Proliferation of
weapons of
mass destruction
A report on the work to prevent and detect
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and carriers of such weapons
Swedish Security Service
Issued by
Swedish Security Service
Box 8304
SE-104 20 Stockholm, Sweden
Layout: RPS Info/G. Söderberg
Printing:
1st edition in English
February 2005
Proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction
A report on the work to prevent and detect
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
carriers of such weapons
Swedish Security Service
June 2003
Contents
Introduction .............................................................................................1
Production of weapons of mass destruction ........................................2
Expertise ............................................................................................. 2
Material .............................................................................................. 3
Equipment .......................................................................................... 4
Missiles ................................................................................................ 4
Acquisition of weapons of mass destruction .......................................6
The chain of acquisition ..................................................................10
Export control ..................................................................................11
Threat assessment .................................................................................12
Incentive & deterrent factors for the acquisition of WMD ..........12
Proliferation patterns ......................................................................13
The role of Sweden in the field of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles .........................................................15
The Swedish market of acquisition – attraction and
vulnerability .....................................................................................15
How is the non-proliferation work carried out? ...........................17
Advice & recommendations .................................................................21
Transfer of expertise ........................................................................21
Material ............................................................................................21
Products ............................................................................................22
Appendix 1: Dual-use items .................................................................23
Appendix 2: International treaties ......................................................25
International agreements ...............................................................25
International control regimes .........................................................26
Appendix 3: Presentation of authorities .............................................28
Swedish Defence Research Agency – FOI.......................................29
National Defence Radio Centre – FRA ...........................................30
Swedish Armed Forces – FM............................................................31
National Inspectorate of Strategic Products – ISP .........................32
Swedish Emergency Management Agency – KBM .......................33
Swedish Coast Guard – KBV ............................................................34
National Police Board – RPS ............................................................35
Swedish Maritime Administration – SJÖV .....................................36
National Board of Health and Welfare – SoS ................................37
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate – SKI ....................................38
Swedish Rescue Services Agency – SRV ..........................................39
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority – SSI ...............................40
The Swedish Security Service – SÄPO .............................................41
Swedish Customs Service .................................................................42
Appendix 4: Measures when finding NBC material ...........................43
Measures when finding radioactive material................................43
Measures when finding chemical warfare agents or
their precursors ................................................................................45
Measures when finding infectious material ..................................45
Preface
The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 more or less coincided in time
and place with the anonymous anthrax letters. Weapons of mass destruction and non-governmental actors stepped into the limelight. This led to
a change consisting mostly in an increased awareness of the threats posed
by biological and chemical weapons, especially in asymmetric conflicts.
Such a conflict is characterised by a heavily skewed balance of military
strength between the conflicting parties, and it is the most common type
of conflict today. This prompts the development of new strategies, military doctrines, combat methods and conflict patterns.
The large majority of governmental and non-governmental actors condemn the use of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, a small
number of actors have started to show an increased interest in such weapons, and a few states have intensified their programmes. Increased access
to items, equipment and competence for the production of weapons of
mass destruction means that higher demands are put on Swedish nonproliferation work. The threat we are facing today clearly justifies an increased emphasis on weapon control issues and disarmament.
During the last ten years, Swedish ministries and authorities have worked
together in a joint reference group with the aim of sharing knowledge
and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and carriers of such weapons. Collaboration mainly takes place within the “small
reference group”, but when there is a need for broader co-ordination,
the “large reference group” is convened. The convening authority is the
Swedish Security Service.
The main tasks of the reference group are information, co-ordination
and preparedness. This report aims to summarise and communicate the
group’s opinion on the proliferation threat from weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The target group for the report is companies and
authorities whose activities normally do not comprise non-proliferation
issues, but who nevertheless might be exposed to the problem, and who
are therefore in the need of guidance.
Stockholm, May 2003
Jan Danielsson
Director-General
Introduction
Sweden’s export control system aims to prevent foreign actors from
developing weapons of mass destruction by using material, equipment or expertise from Sweden. Security policy developments show
the need of continued activity in this field. The report uses the generic
terms weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear weapons (N),
biological weapons (B), and chemical weapons (C). Carriers of weapons of mass destruction are also subject to export control.
Sweden is generally not a leading country in the NBC and missile
field. Within attractive niches, a close guard can however be efficient
from a non-proliferation standpoint. This particularly refers to relevant technological excellence and critical items, such as cutting-edge
technology, technology with few producers or high-quality consumables.
