States in Armed Conflict 2003
Collective Violence in 2002 and 2003
Kristine Eck1
Introduction
As was discussed in the preceding chapter, UCDP has traditionally collected data on
annual state-based conflicts, that is, interstate or intrastate conflicts. In 2002, the
project expanded: First, total fatality numbers for all conflicts were estimated for 2002
and 2003; and second, UCDP expanded the scope of the data to include non-state
conflict (conflict between two groups, neither of which is the government of the
state), and one-sided violence (the unilateral use of force against civilians).
The aim of this article is to present the results of the broadened data collection,
namely, information for 2002 and 2003. First, a quick overview of state-based
conflict is covered; this is only highlighted since previous chapters have dealt with
this data extensively. Next, non-state conflict and one-sided violence are each
discussed. These three categories—state-based conflict, non-state conflict and onesided violence—are then reviewed in the breakdown of collective violence for 2002
and 2003. Because they are considered to be separate and mutually exclusive, this
section compares the results for the various categories. Finally, there is a short
discussion of the results.
1
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala
University. The data on Non-State Conflict and One-Sided Violence was funded by the Human
Security Centre, Liu Institute, University of British Colombia, and some of the data presented here
were published first in Human Security Report 2004, Andrew Mack, ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. Any discrepancy in the data between these two publications is due to subsequent revisions; the
latest version of the data can be downloaded at the UCDP homepage. The author would like to thank
Joakim Kreutz, Frida Möller, Lina Edmark and Hanne Fjelde for their assistance in coding non-state
conflict and one-sided violence. Thanks are also due to the other UCDP project members for their
valuable input. Responsibility for the content of this article, however, rests solely with the author.
1
States in Armed Conflict 2003
State-Based Conflict Data2
State-based conflicts are either interstate conflicts, which occur between two states, or
intrastate conflicts, which occur between a state and an opposition group.3 In 2002,
UCDP recorded 40 warring dyads4 in 31 state-based conflicts, spread over 24
countries. In 2003, this decreased to 35 warring dyads in 29 conflicts spread over 22
countries.
While the number of conflicts dropped, the number of fatalities increased: in 2002,
UCDP estimated that between 12,938 – 27,725 people were killed throughout the
world in state-based armed conflict, with a best estimate of 15,575. In 2003, this
estimate increased dramatically to 20,099 – 34,110, with a best estimate of 20,573.
This large increase occurred in the Middle East and can be attributed solely to the
interstate war that took place in Iraq; otherwise, there was a trend for a decreasing
number of fatalities in all other regions of the world. While UCDP estimates are
based on the best available methods, they are still just estimates. The best estimate is
conservative, so while it is entirely possible that total fatality numbers could be
considerably higher, it is unlikely that they could be lower. This is valid for all of the
fatality estimates provided in this article. Our estimates create, in effect, a baseline
for analyzing annual fatalities in collective violence. Perhaps most importantly,
because the data is systematically collected, it is comparable from year to year, which
allows us to chart general trends.
Africa had the most state-based conflicts in 2002, but by 2003 a number of these
conflicts ended, leaving Asia with the most state-based conflicts in 2003. The vast
majority of state-based conflicts in 2002 are intrastate; there was only one interstate
conflict active in 2002, between India and Pakistan. In 2003, this increased to two
active interstate conflicts, with the onset of the Iraq-USA, UK, Australian war. In
general, the number of state-based conflicts in the world has been declining since the
mid-1990s; the probability that a given country is involved in a state-based conflict is
lower now than it has been since the end of the 1950s.5
2
For more information, please see Eriksson, Sollenberg and Wallensteen (2003) and Eriksson and
Wallensteen (2004) for a list of active conflicts and a discussion of current trends. Please also see the
UCDP internet database, which provides information on numerous additional variables, as well as
conflict descriptions.
3
UCDP defines state-based armed conflict as the following: “An armed conflict is a contested
incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”
4
A dyad is synonymous with ‘a pair’ or ‘a couple.’ A warring dyad as described here consists of two
organized groups that are the primary parties in armed conflict with each other (secondary warring
parties are not included here; information on them is available from UCDP’s web-based database). A
state-based conflict can include several warring dyads due to the definitional specifications regarding
the incompatibility. For example, the conflict in the Ivory Coast in 2002 included three different rebel
groups which challenged the government, thus there were three dyads, though they were included in
one conflict over government. Because there is no incompatibility requirement for the non-state and
one-sided categories, each warring dyad constitutes a conflict.
5
This relates to the number of conflicts relative to the number of countries which exist in the world; for
instance, the rise in conflicts in the 1960’s is partially connected to the rise in the number of countries
during that decade. See Gleditsch et al (2002).
2
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Table 1: Breakdown of State-Based Conflicts, 2002
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Conflicts
15
2
11
1
2
31
Fatalities: best estimate
6659
1557
5579
753
1027
15575
Number of Countries
13
2
6
1
2
24
Table 2: Breakdown of State-Based Conflicts, 2003
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Conflicts
10
1
14
1
3
29
Fatalities: best estimate
5935
487
4854
480
8817
20573
3
Number of Countries
9
1
8
1
3
22
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Non-State Conflict Data
A non-state conflict is the use of armed force between two organized groups, neither
of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.
In 2002, UCDP recorded 34 non-state conflicts spread over 14 countries. In 2003,
this dropped to 31 non-state conflicts spread over 12 countries.
