end of the decade (i.e., keeping the existing
level of about 100,000 troops in the region, stationed mostly in Japan
and South Korea, for the foreseeable future), reinforcing A m e r i c a n
bilateral alliances in the region with Japan as the linchpin, and
developing regional multilateral security dialogues and m e c h a n i s m s as
a supplement to, not a substitute for, "American alliance leadership" in
the region. Tellingly, all of this is justified as financially cost-effective.
"In fact," as Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. N y e , Jr., the chief
architect of the 1995 report, put it, "because of the host-nation support
provided by Japan and South Korea, it is cheaper to base the forces in
Asia than in the United S t a t e s . "
37
38
International Journal of K o r e a n Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
41
By any reckoning, the United States remains the most powerful
external p o w e r in inter-Korean affairs. In the post-Cold W a r era, the
United States has c o m e to play the rather unusual role of the "honest
b r o k e r " in the resolution of the Korean conflict, without first
dismantling its Cold W a r U.S.-ROK alliance, w i t h o u t addressing the
issue of U . S . troop presence in South Korea, and without normalizing
its relations with N o r t h Korea. Indeed, one of the m o s t striking features
of the great-power politics on the Korean Peninsula is that n o n e of the
three n e i g h b o r i n g p o w e r s has a military presence on the Peninsula.
O n l y the United States, the lone superpower, maintains s o m e 37,000
troops on South Korean soil.
T h e point here seems clear enough. A divided or united K o r e a
w o u l d h a r d l y matter in American foreign policy w e r e it not for three
factors: its strategic location at the vortex of N o r t h e a s t Asian
geopolitics, P y o n g y a n g ' s asymmetrical military capabilities (i.e., W M D
or w e a p o n s of mass destruction), and the clear and continuing danger
of a system or state collapse with destabilizing regional spillovers.
Since the m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , N o r t h K o r e a ' s growing w e a k n e s s and instability,
c o m b i n e d with the dangerous a s y m m e t r y of power on the Korean
Peninsula, has paradoxically set in motion an agonizing reappraisal of
A m e r i c a ' s N o r t h Korea policy. It has b e c o m e increasingly clear that
A m e r i c a ' s deterrence policy alone is no longer sufficient for coping
with the threat of a third k i n d — a North Korean "hard landing" (i.e., a
reunification-via-collapse leading to an absorption of North Korea by
South Korea). A m e r i c a ' s North Korea policy shifted in the late 1990s
from deterrence to "deterrence-plus." The logic of the deterrence-plus
policy, associated with the Perry process, is neither to prop up the North
Korean system nor to seek its collapse, but to p r o m o t e a process of
dialogue and confidence-building relations that m o v e beyond
d e t e r r e n c e . With the deterrence-plus policy has c o m e a shift from a
reactive to a m o r e active role in the m a n a g e m e n t of inter-Korean
affairs. A n d yet it has not been easy to pursue the deterrence-plus
policy because of a m i s m a t c h between desirability and feasibility in t w o
scenarios: the hard landing scenario is the least desirable but most
likely o u t c o m e , while the "soft landing" is the m o s t desirable but least
likely o u t c o m e .
39
40
D o e s W a s h i n g t o n still figure prominently in P y o n g y a n g ' s
calculations, to place the w o r l d ' s lone superpower in the e c o n o m i c and
security role previously played by the Soviet Union and China during
the Cold W a r ? Or has there been a subtle but significant reorientation
in P y o n g y a n g ' s great-power strategy, as showcased in the rejuvenation
of S i n o - D P R K and R u s s i a - D P R K relations since 1999? Is P y o n g y a n g
playing multiple c a r d s — t h e China card, the Russia card, and the U . S .
42
International Journal of K o r e a n Studies • Volume VI, Number 1
card—in the strategic g a m e s of Northeast Asian international relations?
In the post-Cold W a r era, as Robert M a n n i n g argues, the United
States has b e c o m e the focal point of Pyongyang's efforts at r e g i m e
survival, t h e key to e n h a n c e m e n t of international legitimacy, e c o n o m i c
aid, investment and increased trade, and tactical benefits in its relations
with South K o r e a . Indeed, the United States is at once a strategic life
boat, a mortal threat, and a Rorschach test, calling for an ever larger
array and variety of threats (asymmetrical military capabilities) as
bargaining chips as well as for existential deterrence. Y e t the successful
execution of such an America-centric survival strategy has encountered
a host of p r o b l e m s , all s t e m m i n g from the different priorities and
incentive structures that drive each p a r t y ' s respective policies t o w a r d
the other.