The responsibility for Swedish non-proliferation work is divided into
different responsibility areas (Appendix 3) falling under different authorities and ministries. “The small reference group” was created in
1992 to improve co-operation between authorities in the non-proliferation field by means of informal contacts. As regards dual-use –
both civilian and military use – items, there is today an operative collaboration between the National Inspectorate of Strategic Products,
the Customs Service, the Security Service, the Armed Forces and the
National Defence Radio Centre.
1
Production of weapons of mass
destruction
In order to produce weapons of mass destruction and carriers of such
weapons, the following is needed: expertise, material (e.g. uranium,
chemical precursors1 or microorganisms) and equipment (items,
components, etc.). Swedish non-proliferation work therefore aims to
prevent such expertise, items, substances or microorganisms from being misused or brought from or through Sweden to actors with ambitions to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction.
Expertise
ert
ise
Ma
Exp
ter
ia
l
The production of weapons of mass
destruction requires a broad and deep
knowledge in many fields. This is the
reason why researchers and technicians
are often recruited from other countries
than the country where the project is running, and also why students and researchers often get additional training abroad.
Another method is to let the intelligence
Equipment
service of the country participate in the
acquisition of relevant expertise. When
developing weapon carriers, it is frequent for a state to buy expertise
in the form of a finished missile system, which is then further developed inside the country.
In specific cases, a research institution or company can be forced to
choose between stimulating international exchange and the assurance
that one does not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. This is a non-trivial conflict of interests, which has to be
assessed from case to case. A minimum requirement, however, has to
be that Sweden does not share proliferation technology or cuttingedge competence which can be used for the production of weapons
of mass destruction with actors who can be suspected of nurturing
WMD ambitions.
In addition, particular vigilance should be observed in research exchanges, since it is not uncommon that guest researchers with government
grants (from states with WMD ambitions) within relevant
____________________
1
2
Precursors signify the crude material or the first steps towards the final products.
research areas are expected to contribute their know-how in exchange
for the financing of their studies.
Unusually frequent contacts with the embassy of the country of
origin, exceptional interest in research fields outside the own field,
unusual working-hours and extensive copying may be signs of such
activity.
At the same time, vigilance must not be exaggerated, as carefully calculated risk-taking may often be motivated from other perspectives.
Exceptions exist within particularly sensitive research areas where
caution should come first. Examples are secret defence projects or research the content of which might lead to more devastating versions
of the current weapons of mass destruction (for instance niches of
detonation research, the development of nanotechnology and biotechnology), or new holders of NBC weapons.
Material
The most important component of a nuclear charge is the fissile material, weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, and explosives to create
a supercritical system. Many nuclear charges also contain tritium to
increase or otherwise affect the yield, and a reflector (for example natural uranium or beryllium), influencing the amount of fissile material
needed for the charge. Fissile material for weapons purposes contains
more than 90% enriched uranium-235 or plutonium-239.
A primitive nuclear charge does not require the same reliability, yield
and reproducibility as a military nuclear weapon. It might therefore
be within reach for well-organised non-governmental actors, provided they have access to fissile material – probably highly enriched, externally acquired uranium. A good yield is however not very likely.
A radiological weapon (a ”dirty bomb”) means that radioactive material is dispersed passively as an aerosol or actively using an explosive.
No nuclear fission takes place, which means that the risk of mass
death is small, whereas the decontamination work might be extensive.
The risks for the potential perpetrator’s own physical health is also a
limiting factor. Conceivable starting materials are radiation sources
or other radioactive material used in research, industry, health care or
nuclear plants.
Biological warfare agents mainly consist of living organisms, mostly
microorganisms. Pathogenic microorganisms which can be used as
3
biological weapons – biological agents – are bacteria, viruses and
microfungi which may cause death in humans, animals or plants. A
number of countries have biological weapons or pursue activities in
the field of biological warfare, but many have also interrupted their
biological weapons programmes, since these programmes are often
more complicated than they are interesting.
Certain poisonous substances are considered chemical warfare agents
if they are dispersed for the purpose of harming or killing humans or
animals. Toxins – poisons produced by organisms – are also classified as chemical warfare agents. A number of countries have chemical
weapons or pursue activities with possible connections to the production of chemical weapons. Most countries with chemical weapons
programmes have foremost turned their interest to mustard gas and
different kinds of nerve gases. At the same time, it should be emphasised that many countries in recent years have chosen to join the
Chemical Weapons Convention and to destroy their stocks of chemical weapons. However, some countries have not managed to destroy
their stocks yet, and it cannot be excluded that isolated actors may
also have concealed limited stockpiles.