It was not only the number of conflicts that decreased; the number of people killed in
non-state conflict dropped as well. In 2002, an estimated 6,353 – 10,617 people were
killed in non-state conflict, with a best estimate of 7,129. In 2003, these numbers
dropped to 3,296 – 6,089, with a best estimate of 3,923— nearly half of 2002’s
estimate. As with the state-based data, it is important to stress that these are only
estimates, and that the best estimate is conservative.
In both 2002 and 2003, Africa had an overwhelming majority of the non-state
conflicts, with 26 active in 2002 and 25 active in 2003. It is followed by Asia, which
had 5 non-state conflicts active in 2002 and 2 in 2003; for both years, the Americas
had 2 and the Middle East had 1. Europe had no active non-state conflicts in 2002 or
2003. In terms of severity, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo between
Hema and Lendu ethnic militias in Ituri province claimed the most lives in both 2003
and 2003.
Table 3: Breakdown of Non-State Fatalities, 2002
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Conflicts
26
2
5
0
1
34
Number Killed: best
4556
595
1778
0
200
7129
Number of Countries
8
2
3
0
1
14
Table 4: Breakdown of Non-State Fatalities, 2003
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Conflicts
25
2
2
0
1
30
Number Killed: best
3464
129
149
0
181
3923
Number of Countries
7
2
1
0
1
11
Based on our sources, we have noted that non-state conflicts generally garner
considerably less media attention than state-based conflicts. This may be due to the
fact that because a state is not party to the conflict, non-state conflicts are less likely
to threaten the stability of other countries, often making the international response to
non-state conflicts relatively muted. While the international community as a whole
may be less active in non-state conflicts, national governments often play an active
4
States in Armed Conflict 2003
role in non-state conflicts, especially when they occur on that government’s territory.
A government’s response to a non-state conflict on its territory can vary. Sometimes
the state can contribute to conflict resolution by encouraging negotiations, inviting
international actors such as the UN to mediate,6 and/or providing military security in
conflict areas through the imposition of armed force between the two groups. States
can also perpetuate the conflict through such actions as oppressive military
intervention, supporting one (or more) of the parties, and/or media censorship.
One Case of Non-State Conflict:
One prominent example of a non-state conflict in 2002 was the conflict between
Muslims and Hindus in the Indian state of Gujarat. On 27 February, a fight broke out
between Muslim vendors and Hindu pilgrims in the city of Godhra in Gujarat. This
incident set off a chain reaction of violent attacks throughout Gujarat, which led to the
deaths of approximately between 1,000-2,000 people, most of them within a period of
only a week. While there is a history of Muslim-Hindu conflict in Gujarat, the
violence was considerably more organized than just mobs run amok. The attacks
appear to be have been coordinated and possibly planned in advance; evidence
suggests that both state officials and police were complicit in the killings.7 A
European Union investigation concluded that the violence was not spontaneous but a
pre-planned policy involving state ministers to "purge" Muslims and destroy their
economy. Party politics, economic motivations, past grievances between the two
groups, and the instrumental use of identity issues by politicians are among the
intertwining factors that caused the violence to explode. The conflict in Gujarat also
demonstrates the enormous toll conflict can take on individuals lives; most of those
who died in the fighting were people who lived in areas identified with one of the
groups. The conflict also resulted in the displacement of over 100,000 people, most
of them Muslims fleeing Gujarat.8
6
For example, when Ghana experienced an outbreak of non-state conflict in 2002, one of the first
government reactions was to invite the UN to evaluate the situation and make recommendations for
resolving the conflict.
7
There are numerous reports that support this conclusion. Please see Human Rights Watch (April
2002).
8
See the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Global IDP Database: http://www.idpproject.org
5
States in Armed Conflict 2003
One-Sided Violence Data
One-sided violence is the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a
formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths;
extrajudicial killings, or killings which take place in government facilities, are
excluded. In 2002, UCDP recorded 33 actors committing one-sided violence spread
over 18 countries. In 2003, this number declined to 28 actors in 18 countries.
As with non-state conflict, total fatalities dropped in the one-sided violence category
as well. In 2002, an estimated 4,055-7,912 people were killed in one-sided violence,
with a best estimate of 4,386. In 2003, these numbers declined to 2,213 – 6,134, with
a best estimate of 2,449— nearly half of 2002’s estimate. As with all of the fatality
data UCDP provides, these numbers are conservative estimates.
While Africa had the most one-sided actors in 2002, Asia had the most actors in 2003,
though in both years Africa had the highest number if fatalities. There was an increase
from 2 to 4 actors in the Middle East while the Americas went from 2 to only 1 actor.
Europe remained the same with only 1 one-sided actor in 2002 and 2003.
In terms of severity, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda killed the most
civilians in both 2002 and 2003.