41
F o r Washington, the central concern has remained the s a m e : h o w
to deal w i t h P y o n g y a n g ' s asymmetrical threats in an alliance-friendly
and cost-effective way. T h e N o r t h K o r e a policy of the United States, as
t h e lone superpower in the post-Cold W a r era, is shaped by global
concerns (such as m a i n t e n a n c e of the integrity of the Non-Prol iferation
Treaty regime), but also by East Asian regional and U . S . - R O K bilateral
concerns and by fractious partisan politics at h o m e .
C o n t r a r y to the conventional realist w i s d o m , in asymmetrical
negotiations the strong state does not ipso facto exert greater control
than the w e a k state. If a small and w e a k state occupies territory of
strategic importance to a larger and stronger state, or if the "field of
p l a y " is on the w e a k a c t o r ' s h o m e turf (as w a s the case in the U . S . P a n a m a negotiations and British-Iceland Cod W a r s , and as n o w is the
case in U . S . - D P R K asymmetrical negotiations), the w e a k e r state can
display bargaining p o w e r disproportionate to its aggregate structural
p o w e r . P y o n g y a n g ' s proximity to the strategic field of play, its high
stakes, resolve, and control, its relative asymmetrical military
capabilities, and its coercive leverage strategy have all c o m b i n e d to
enable t h e D P R K to exercise bargaining p o w e r disproportionate to its
aggregate structural p o w e r in the U . S . - D P R K a s y m m e t r i c conflict and
negotiations.
42
T h e Clinton administration learned the hard w a y that the United
States had no alternative but to retreat by accepting North K o r e a ' s
p a c k a g e deal proposal that culminated in the 1994 U . S . - D P R K A g r e e d
F r a m e w o r k . Reflecting on his involvement in the e m e r g e n c y national
security m e e t i n g of June 16, 1994, on t h e m o s t serious N o r t h Korean
nuclear b r i n k m a n s h i p crisis of his tenure as Secretary of Defense,
W i l l i a m Perry writes about a third-way option for a negotiated deal in
t h e face of the extremely limited alternatives available to U . S .
p o l i c y m a k e r s : " W e w e r e about to give the president a choice between
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
43
a disastrous o p t i o n — a l l o w i n g N o r t h K o r e a to get a nuclear arsenal,
which we m i g h t h a v e to face s o m e d a y — a n d an unpalatable option,
blocking this development, but thereby risking a destructive nonnuclear
w a r . " Given all the constraints on A m e r i c a ' s issue-specific power, the
rise of a cost-effective foreign policy, and the collapse of a bipartisan
foreign policy consensus in the 1990s, the A g r e e d F r a m e w o r k could be
said to be the worst deal, except that there w a s no better alternative.
43
At the s a m e time, P y o n g y a n g ' s normalization efforts are best seen
as part of a Cold W a r habit of manipulating major p o w e r s to gain
m a x i m u m security and e c o n o m i c benefits. It is b e c o m i n g increasingly
clear that K i m Jong II's a g r e e m e n t to hold the historic inter-Korean
s u m m i t in June 2 0 0 0 w a s a major concession not so m u c h to Seoul as
to W a s h i n g t o n . P y o n g y a n g w a s exploiting the n e w connection with
Seoul to speed up normalization talks w i t h t h e United States and to gain
access to bilateral and multilateral aid and foreign direct i n v e s t m e n t .
Indeed, the second half of 2000 witnessed a flurry of P y o n g y a n g W a s h i n g t o n interactions, including t w o q u a s i - s u m m i t m e e t i n g s — o n e
b e t w e e n President Clinton and V i c e Marshal Jo M y o n g - R o k in
W a s h i n g t o n and another between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
and C h a i r m a n K i m J o n g II in P y o n g y a n g . Despite significant progress
toward a U . S . - D P R K missile accord, at the end of the year P y o n g y a n g
stopped short of diplomatic success, due partly to on-site verification
issues and partly to rapidly changing U . S . political circumstances
b e y o n d its control.