Equipment
There is a wide range of equipment which might be used in the efforts
to obtain weapons and missile capacity. The major part of this equipment is dual-use items, which can be used in a completely civilian
context and also in the production of weapons of mass destruction.
This might involve e.g. equipment for DNA analysis, for treatment
and navigation, sensors, lasers, optronics and ceramics. The latest developments indicate that today’s states with WMD ambitions2 have
become more skilful in upgrading items just below the export control limits to become usable in the production of weapons of mass
destruction.
Missiles
There are several possible weapon carriers for weapons of mass destruction. Ballistic missiles are often preferable, as these are unmanned, have a long range and are difficult to put up a defence
against. Aircraft, cruise missiles, other unmanned craft, artillery and
grenades are alternative forms of delivery. For a good propagation of
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
States with WMD ambitions include both ‘threshold states’ and states with less
far-reaching WMD ambitions.
2
4
biological and chemical weapons, barometric fuses, parachute ammunition and suitable nozzles are also needed. More primitive technology might be of interest to non-governmental actors.
The new technology for weapon carriers is dominated by missiles,
other forms of unmanned craft and warheads with lower heat and
radar signature, and decoys which can paralyse missile defence systems.
Centrifuges
High-speed cameras
Induction furnaces
Composites
Maraging steel
Mass spectrometers
Pulse generators
X-ray flash apparatus
Pressure gauges
Ignition units
Vacuum pumps
”Scrubbers”
Mixing vessels
Centrifuges
Elevators
Condensers
Connectors
Coolers
Precursors
Pumps
Reactors
Heat exchangers
Examples of dual-use items in
the context of nuclear weapons.
Examples of dual-use items in the
context of chemical weapons.
Bacterial strains
Centrifuges
Fermenters
Filters
Mills
Presses
Pumps
Spray dryers
Tanks
Growth media
Examples of dual-use items in the
context of biological weapons.
Accelerometers
Aluminium alloys
Aluminium powders
Gyros
Isostatic presses
Composites
Maraging steel
Homing devices
Oxidants
Machine tools
Examples of dual-use items
which can be used to produce
missiles.
5
Acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction
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For an actor to constitute an acquisition threat, he has to have both
1) the intent and 2) the capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction. A future weapon-threat
depends on these two aspects.
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Therefore it is of great interest to
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investigate the technological ca��
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pacity of the actor, if one has been
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able to establish a WMD ambition. There might also be a reason to re-evaluate the ambitions
of a certain actor, for example in
connection with an increase in resource allocation, significantly in������������������������
fluencing the actor’s capacity.
The possibilities for a state to acquire weapons capacity depend on its
ambitions and technological level. While the step from no ambition
to high ambition is short – in principle, it is only a political decision
– the build-up of a high technological level is time-consuming. In a
country at a low technological level, the movement towards weapons
capacity is more evident than in a country where the technological
level is high, since the former case necessitates an extensive acquirement of expertise, substances and equipment. States where the technological level is low therefore disclose their ambitions more explicitly
and over a longer period of time than those at a high technological
level.
The proliferation process
The different phases of the proliferation process can roughly be illustrated by the steps of acquisition on the following page, where each
step is necessary for the next, even though attempts are made to reach
several steps in parallel. Sweden is mainly an interesting acquisition
country for steps 3 and 4, but may be of interest also in the first step
in certain research areas.
A WMD programme usually starts with a political decision, made
in silence or following an open debate. The time required to achieve
weapons capacity relates to the actor’s technological level at the beginning of the process, and his access to expertise, substances, equipment
and weapons systems.