Table 5: Breakdown of One-Sided Fatalities, 2002
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Actors
16
2
11
1
2
32
Number Killed: best
2550
188
1138
132
306
4314
Number of Countries
10
1
5
1
1
18
Table 6: Breakdown of One-Sided Fatalities, 2003
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Actors
10
1
13
1
4
29
Number Killed: best
1215
115
812
59
248
2449
Number of Countries
8
1
5
1
4
19
It is interesting to examine the breakdown of one-sided violence between government
actors and non-governmental actors (i.e. formally organized groups). As Table 7
shows, there are twice as many non-governmental actors as governmental. Even more
noticeable is that the fatality estimate for non-governmental actors is three times as
6
States in Armed Conflict 2003
much as for governments. Given the long history of mass killings by governments,9
this may be a surprising finding. But the result is indicative of two factors: 1) there
were no cases of mass killing or genocide in 2002 (low-level, one-sided violence is
far easier to cover up than mass killings); and, 2) governments often have a better
ability than rebel groups to conceal activities they prefer not to make public, like the
killing of civilians. Because we have deliberately excluded killings that take place in
governmental facilities, there is the question of selection bias. In effect, because of
our definitions, virtually all cases of one-sided violence should be expected to take
place in countries that are either engaged in armed conflict or which are weak states
(or both).
Table 7: Breakdown of One-sided Violence by Actor in 2002
governmental actors
non-governmental actors
number of actors
10
22
best estimate
1021
3293
The one-sided category, in particular, is difficult to measure, as there is a considerable
lack of reliable data available. Because of this control that states exert, the media can
often be manipulated, repressed or have access restricted to certain areas. For
example, Laos’ Xaysamboun area is a virtual black hole for the media; it is a special
security zone under direct military control and all foreigners are banned. While it is
entirely possible that there is some sort of violence occurring there, it is quite simply
impossible for the outside world to know what is actually happening.
Often governments react with excessive force in order to crush an insurgency
movement, including killing any civilian suspected of association with insurgents.
Governments are not likely to admit when they have killed civilians because it makes
them unsympathetic, both domestically and within the international community.
Instead, governments are more likely to assert that those it killed were insurgents.10
In Nepal, for example, the government includes in its definition of a Maoist anyone
who gives shelter, food or money to the armed Maoists, even if they do so under
duress. The result is that many civilians are killed by the government in the name of
fighting the Maoist insurgency. UCDP’s ability to ascertain the truth in such
situations is limited and depends very much on the existence of local human rights
organizations that perform case-by-case investigations. Obtaining information about
groups (like the LRA) who commit one-sided violence is substantially easier since
they rarely have the same ability to exert control over the media. Given the
difficulties in finding reliable information about some states’ behavior, one can
suspect there is considerably more one-sided violence occurring than UCDP is able to
9
There are numerous well-known cases of mass killings by governments. Those interested in the topic
should refer to Valentino et al. (2002).
10
Although it is possible that they often do not know how many are opposition group members and
how many are civilians.
7
States in Armed Conflict 2003
record.11 Thus, the data on one-sided violence should not be used as a sole indicator
for state repression.12
One Case of One-Sided Violence:
Probably the most prominent case of one-sided violence in 2002 was the Bali
bombings. On 12 October 2002, three bombs exploded nearly simultaneously in the
Bali province of Indonesia, with most damage occurring at the popular tourist area of
Kuta Beach. A total of 202 people were killed, the majority of which were
Westerners. Both Asian and Western intelligence sources believe that the group
responsible for the bombings was Jemaah Islamiah (JI), a loose network of Islamic
radicals that stretches across Southeast Asia and has been linked to dozens of deadly
attacks across Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia from 1999 to the present.13
The Bali bombings, like the events of 11 September 2001, shocked several
governments into re-evaluating their concepts of security, with many countries feeling
an increased vulnerability to attack from militant groups. The attack also served to
galvanize some countries into joining the “war on terror.”
Perhaps one of the reasons the Bali bombings were so shocking is that they occurred
in an area considered to be peaceful. Unlike the Bali bombings, most of the one-sided
violence in 2002 occurred in areas that were already in conflict. Because one-sided
violence often occurs in areas that already have active state-based conflicts, it is often
seen as a side effect of armed conflict. However, one need only reflect on the
numerous cases of unilateral mass killings throughout history to realize that the
civilian population can become the target of violence in and of itself. While no
prominent examples of deliberate massive killings of civilians were present in 2002 or
2003, the recent history of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda
serves as a reminder of the devastating potential of one-sided violence.
11
As the Nepal example suggests, some one-sided violence may very well be included in estimates for
inter- or intrastate conflict, thus possibly inflating that category vis-à-vis the other categories.
12
Those interested in finding more country-specific information about state repression should begin by
consulting organizations such as Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International.
See also Mark Gibney’s Political Terror Scale (http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/gibney.html).
13
International Crisis Group (December 2002).
8
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Collective violence in 2002 and 2003
Approximately 23,274 – 46,145 people were killed in collective violence in 2002,
which is defined here as encompassing the categories of state-based conflict, non-state
conflict and one-sided violence. In 2003, this total was roughly the same, with an
estimate of 25,608 – 46,024 fatalities.
Table 8: Breakdown between Different Categories of Collective Violence, 2002
Fatalities: best estimate
Percentage of Fatalities
Number of Dyads
Percentage of Dyads
State-Based
15575
58%
40
38%
Non-State
7129
26%
34
32%
One-Sided
4314
16%
32
30%
It is interesting to compare the results of the different categories to examine whether
adding the new categories of non-state conflict and one-sided violence affects our
overall understanding of collective violence. Table 8 shows that in 2002 over 50% of
the fatalities recorded fell under the state-based conflict category; the non-state
conflict category contained 26% and the one-sided category 16%. Overall in 2002,
there were 106 warring dyads/actors14 in 32 countries. Table 8 also shows that the
number of warring dyads/actors across the categories was less skewed than the
fatalities: there were 40 state-based, 34 non-state and 32 one-sided. Thus, while there
are almost as many non-state conflicts and cases of one-sided violence in 2002, they
were less severe in terms of fatalities than state-based conflicts.