44
T h e presence of 37,000 A m e r i c a n troops on South K o r e a n soil,
coupled with President K i m D a e J u n g ' s public declaration on several
occasions that U . S . troops must, for the sake of peace and security in
N o r t h e a s t Asia, remain even after the t w o K o r e a s are unified, have
b e c o m e symbols of allied credibility, resolve, and c o m m i t m e n t . As
President K i m D a e J u n g has explained, " T h e US forces stationed on the
K o r e a n Peninsula and in Japan are decisive to the m a i n t e n a n c e of p e a c e
and balance of p o w e r not only on the Peninsula but also in N o r t h e a s t
Asia. By the s a m e token, the U . S . forces in E u r o p e are an indispensable
factor for peace and stability of all of E u r o p e . " T h e United States and
South K o r e a have agreed publicly that U . S . forces in K o r e a will r e m a i n
even after the disappearance of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n threat: " T h e US
w e l c o m e s the public statements o f R O K President K i m D a e J u n g
affirming the value of the bilateral alliance and the US military
presence even after reunification of the Korean peninsula. T h e US
strongly agrees that our alliance and military presence will continue to
support stability both on the Korean Peninsula and throughout t h e
region after N o r t h K o r e a is no longer a t h r e a t . "
45
46
Although the United States and South K o r e a share t h e c o m m o n
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International Journal of Korean Studies • Volume VI, Number 1
goal of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, their interests and
strategies are not identical. E v e n under the best of circumstances, it is
not easy to h a r m o n i z e competing global, regional, and bilateral
interests. B u t the demise of the Soviet threat, a c c o m p a n i e d by the rise
of contentious partisan domestic politics—in A m e r i c a n foreign policy
in general and East A s i a policy in particular—has increasingly b e c o m e
a m o v i n g target on turbulent trajectories of competing and m u t u a l l y
conflictive ends and m e a n s . Post-Cold W a r A m e r i c a n foreign policy is
m a r k e d not only by the traditional discrepancy between ends (purposes)
and m e a n s (power), but also by multiple discrepancies between ends
and e n d s — n e o - W i l s o n i a n multilateralism, mercantile realism
( e c o n o m i c nationalism), strategic realism, humanitarianism, and n e o i s o l a t i o n i s t m i n i m a l i s m — a s well a s b e t w e e n m e a n s
and
m e a n s — u n i l a t e r a l i s m , bilateralism, neo-multilateralism (bilateralismcum-multilateralism), and U . S . h e g e m o n i c l e a d e r s h i p .
47
W i t h t h e c o m i n g of the hardline " A B C " (All But Clinton) Bush
administration, it w a s C l i n t o n ' s N o r t h K o r e a policy, not North K o r e a
itself, that first experienced a hard crash landing, with the paradoxical
c o n s e q u e n c e of a r e m a r k a b l e role reversal in the U . S . - R O K alliance
relationship. M o r e than ever before, W a s h i n g t o n ' s and S e o u l ' s N o r t h
K o r e a policies are out of sync with each other. All the same, the Bush
administration has initiated a major paradigm shift in its military and
strategic doctrine from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" model,
better to c o p e with the asymmetrical advantages of its adversaries,
including N o r t h K o r e a . P y o n g y a n g has held W a s h i n g t o n ' s n e w hardline administration hostage to the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue
for m o r e than a y e a r (from early 2001 to m i d - 2 0 0 2 ) . This A m e r i c a centric effort not only breaches the letter and the spirit of the N o r t h South Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000 (Article 1), but also
contradicts N o r t h K o r e a ' s own longstanding party line that K o r e a n
affairs should be handled without foreign intervention or interference.
W i t h the B u s h administration openly threatening to launch a
preemptive military strike against Iraq, one of the three charter
m e m b e r s of the "axis of evil," will N o r t h K o r e a be next on A m e r i c a ' s
hit list?
48
Concluding Remarks
There is no simple answer to the question of h o w long the post-Kim
II Sung system will survive and in w h a t shape or form, b e c a u s e the
interplay of N o r t h K o r e a and the outside world is highly c o m p l e x ,
variegated, and well-nigh unpredictable. W h a t complicates our
understanding of the shape of things to c o m e in North K o r e a is that all
the neighboring countries involved, including C h i n a and the United
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
45
States, h a v e b e c o m e m o v i n g targets on turbulent trajectories of their
respective domestic politics, subject to c o m p e t i n g and often
contradictory pressures.