6
The steps of acquisition
4. More sophisticated weapons
Symptoms:
Further development of
• Weapon effect
• Explosives
• Profileration technology
• Research co-operation
• Special units
• Military training
3. Complementary
technology & competence
Symptoms:
Further development of
• Inquiries & putchases of
dual-use items
• Contact with like-minded
• Systematic inquiries
– sometimes by middlemen
(foreign companies/persons)
or Swedish one-man companies)
• Guest researchers
2. Fundamental build-up
of technology
Symptoms:
Purchase or development of
a) fissile material (N)
b) chemical precursors (C)
c) biological agents (B)
d) proliferation technology
Build up of
a) research reactors (N)
b) isolated research labs (BC)
1. Political decision & build-up
of competence
Symptoms:
• Political debate
• Rumours
• Increased defence budget
• Restructuring of defence material
administration with isolated competence
• Recruitment of specialist competence,
increased R&D and guest
researchers within relevant areas
The first acquisition step is mainly characterised by a build-up of
competence within relevant research areas. This can often be accomplished discreetly, except in cases where an extensive recruitment
of expertise abroad is needed. New organisational structures in the
armed forces may however often be noted during this phase, with the
isolation of certain divisions and changes in purchase procedures. It
is also common to observe an increase in resource allocation for the
armed forces and related research areas. Likewise, there will often be
a rise in the number of technicians and guest researchers sent abroad.
7
It is also common to observe new research co-operations in adjacent
areas with other states who have reached further in their acquisition
striving.
In the second step of acquisition, the fundamental technology must
be acquired, and the required crude material produced, or a willing
seller found. Most governmental actors are unwilling to rely on the
good will of a foreign supplier in the long run, and instead try to find
a domestic solution for the production. This is the reason why there
is often a civilian nuclear programme in states with the ambition to
produce nuclear weapons. This programme may involve one or several research reactors, for the production of fissile material and in order to provide a “legitimate” research platform. Where biological or
chemical weapons capacity is an objective, there is instead a striving
to produce weapons-grade biological agents or chemical precursors
in isolated research laboratories. In these cases, suspicious orders may
may be placed by companies in the vaccine and pharmaceutical industries, or by research institutes.
As concerns the development of nuclear weapons, there are many indications that Iran, Libya, North Korea and possibly Algeria, more or
less actively, are in the acquisition process. Furthermore, there are indications that a number of Middle Eastern, North African and Asian
states – states often involved in regional conflicts – are making efforts
to acquire biological agents and/or chemical precursors for the development of weapons of mass destruction.
The third step of acquisition often overlaps the second and forth steps
of acquisition, since these steps are time-consuming and difficult to
surmount. The technological survey is usually both extensive and
global, in collaboration with the intelligence service, front companies and guest researchers. In general, the survey starts with Internet
searches through an anonymous server, and if more information is
needed, quotation requests and delegation visits will follow. Some
sort of civilian demand can be used as a pretext for delegation visits.
Delegation visits with a double agenda are also known to occur, for
instance where one person is from the intelligence service and behaves differently from the rest of the group. To some extent, states
with WMD ambitions co-operate in this context. Therefore, identical quotation requests may come from different countries.
Commonly, new actors place the orders before purchase, to conceal
the real recipient country. Front companies registered in other coun8
tries and one-man companies in the purchasing country may be used
as middlemen. Even though it is impossible to stop all purchases, it
is important to make the process difficult and to prevent that critical items for WMD programmes originate from or transit through
Sweden. Critical items in this context signify items the acquisition of
which may be of significant importance to the programme in question (high technology, essential items, items with few producers and
items which have to be supplied continuously). The same should apply to technological expertise.
Examples of actors who are seeking continuously and purposefully for
dual-use items in Sweden are Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and
India. In addition, some states in Africa, Asia, the Gulf area and the
Middle East have occasionally inquired about items subject to export
control. In some of these cases, the explanations may be activities of
transit companies or similar, while other cases involve more suspicious procedures and circumstances.
The fourth acquisition step involves the further development of produced weapons of mass destruction and weapon carriers into more
sophisticated and functionally well-adapted weapons. This step is not
necessary for a non-governmental actor, who can take the risk of the
weapon not working as planned. For governmental actors, it is however almost always of importance to develop a stockpile which can
stand up to active-service conditions. In this case, there is a need for
training as well as testing and trial activities. This includes the buildup of special NBC units. The last phase of the proliferation process
involves a continued build-up, development and modernisation of
existing weapons systems, a phase which is also called vertical proliferation. This might include the elaboration of biological weapons
which are more difficult to trace and treat, nuclear weapons with new
functions, enlarged stockpiles or missiles with a longer range.