Table 9: Breakdown between Different Categories of Collective Violence, 2003
Fatalities: Best Estimate
Percentage of Fatalities
Number of Dyads
Percentage of Dyads
State-Based
20573
76%
35
37%
Non-State
3923
15%
30
33%
One-Sided
2449
9%
29
30%
A similar, but even more dramatic, trend is seen in 2003. Table 9 shows that in 2003
over 75% of the fatalities recorded were in interstate or intrastate conflict. This
dramatic increase in state-based fatalities from 2002 to 2003 can be attributed to the
single case of Iraq. The non-state conflict category in 2003 consisted of 15% of the
yearly fatalities and one-sided violence 9%. Overall in 2003, there were 94 warring
dyads/actors in 29 countries. Table 9 shows that the number of warring dyads/actors
across the categories was again far less skewed than the fatalities: there were 35 statebased, 30 non-state and 29 one-sided. This again suggests that, while non-state
14
For the state-based and non-state categories, we have counted per dyad (e.g. FARC v. Colombian
government); for the one-sided category, we have counted instead per actor (e.g. FARC killing
civilians). This is a small but important detail—the civilians who are killed are not actors in conflict,
but the victims of unilateral violence. For the difference between a warring actor and a dyad, please
see footnote 4.
9
States in Armed Conflict 2003
conflict and one-sided violence occurs almost as often as state-based conflict, in the
two years studied here, it is far less severe in terms of fatalities.
When comparing fatality numbers, it is important to remember that there were no
cases of intentional killing of civilians on a mass scale in 2002 or 2003; the data for
1994, for example, would tell an entirely different story. Furthermore, while the nonstate and one-sided numbers were not as significant on a global scale in 2002 or 2003,
they were often very significant on a national scale: the DRC and Somalia are two
prime examples of countries torn by non-state conflict.
In 2002, of the 14 countries only half of non-state conflicts occurred in countries
where state-based conflict also occurred. In 2003 there was a slightly higher level of
co-occurrence: of the 11 countries with non-state conflict, 7 also had some form of
state-based conflict.
One-sided violence in 2002, on the other hand, was found primarily in countries
where state-based conflicts existed.15 A similar pattern occurred in 2003, as well.16
This could be explained in part by the fact that many parties’ military strategy
involves killing civilians suspected of supporting their opposition. It should be
stressed, though, that the unilateral killing of civilians need not necessarily be related
to the goals of conflict—it can take on its own impetus, as well.
Regional Distribution
2002
In terms of the regional distribution, Africa was by far the continent most affected by
collective violence in 2002. Africa had 61 warring dyads—almost twice the number
of Asia. Approximately 11,280 – 24,202 people were killed across all three
categories in Africa, with a best estimate of 13,765. The second most-affected
continent was Asia, which had 32 warring dyads in 7 countries. Approximately 7,693
– 13,248 people were killed across the three categories in Asia. The Americas saw 7
warring dyads in 3 countries with a range of 2,049 – 3,338 while the Middle East had
5 warring dyads in 3 countries with a range of 1,462 – 1,714. Finally, Europe had 2
warring dyads in 1 country, with a range of 869 – 3,883. Africa was the continent
which suffered most from collective violence; not only did it have the most warring
dyads and the highest total fatality rate, but the violence was widespread—18 of
Africa’s 52 countries suffered from some form of collective violence.17
15
One-sided violence in 2002 took place in the following countries which did not have an active statebased conflict: Senegal, DRC and Nigeria. Furthermore, while one-sided violence may take place in
the same country where a state-based conflict is found, it does not necessarily occur in the same area of
the country; the Bali bombings, for example, took place far away from the conflict in the Aceh
province of Indonesia.
16
One-sided violence in 2003 took place in the following countries which did not have an active statebased conflict: DRC, Morocco, Nigeria, Thailand and Saudi Arabia.
17
This includes the 48 sub-Saharan states and four North African states: Algeria, Libya, Morocco and
Tunisia. UCDP places Egypt in the Middle East category and Western Sahara is not included as a
state.
10
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Table 10: Breakdown of all Collective Violence Fatalities, 2002
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Warring Dyads
61
7
31
2
5
106
Number Killed: best
13765
2340
8495
885
1533
27018
Number of Countries
18
3
7
1
3
32
2003
In terms of the regional distribution, Africa was the continent most affected by
collective violence in 2003, but it was closely followed by the Middle East. Africa
had 49 warring dyads, with approximately 9,973 – 16,455 people killed across all
three categories, with a best estimate of 10,614. The Middle East had 8 warring dyads
in 4 countries with approximately 9,246 – 16,363 people killed across the three
categories. Asia had 31 warring dyads in 9 countries, with a range of 5,179 – 11,740.
The Americas saw 4 warring dyads in 2 countries with a range of 702 – 754, while
Europe had 2 warring dyads in 1 country, with a range of 508 – 712.