Still, the interplay of C h i n a and the United States in inter-Korean
affairs leads to an obvious and s o m e w h a t paradoxical conclusion. For
its part, p o s t - T i a n a n m e n C h i n a as a rising p o w e r is arguably a m o r e
influential player than at any time since the Korean War, and m o r e so
than any other peripheral p o w e r in the reshaping of the future of the
Korean Peninsula. For its own geopolitical interests, Beijing has played
a generally positive role in K o r e a n affairs, not only by providing
necessary if insufficient (in P y o n g y a n g ' s eyes) diplomatic and
e c o n o m i c support to the D P R K , but also by m a k i n g it clear to Seoul,
W a s h i n g t o n , and T o k y o that it is n o w in the c o m m o n interest of all to
p r o m o t e the peaceful coexistence of the t w o Korean states on t h e
Peninsula, rather than having to cope with the turmoil, chaos, and even
m a s s i v e e x o d u s of refugees that w o u l d follow in the w a k e of system
collapse in the North. T h u s , Beijing s e e m s determined to m a n a g e the
threat of a N o r t h Korean collapse and t h e costs of regional spillover in
the form of refugees or even a r m e d conflict escalation. W a s h i n g t o n ,
however, is determined to eliminate the threat of P y o n g y a n g ' s
asymmetrical capabilities (weapons of m a s s destruction) once and for
all, even at the risk of igniting armed conflict escalation on the K o r e a n
Peninsula and beyond.
Although Beijing and W a s h i n g t o n today c o m m a n d a rather u n i q u e
position and rather unique influence as holding the key to r e g i m e
survival, the future of N o r t h K o r e a is not for China or the United States
to m a k e or u n m a k e . Both countries can help or hinder N o r t h K o r e a in
taking one system-rescuing approach instead of another, but in the end
no outside p o w e r can determine N o r t h Korea's future and the future of
the K o r e a n Peninsula.
That said, however, we m a y proceed from the premise that the w a y
the outside world, especially Beijing and Washington, responds to
P y o n g y a n g is closely k e y e d to the w a y N o r t h K o r e a responds to the
outside world. To say that N o r t h K o r e a ' s future is unpredictable is to
say 'that its future is m a l l e a b l e , not predetermined. Herein lies the
potential of external factors in the reshaping of N o r t h K o r e a ' s future in
a preferred direction. Such a nondeterministic i m a g e of the future of the
post-Kim II Sung system opens up s o m e space for the outside world to
use whatever leverage it m i g h t have to help North K o r e a n leaders opt
for o n e futurible scenario or another in the c o m i n g years. The j u r y is
still out as to whether post-Kim II S u n g N o r t h K o r e a can ride out its
e c o n o m i c difficulties by m e a n s of a tenuous external life-support
system without forfeiting its juche identity or without a sudden crash
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landing. Final note: to paraphrase Campbell and Reiss, if the long and
b u m p y road to Korean reunification runs through P y o n g y a n g , Beijing
and W a s h i n g t o n should expect to be charged a h e a v y toll.
Notes
1. See Michael Green, "North Korean Regime Crisis: US Perspectives and Responses,"
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 9, no. 2 (Winter 1997): 7; and "North Korea
Collapse Predicted," The Associated Press, March 6, 1997, online.
2. For a wide array of analyses on the future of post-Kim II Sung North Korea and
prospects for Korean reunification, see Nicholas Eberstadt, "North Korea: Reform,
Muddling Through, or Collapse?" NBR Analysis 4, no. 3 (1993): 5-16; idem,
"Hastening Korean Reunification," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 1997): 77-92;
Kyung-Won Kim, "No Way Out: North Korea's Impending Collapse," Harvard
International Review 18, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 22-25, 71;Gavan McCormack, "Kim
Country: Hard Times in North Korea," New Left Review, No. 198 (March-April 1993):
21-48; Dae-sook Suh, "The Prospects for Change in North Korea," Korea and World
Affairs 17, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 5-20; Robert Scalapino, "North Korea at a
Crossroads," Essays in Public Policy No. 73 (Hoover Institution, Stanford University,
1997): 1-18; Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean
Unification: Scenarios and Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999); Nicholas
Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1999); Marcus
Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 2000); Samuel S. Kim, "The Future of the PostKim II Sung System in North Korea," in The Two Koreas and the United States, ed.
Wonmo Dong (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 32-58; Kongdan Oh and Ralph
Hassig, "North Korea Between Collapse and Reform," Asian Survey 39, no. 2
(March/April 1999): 287-309.