Out of the nuclear states of today, at least the US, Russia, China, India
and Pakistan are assessed to be aiming at modernisation and further
development of their current stockpiles. The US is the nuclear state
which seems to be putting the largest effort into the development of
high-energy materials, with the aim of producing nuclear weapons
with less radiation and increased explosive force to broaden the current functions of nuclear weapons to new fields of application. China,
North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Libya are examples of countries where an active missile development is taking place, and some of
9
them, alike Israel, are striving for a second-strike capacity by placing
parts of the nuclear stockpiles aboard submarines.
Russia is by far the most prominent country in terms of qualitative
research on biological and chemical weapons. The assessment is that
newer actors, such as Syria and North Korea, have much less sophisticated weapon types, despite their ambitious programmes. It is absolutely necessary to counteract the development of biological and
chemical weapons which can benefit fully from the biotechnology
revolution. A positive trend is that many countries voluntarily have
pledged to destroy their stocks of chemical weapons in the course
of the coming decade in accordance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. There is however likely to be a number of unrecorded
actors with biological and chemical weapons programmes, in the
form of hidden stocks and concealed programmes (within protective
research or closely related civilian industries), since these are easier to
keep secret than nuclear and missile programmes.
The chain of acquisition
The acquisition of dual-use items often follows established trade patterns. The transactions therefore seldom give reason to suspect that
the items are to be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction. In order to discover that the purchase is part of the endeavours of a state to develop weapons of mass destruction, the transaction therefore has to be closely scrutinised, with the focus on order,
shipment and payment procedures. This requires detailed knowledge
about the purchasing country, the end user, the seller and any intermediaries.
In many cases these attempts can be discovered when the Swedish
company turns to the National Inspectorate of Strategic Products
(ISP), the Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) or the Customs Service
with inquiries about a quotation request. In other cases, the information may originate from different authorities, sometimes through
active collection of information. Irrespective of how the information
reaches the authority, the company will be informed of regulations
in force.
The procurement procedure varies depending on the actors involved
and the types of product. Sometimes purchasing departments of the
defence forces are used, and in other cases civilian manufacturing industries and universities. The work of the Swedish Security Service
10
has shown that certain states make use of their intelligence services
for contacts with companies. At present, there is reason to pay attention also to certain non-governmental actors in the context of acquisition. Other methods are to use false end-user certificates, or to make
purchases through front companies or individuals. Several countries
make their purchases through other countries and benefit from the
mobility within different free-trade areas.
The Swedish authorities involved in non-proliferation should foremost identify and intervene against the weak links in the chain of
acquisition. Technological surveys have to be performed, certain information retrieved, merchandise has to be delivered and payment
sent. To succeed in identifying the weak links, it is crucial to maintain
a good dialogue with the Swedish companies exposed to acquisition
attempts. The more information the authorities can access, the more
efficient counter-moves can be prepared and performed.
The chain of acquisition
SWEDEN
Items
Material
Expertise
Unknowing
actors
Conscious
actors
Transit
countries
Actors
States or
organisations with
ambitions to produce
weapons of mass
destruction with
suitable carriers
Export control
It is important to Swedish exporters to know that dual-use items, according to the Act (2000:1064) on control of dual-use items and technical assistance, require export authorisation. The items concerned
are mainly the items listed in the annexes to Council Regulation (EC)
149/2003. Alternatively, other dual-use items are concerned, if the
exporter has received information that the products in the specific
transaction may be intended for production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles (“catch-all”).
Authorities responsible for export control of dual-use items are the
Nuclear Power Inspectorate, for items with specific nuclear use, and
the Inspectorate of Strategic Products for remaining items. The decision in an authorisation case is founded on a joint assessment of item,
purchasing country and end user. In some cases, an end-user certificate is required. When an authorisation request is denied, the company itself has to defray the costs incurred in the deal, including any
future claims for damages.
11
Threat assessment
In times when more and more states and non-governmental actors
experience a sense of threat or discontent with the current security
policy and world order, more are tempted by weapons of mass destruction. This particularly applies to actors with limited conventional forces who wish to maintain or displace some sort of power balance. Weapons of mass destruction seldom create a safer or changed
situation. This does not deter certain actors from taking this road or
from pretending to possess such capacity, especially in cases of escalating conflicts where one or several parties already have weapons of
mass destruction.
Nuclear (N), biological (B), chemical (C) weapons and missiles gain
in interest as conflicts and power games are carried to extremes. The
usual norms can then be suppressed, in favour of a strategic game
with elements of realpolitik. Today, certain individuals and networks
sometimes also take part in this game as worthy opponents, and
asymmetric conflicts have come to dictate the security policy agenda,
something which might have inspired more actors to aim for NBC
capacity. The development of increasingly advanced missile defence
systems does not constitute a threat in itself, but might lead to the
development of more offensive types of weapons.