Table 11: Breakdown of all Collective Violence Fatalities, 2003
Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Total
Number of Warring Dyads
49
4
31
2
8
94
Number Killed: best
10614
731
5815
539
9246
26945
11
Number of Countries
12
2
9
1
4
28
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Countries with the Highest Fatality Rates
In 2002, India had the highest number of fatalities.18 It was followed by DRC, Nepal,
Sudan and Colombia (see Table 12). In 2003, Iraq clearly had the highest number of
fatalities, followed by Sudan, India, DRC and Uganda. Seven of the countries are
included on both top 10 lists.
Table 12: Countries with the Highest Total Fatalities
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2002
India
DRC
Nepal
Sudan
Colombia
Uganda
Israel and the Palestinian Territories
Russia
Burundi
Angola
2003
Iraq
Sudan
India
DRC
Uganda
Liberia
Philippines
Burundi
Nepal
Colombia
Considering that some of the countries listed in Table 12 have very large populations,
we found that the total fatality numbers did not tell us much about the effect of
conflict on the lives of all of the countries’ inhabitants. So in order to get a better
appreciation for the severity of a conflict, we also created a ratio between total
fatalities compared with a country’s population (see table 13).
Table 13: Countries with the Highest Fatalities per Capita
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2002
Liberia
Israel and the Palestinian Territories
Burundi
Nepal
DRC
Sudan
Uganda
Somalia
Angola
Congo-Brazzaville
2003
Liberia
Iraq
Burundi
Sudan
Uganda
Israel and the Palestinian Territories
Nepal
DRC
Somalia
Colombia
We found that using this criteria, the conflict in Liberia was the most severe in 2002:
approximately 15 of every 100,000 were killed in 2002 in collective violence. Israel
& the Palestinian territories,19 Burundi, Nepal, Sudan, and Uganda followed in
18
This is across all three categories added together, using the best estimate.
It should be noted that due to the presence of reliable and thorough reporting in Israel, UCDP is able
to record the majority of the violence that occurs there. This is not true for many other parts of the
world, where there is either a lack of reliable reports or else violence takes place in such remote areas
19
12
States in Armed Conflict 2003
severity. Liberia remained at the top of the list in 2003, with an increase in fatalities
per capita: approximately 48 out of 100,000 were killed in collective violence. Iraq
also had an exceptionally high fatality ratio, with 35 out of 100,000 killed in
collective violence in 2003. It was followed by Burundi, Sudan, and Uganda. Seven
countries appear on both lists. Of course, some conflicts are regionalized within a
country, but both UCDP’s data and demographic data are not yet sophisticated
enough to assess the regional effects of conflicts.20
While the data provided here can aid in the understanding of conflict, there are limits
to its explanatory power. What the data cannot do is describe the plethora of personal
tragedies that lay behind the numbers; we cannot begin to measure how others’ lives
are affected by this violence. What that data can do, however, is help to give an
indication of where the international community should focus its attention to
minimize the suffering caused by collective violence.
that it is difficult to record. Quite simply, our access to reliable reports affects the quality of our data,
which should be expected to vary from country to country. If we had reliable data across all countries,
it is possible that this ratio would be different.
20
For example, several thousand people died in various types of collective violence in Kashmir, which
has a small population compared to the rest of India. If Kashmir were its own country, it would surely
rank as one of the most insecure.
13
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Discussion
UCDP’s overall totals for collective violence are surprisingly low. UCDP has
admittedly conservative methodology for estimating fatality totals, but even the high
estimate provided here is lower than expected, given estimates from organizations like
the WHO.21 Because UCDP is the only organization to collect annual global data on
fatalities systematically, we have no reference for comparison. Thus, it is impossible
to know whether our estimate seems low because of faulty data or because there is
actually less direct, collective violence than people perceive.
There are a number of factors that could contribute to the perception that collective
violence is more widespread than it is. One factor could be the nature of news media
reports. Many people believe, for instance, that there has been an increase in conflict
over the 1990s. UCDP’s data shows the contrary; in fact, there has been a fairly steep
decline in interstate and intrastate armed conflict.22 This example serves to highlight
how data collection can help correct false perceptions of the world.
Moreover, many people believe that there is a high level of violence in war because
reports do not always distinguish between those killed in direct violence and those
killed by structural violence. That is, conflict often leads to the breakdown of normal
social services; in particular health services are often strained or broken. One
prominent example of the effect of conflict on health is the Democratic Republic of
Congo, where it was estimated that 3.3 million excess deaths have occurred between
August 1998 and December 2002.23 The International Rescue Committee points out
that most of these deaths are related to infectious diseases induced by displacement,
severe poverty and social dysfunction; only a fraction of the deaths in the DRC were
caused by direct violence by another person. In previous studies, the IRC found that
areas which had the highest violence-specific mortality rate also tended to have the
highest non-violent mortality rate, as well. The IRC suggested that the link between
death from violence and death from various non-violent causes of death was
“assumed to be a consequence of displacement and economic and social disorder that
accompanied outbreaks of violence.”24
Ghobarah, Huth and Russett have conducted a study aimed at examining the
systematic longer-term effects of civil wars on public health. They write that, “we
developed the argument that civil wars should produce long-term damage to public
health-care systems that extend well beyond the period of active warfare…civil wars
greatly raise the subsequent risk of death and disability from many infectious
diseases.” Moreover, they also assert “we have some evidence, though weaker, that
civil wars increase the risk of death and disability through the breakdown of norms
and practices of social order, with possible increases in homicide, transportation
accidents, other injuries, and cervical cancer.”25
21
See WHO’s World Report on Violence and Health
UCDP’s data shows the same general trends as most other conflict data collection projects—such as
the State Failure project and Correlates of War—all of which show a decline in conflict since the mid1990s.