3. See Samuel Kim, "Introduction: A Systems Approach," and Chung-in Moon and
Yongho Kim, "The Future of the North Korean System," in Samuel S. Kim, ed.. The
North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 137 and 221-258.
4. Robert Legvold, "The Three Russias: Decline, Revolution, and Reconstruction," in
A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World, ed. Robert A. Pastor
(New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 158.
5. Bertrand de Jouvenal, The Art of Conjecture (New York: Basic Books, 1967).
6. See William M. Drennan, "The U. S. Role in Korean Reunification," Korea and
World Affairs 22, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 159-176. and Pollack and Lee, Preparing for
Korean Unification.
7. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management
of an Emerging Power (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
8. Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" Foreign Affairs 78, 5 (September/October
1999): 24-36; quote on 32.
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
47
9. The World Bank, World Development Report 2002 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), p. 232.
10. Song Dexing, "Lengzhan hou Dongbei Ya anquan xingshe de bianhua," (Changes
in the Post-Cold War Northeast Asian Security Situation) Xiandai guoji guanxi
(Contemporary International Relations), No. 9 (1998): 34-38.
11. Hu Weixing, "Beijing's Defense Strategy and the Korean Peninsula" Journal of
Northeast Asian Studies 14:3 (Fall 1995): 50-67 and Zhang Xiaoming, "The Korean
Peninsula and China's National Security: Past, Present, and Future," Asian Perspective
22:3 (1998): 259-272.
12. Chen Qimao, "The Role of the Great Powers in the Process of Korean
Reunification," in Korean Unification: Implications for Northeast Asia, ed. Amos A.
Jordan (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 70,
emphasis added.
13. See Lee Young-sun, "Is Korean Reunification Possible?" Korea Focus (May-June
1995), p. 13.
14. Park Young-ho, "International Perceptions of Korean Unification Issues," Korea
Focus (January-February 1998): 72-80, quote on p. 78.
15. For a trenchant analysis of North Korea's unification policy, see Nicholas
Eberstadt, "North Korea's s Unification Policy: 1948-1996," in North Korean Foreign
Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, ed., Samuel S. Kim (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998), pp. 235-257.
16. See Hsin Pao (Hong Kong), 8 April 1994, 24, in FBIS-Ch^ 12 April 1994, pp.
13-15, and Hsin Pao^ 24 June 1994, 25, in FBIS-China^ 24 June 1994, pp. 7-8,
quotations on pp. 14 and 7, respectively.
17. Yan Xuetong, "Lengzhan hou Zhongguo de duiwai anquan zhanliie." (China's postCold War external security strategy), Xiandai guoji guanxi, no. 8 (1995), p. 24.
18. Yan Xuetong and Li Zhongcheng, "Zhanwang xia shiji chu guoji zhengzhi,"
(Prospects for international politics in the beginning of the next century), Xiandai guoji
guanxi (Contemporary international relations), no. 6 (1995), p. 7.
19. See Wang Chunyin, "Chaoxian bandao anquan xingshi zhanwang" (Prospects for
the security situation on the Korean peninsula), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 6 (1996), pp.
10-12.
20. See Yu Shaohua, "Chaoxian bandao xingshi de fazhan yu qianjing," (The Evolving
Situation and Future Prospects of the Korean Peninsula) Guoji wenti yanjiu
(International Studies), No. 4 (1997), pp. 12-16, especially 12.
21. Yong Deng, "Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Power and Strategy," Asian Affairs 28,
3 (fall 2001): 151-52.
22. Quoted in Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean
Peninsula," in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), 170.
23. Xinbo Wu, "Managing the Korean Issue: A Chinese Perspective," Korea & World
Affairs 24, 1 (spring 2000), 81; Yong Deng, "Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Power and
Strategy," Asian Affairs 28, 3 (fall 2001), 151 - 5 2 .
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International Journal of Korean Studies • Volume VI, Number 1
24. Wu, "Managing the Korean Issue" 81 and Yong Deng, "Chinese Perceptions of
U.S. Power and Strategy," Asian Affairs 28, 3 (fall 2001), 151-52.
25. "Grain Crisis Causes Hardship for DPRK People," Beijing Review 40:43 (October
27-November 2,1997): 7. See also Song, "Lengzhan hou DongbeiYa anquan xingshe
de bianhua," p. 36.