23
Excess deaths are those deaths that are above and beyond the estimated 1 million people that would
have died under normal circumstances. All data on the DRC comes from Roberts et al. (2003).
24
The IRC suggests that the 2002 survey data may indicate a more complex relationship.
25
Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett (2003): p. 200.
22
14
States in Armed Conflict 2003
The health effect of conflict on civilian populations, both during and after the
fighting, is a little-researched field.26 While the body of literature about the civilian
health consequences of civil war is slowly growing, the effects of other types of
collective violence like non-state conflict and one-sided violence is entirely unknown.
While one might suppose that non-state conflicts would not affect social services as
severely as civil war, areas that are stricken by severe non-state conflict could show
similar patterns as in intrastate conflict. For instance, the effect of the non-state
conflict between Hema and Lendu militias in the Ituri province of DRC could well
prove to have as severe health consequences in that area as intrastate conflict. This,
however, is pure speculation, as there is currently no data on which to construct a
systematic empirical study.
The number of people killed in direct, collective violence may be a relatively small
number, which might lead one to wonder why so much time is devoted to the study of
conflict. The consequences for a country that experience conflict can be severe,
depending on the extent of the violence. Conflict often leads to economic and health
system breakdown, creating a rippling effect in local populations. The effects of
conflict on civilians populations both during and after the war is an under-researched
area, but the data that is available suggests that civilian populations are severely
effected by conflict far beyond the number of people killed in direct violence. The
data on collective violence provided by UCDP cannot by itself describe the effects of
conflict on populations, it is but one aspect. Finally, due to methodological
constraints, UCDP almost surely underestimates the actual number of yearly fatalities
in collective violence. The fatality data provided by UCDP is, however, especially
relevant as an indicator of where collective violence is taking place. In particular, the
data can be useful for drawing conclusions about the severity of violence in a country
vis-à-vis other countries, but the numbers provided here are not meant to be taken as
absolute truths. This project is best seen as the first step in improving our knowledge
about collective violence and its impact on individuals’ lives.
26
See Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett (2003) as well as the WHO’s World Report on Violence and
Health. There is also a small body of case study literature that relates to the indirect effect of wars (for
example, Roberts et al., 2003 and Daponte, 1993).
15
States in Armed Conflict 2003
References
BBC Online: Asia-Pacific, “Bali attack ‘targeted Australians,’” 2003-02-10.
Daponte, Beth, 1993. "A Case Study in Estimating Casualties from War and Its Aftermath: The 1991
Persian Gulf War," PSR Quarterly 3 (2): 57-66.
Eriksson, Mikael and Peter Wallensteen, 2004. “Armed Conflict 1989-2003,” Journal of Peace
Research, 41 (5): 625-636.
Eriksson, Mikael, Margareta Sollenberg, and Peter Wallensteen, 2003. “Armed Conflict 1989-2002,”
in Journal of Peace Research, 40 (5): 593-607.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand,
2002. ”Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39 (5).
Ghobarah, Hazem, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett, 2003. “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People–Long After
the Shooting Stops.” American Political Science Review, 97 (2): 189-202.
Human Rights Watch, April 2002. We Have No Orders to Save You, available online at:
http://www.hrw.org
International Crisis Group, 11 December 2002. Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah
Terrorist Network Operates, available online at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
Roberts, Les, Pascal Ngoy, Colleen Mone, Charles Lubula, Luc Mwezse, Mariana Zantop, Michael
Despines, April 2003. “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide
Survey,” report from the International Rescue Committee.
WHO, 2002. World Report on Violence and Health, Geneva: World Health Organization.