26. Yi Xiaoxiong, "China's Korea Policy: From 'One Korea' to 'Two Koreas'," Asian
Affairs (Summer 1995): 133.
27. Eric A. McVadon, "Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula," in James
R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk,
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 287.
28. Fei-Ling Wang, "Joining the Major Powers for the Status Quo: China's Views and
Policy on Korean Reunification," Pacific Affairs 72:2 (Summer 1999): 181.
29. Ibid.
30. Kurt M. Campbell and Mitchell B. Reiss, "Korean Changes, Asian Challenges and
the U.S. Role," Survival 43, 1 (spring 2001): 62.
31. Zhao Gancheng, "China's Korea Unification Policy," in The Four Powers and
Korean Unification Strategies, ed., Tae-Hwan Kwak (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern
Studies, Kyungnam University, 1997), p. 82 (emphasis added).
32. Cai Jianwei, ed., Zhongguo da zhanlue: lingdao shijie da lantu (China's Grand
Strategy: A Blueprint for World Leadership) (Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 1996), p.
200.
33. Gregory Henderson, "Korea," in Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and
John G. Stoessinger, eds., Divided Nations in a Divided World (New York: David
Mckay, 1974), p. 43.
34. Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and
Disengagement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 102.
U.S.
35. Tong-a Ilbo (Seoul), December 4,2000. For further discussion, see Samuel S. Kim,
"North Korea and Northeast Asia in World Politics," in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan
Lee, eds., North Korea and Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2002), pp. 18-23.
36. See Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 24:4 (December 1980): 563-592.
37. U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim:
Looking towards the Twenty-first Century (Washington, D.C: April 1990).
38. Joseph S.Nye; Jr., "East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement," Fore ign
Affairs 74:4 (July/August 1995): 90-102 (quote on 98). The conceptual foundation of
the report may be found in the anti-decline thesis expounded in idem Bound to Lead:
The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
39. See "Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and
Recommendations," Unclassified Report by Dr. William J. Perry, U.S. North Korea
Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State,
Washington, DC, October 12,1999 at the Department of State home page on the World
Wide Web at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html
[accessed October 30, 2001 ].
International Journal of Korean Studies • Spring/Summer 2002
49
40. See Drennan, "The U.S. Role in Korean Reunification."
41. Robert Manning, "United States-North Korean Relations: From Welfare to
Workfare?" in Samuel S. Kim, and Tae Hwan Lee, eds., North Korea and Northeast
Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), pp. 61-88.
42. Ronald P. Barston, "The External Relations of Small States," in August Schou and
Arne Olav Brundtland, eds., Small States in International Relations (Stockholm:
Almqvist and Wiskell, 1971), 46 and William Habeeb, Power and Tactics in
International Negotiation:
How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations.
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 130-131.
43. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security
Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 123-124.
A footnote for this statement explains that Ashton Carter was not present for the
meeting referred to here, so Perry "tells this story himself," 123.
44. For analysis by Russia's Korea experts based on their discussions with North
Korean representatives, see DPRKReport, no. 24 (May-June 2000) and DPRK Report,
no. 26 (September-October 2000), at the Nautilus Institute home page on the World
Wide Web at http://www.mautilus.org/pub/ftp/nasnet/russiadprk [access October 30,
2000]. Interestingly enough, Han Sik Park of the University of Georgia, who has
extensive connections and who regularly visits North Korea, argues that the Pyongyang
summit is a continuation of "legitimacy war" by other means, not the end of it. See Han
S. Park, "The Nature and Evolution of the Inter-Korean Legitimacy War," in Kyung-Ae
Park and Dalchoong Kim, eds., Korean Security Dynamics in Transition (New York:
Palgrave, 2001), 3-17.
45. Address by President Kim Dae Jung at the 54* Commencement Exercises of the
Korean Military Academy, 16 March 1998, available at http://www.bluehouse.go.kr/
engpdown/031717485480316-1 [accessed October 30, 1999].
46. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, UnitedStates
Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998, p. 62 at the Department of
Defense home page on the World Wide Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf [accessed June 15, 2002].
47. See Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost," Foreign Affairs 74:1 (January-February
1995): 43-58.
48. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30,
2001 at the Defense of Defense home page on the World Wide Web at Quadrennial
Defense Review released on September 30, 2001 at http://www.defenselink.mil/
pubs/qdr2001.pdf [accessed June 15, 2002].
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