Webpages:
http://www.ucdp.uu.se (UCDP’s homepage)
http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php (UCDP searchable online database)
http://www.idpproject.org/ (Norwegian Refugee Council’s Global IDP Project)
http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/ (International Crisis Group)
http://www.hrw.org (Human Rights Watch)
16
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 1: Fatalities in all Types of Collective Violence, 2002
COUNTRY
Africa
Algeria
Angola
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo-Brazzaville
DRC
Ethiopia
Ghana
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Madagascar
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda
Americas
Colombia
Mexico
USA
Asia
Afghanistan
India
Indonesia
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Europe
Russia
Middle East
Israel & Palestinian territories
Turkey
Iraq
FATALITIES: best estimate
FATALITIES: per 100,000
306
786
845
159
418
171
4061
414
36
626
500
79
535
59
33
644
2419
1674
1,0
5,7
12,0
4,2
5,1
5,4
7,5
0,6
0,2
3,7
15,2
0,5
0,4
0,7
0,3
6,9
7,5
7,2
1914
26
400
4,4
0,0
0,1
187
4046
364
358
2658
265
617
0,7
0,4
0,2
0,7
11,0
0,2
0,8
885
0,6
1277
56
200
13,2
0,1
0,8
17
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 2: Fatalities in all Types of Collective Violence, 2003
COUNTRY
Africa
Algeria
Burundi
Democratic Republic of Congo
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Morocco
Nigeria
Senegal
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda
Americas
Colombia
Ecuador
Asia
Afghanistan
India
Indonesia
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Europe
Russia
Middle East
Iraq
Israel & Palestinian territories
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
FATALITIES: best estimate
FATALITIES: per 100,000
223
1142
2154
57
224
121
1589
45
256
40
368
2803
1592
0,7
16,2
4,2
1,3
0,3
0,7
48,2
0,2
0,2
0,4
3,9
8,5
6,5
701
30
1,6
0,2
317
2430
517
40
1064
198
1150
25
74
1,1
0,2
0,2
0,1
4,4
0,1
1,4
0,1
0,1
539
0,4
8494
573
43
136
35,1
5,8
0,2
0,2
18
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 3: Fatalities in State-Based Conflict Dyads, 2002
COUNTRY
Africa
Algeria
Angola
Angola
Burundi
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Congo-Brazzaville
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Ivory Coast
Ivory Coast
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda
Uganda
Americas
Colombia
Colombia
USA
Asia
India-Pakistan
India
India
India
India
India
India
Indonesia
Myanmar
Myanmar
Nepal
Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
Europe
Russia
Middle East
Israel
Turkey
INCOMPATIBILITY
GROUP/s
FATALITIES
Govt
Govt
Terr-Cabinda
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt
Terr-Ogaden
Terr-Oromiya
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt/Terr- S.Sudan
Govt
Govt
GIA
UNITA
FLEC-FAC
CNDD-FDD
Palipehutu-FNL
Forces of François Bozize
MDJT
Ntsiloulous
ONLF
OLF
MPCI
MJP
MPIGO
LURD
Opposition alliance
SRRC
NDA
LRA
ADF
150
414
315
330
130
159
418
116
25
25
400
100
100
500
59
132
2254
956
76
Govt
Govt
Govt
FARC
ELN
al-Qaeda
1077
80
400
Terr-Kashmir
Terr-Kashmir
Terr-Assam
Terr-Assam
Terr-Tripura
Govt
Govt
Terr-Aceh
Terr-Shan
Terr-Karen
Govt
Terr-Mindanao
Terr-Mindanao
Terr-Mindanao
Govt
India v. Pakistan
Kashmir insurgents
ULFA
NDFB
NLFT
MCC
PWG
GAM
SSA
KNU
CPN-M
MILF
MNLF
ASG
CPP
350
1585
63
44
43
57
131
112
170
60
2425
85
25
249
180
Terr-Chechnya
Republic of Chechnya
753
Terr-Palestine
Terr-Kurdistan
Palestinian groups
PKK
971
56
19
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 4: Fatalities in State-Based Conflict Dyads, 2003
COUNTRY
Africa
Algeria
Algeria
Burundi
Burundi
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Ivory Coast
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Senegal
Sudan
Sudan
Sudan
Uganda
Americas
Colombia
Asia
Afghanistan
India-Pakistan
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
Indonesia
Myanmar
Nepal
Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Europe
Russia
Middle East
Iraq
Israel
Turkey
INCOMPATIBILITY
GROUP/s
FATALITIES
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt
Govt
Terr-Oromiya
Govt
Govt
Govt
Terr-Casamance
Govt/Terr- S.Sudan
Govt
Govt
Govt
GIA
GSPC
CNDD-FDD
Palipehutu-FNL
EIJM
OLF
MJP
MPIGO
LURD
MFDC
SPLM/A
SLM/A
JEM
LRA
25
173
262
693
57
25
25
96
1589
40
44
1236
1041
629
Govt
FARC
487
Govt
Terr-Kashmir
Terr-Kashmir
Terr-Assam
Terr-Assam
Terr-Tripura
Terr-Manipur
Govt
Govt
Terr-Aceh
Terr-Karen
Govt
Terr-Mindanao
Terr-Mindanao
Govt
Terr-Eelam
Taliban
India v. Pakistan
Kashmir insurgents
ULFA
NDFB
NLFT
UNLF
MCC
PWG
GAM
KNU
CPN-M
MILF
ASG
CPP
LTTE
168
211
1246
73
100
114
73
69
157
429
40
1064
726
129
230
25
Terr-Chechnya
Republic of Chechnya
480
Govt
Terr-Palestine
Terr-Kurdistan
USA, UK, Australia
Palestinian groups
KADEK
8313
425
79
20
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 5: Fatalities in Non-state Conflict Dyads, 2002
COUNTRY
AFRICA
DRC
DRC
DRC
DRC
DRC
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Ghana
Ivory Coast
Madagascar
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Sudan
Sudan
AMERICAS
Colombia
Mexico
ASIA
Afghanistan
Afghanistan
India
Myanmar
Myanmar
Iraq
GROUP a
GROUP b
FATALITIES
Alur
Hema
RCD-Goma
RCD-Goma
RCD-K-ML
Afar tribe
Anuak tribe
Anuak tribe
Andani clan
Gbago supporters
Ratsiraka supporters
Oodua People's Congress (OPC)
Hausa-Fulani/herdsmen
Hausa
Fulani/herdsmen
Hausa/Muslims
Muslims/Hausa
RRA-Shatigudud faction
USC/SSA-Muse Sudi faction
Ali-Gaf subclan of the Abgal clan
Warsangeli subclan of the Abgal clan
Dir clan
Jiddoh subclan of the Dir clan
Abdullahi Yusuf forces
Ma'alaia
NPDF
Lendu
Lendu
RCD-Masunzu faction
Mayi-Mayi, Interahamwé, CNDD-FDD
RCD-N, MLC
Issa tribe
Nuer tribe
Dinka tribe
Abudu clan
Ouattare supporters
Ravalomanana supporters
Olowo forces
Indigenes/farmers
Tarok
Mambila/farmers
Yoruba/Christians
Christians/Igbo
RRA-Madobe-Habsade faction
USC/SSA-Finish faction
Mahadade subclan of the Abgal clan
Agon-Yar subclan of the Abgal clan
Sacad subclan of the Habr Gudir clan
Jareer subclan of the Hawiye clan
Jama Ali Jama forces
Rezaigat
SSDF
50
2394
221
375
144
45
60
33
36
26
79
36
99
35
50
100
170
173
62
33
87
72
33
52
53
38
FARC
Santo Domingo Teojomulco residents
AUC
Santiago Xochiltepec residents
569
26
Rashid Abdul Dostum supporters
Forces of Amanullah Khan
Muslims
SSA
KNU
MIDDLE EAST
PUK
Ustad Mohammad Atta supporters
Forces of Ismail Khan
Hindus
UWSA
DKBA
101
86
1500
63
28
Ansar al-Islam
200
21
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 6: Fatalities in Non-state Conflict Dyads, 2003
COUNTRY
AFRICA
Burundi
DRC
DRC
DRC
DRC
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Somalia
Sudan
Sudan
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Americas
Colombia
Ecuador
Asia
Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Middle East
Iraq
GROUP a
GROUP b
FATALITIES
CNDD-FDD
Hema
Alur
RCD-Goma
RCD-K-ML
Sokumar tribe
Anuak tribe
Surma tribe
Gura clan
Itsekiri
PDP supporters
Fulani/herdsmen
Eiye
RRA-Shatigudud faction
Darod subclan of the Marehan clan
USC/SSA-Muse Sudi
Warsangeli subclan of the Abgal clan
Sacad subclan of Habr Gudir clan
Janjaweed
Janjaweed
Pian subclan of the Karimojong clan
Bokora subclan of the Karimojong clan
Pian subclan Karimojong clan
Pokot clan
LRA
Palipehutu-FNL
Lendu
Lendu
Mayi-Mayi
RCD-National
Aliwan tribe
Nuer tribe
Dizzi tribe
Dawe clan
Ijaw
AD supporters
Yugur/farmers
Buccaneers
RRA-Madobe-Habsade faction
Fiqi Muhumud subclan of the Dir Clan
USC/SSA-Finish faction
Mohamed Muse subclan of the Abgal clan
Saleban-Abdalla clan
African tribes
JEM
Pokot clan
Jie clan
Bokora subclan of the Karimojong clan
Sabiny clan
Arrow Boys
43
1875
90
53
45
25
30
33
55
108
28
40
30
106
104
72
58
28
123
186
93
108
30
30
71
FARC
Tagaeri tribe
AUC
Huaorani tribe
99
30
Rashid Abdul Dostum supporters
Abdul Rahman Khan supporters
Ustad Mohammad Atta supporters
Amanullah supporters
124
25
PUK
Ansar al-Islam
181
22
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 7: Fatalities by One-sided Violence Actors, 2002
COUNTRY
Africa
Algeria
Angola
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
Congo-Brazzaville
DRC
DRC
DRC
DRC
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Senegal
Sudan
Sudan
Uganda
Americas
Colombia
Colombia
Asia
India
India
India
India
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
Myanmar
Nepal
Nepal
Philippines
Philippines
Europe
Russia
Middle East
Israel
Israel
ACTOR
FATALITIES
GIA
UNITA
CNDD-FDD
Palipehutu-FNL
Government
Ntsiloulous
Government
RCD-Goma
Mai-Mai
RCD-N, MLC
Government
Government
MFDC
Government
SPLM/A
LRA
156
57
88
79
218
55
114
410
51
302
226
45
33
49
25
642
FARC
AUC
107
81
Kashmir insurgents
NDFB
NLFT
Government
JI
GAM
Government
Government
Government
CPN-M
CPP
ASG
436
73
29
72
202
25
25
37
134
99
35
43
Government
132
Palestinian groups
Government
265
41
23
States in Armed Conflict 2003
Appendix Table 8: Fatalities by One-sided Violence Actors, 2003
COUNTRY
Africa
Algeria
Burundi
Burundi
DRC
DRC
Ethiopia
Morocco
Nigeria
Sudan
Uganda
Americas
Colombia
Asia
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
India
Indonesia
Indonesia
Pakistan
Philippines
Thailand
Europe
Russia
Middle East
Israel
Israel
Saudi Arabia, Iraq
Turkey
ACTOR
FATALITIES
GIA
CNDD-FDD
Government
Government
RCD-Goma
Government
Assirat al Moustaquim
Government
Government
LRA
25
58
86
36
55
56
45
50
173
631
FARC
115
Kashmir insurgents
ATTF
NLFT
ULFA
HPC
UPDS
MCC
PWG
GAM
Government
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
MILF
Government
242
43
55
41
28
29
58
35
25
63
54
65
74
Republic of Chechnya
59
Palestinian groups
Government
al-Qaeda
IBDA-C, Abu-Hafs al-Masri Brigades
110
38
43
57
24