With each actor with weapons of mass destruction involved in a
conflict, the risk of these weapons being used increases, since a climate of conflict is a risk factor for misjudgements followed by forceful responses. This is particularly relevant as more implicit or explicit
threats to use weapons of mass destruction are expressed. The risk of
use also increases in cases of deficiencies in warning systems, chains of
command and doctrines of use. The risk of misjudgements in a crisis
situation is thereby heightened. Furthermore, the present weapons
development trend jeopardises the long-established taboo on using
weapons of mass destruction. The risk of accidents is also higher with
more weapons and weapon holders.
Incentive & deterrent factors for the acquisition of
WMD
The anonymous anthrax letters in the US had a global effect despite
the limited number of casualties. The shocking incident had repercussions in the defence budgets of many states and may have inspired
more actors to strive for a biological weapons capacity. The mani12
fold problems in connection with biological weapons programmes
have however caused many actors to voluntarily dismantle their programmes.
WMD ambitions can be traced back either to a discontent with the
status quo or an uncertainty regarding the preservation of the current
power balance. In these cases, the expectations are that weapons of
mass destruction will act as deterrents, forcible means and/or negotiation weapons. Threat assessments, security analyses, foreign and domestic policy considerations, international norms and visions of the
future strongly influence the outcome of an acquisition decision. In
order to use NBC material or warfare agents for harmful purposes,
another prerequisite is an unusually strong conviction that the end
justifies the means, even when this includes breaching prevailing
norms and legislation.
It will always be tempting to develop new technological possibilities,
also in the absence of needs or motives of security policy. This is also a
way of maintaining competence. The technological development has
opened up certain possibilities for non-governmental actors, although
it is seldom of interest to e.g. terrorist organisations to invest their limited resources in weapons of mass destruction. There is however good
reason to be attentive to any exceptions to this behaviour.
As regards extremist groups and individual fanatics, their attacks
might involve poisons or infectious substances, which in unfortunate
circumstances could have mass-destructive capacity. It should however be noted that although the production or acquisition of poisonous
microorganisms, toxins or chemical substances is not unattainable,
it is a lot more complicated to use these as weapons of mass destruction. High efficiency requires suitable carriers, precision, proliferation
technology and favourable weather conditions.
There is often little reason to try to develop technologically demanding, time-consuming and costly weapons of mass destruction, since
similar effects can be achieved by much simpler means. This was illustrated by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. At the same
time, the use or threat of NBC weapons might in certain contexts be
of symbolic or psychological significance.
Proliferation patterns
From a proliferation perspective, it is very detrimental that dual-use
items are procured to actors with ambitions to develop weapons of
13
mass destruction. The same is valid for the illegal trade in radioactive
and nuclear materials, albeit the extent is limited and the materials are
seldom highly enriched. There are also a few technicians and scientists
who are prepared to sell their expertise irrespective of the customer
and the purpose. It has also happened that countries have provided
biological and chemical agents to other countries for security policy
reasons, to build up a larger security threat in time.
Deliberate proliferation occurs both from states who already possess
weapons of mass destruction, and from states in the process of acquisition. Unknowing proliferation also takes place from a number of other states. Contracts for educational exchanges and technology transfer
in closely related fields have also become more common.
The security policy arena is nowadays often characterised by national
double-dealings, and it is not uncommon that questioned technical assistance, which may be used for the production of weapons of
mass destruction, is given within larger or smaller fields. Securing the
energy supply and gaining profit is sometimes more important than
abiding by international commitments. However, certain companies
and states have paid a high price for such assistance. It is also worth
noting that certain ambition states to some extent have started to collaborate in their product procurement.
Non-governmental actors have gained new importance with the
many transaction steps in WMD acquisition. The profusion of nongovernmental actors in the intermediary steps makes it difficult to tell
business sanctioned by the state apart from private profit interests.
Non-governmental actors as end recipients have been given exaggerated attention in relation to occurrences. This attention might however be justified, since non-governmental actors are often more likely
to make use of the weapons and more difficult to negotiate with after
acquisition.
14
Swedish non-proliferation work
The main objective for the non-proliferation work is to prevent a state
from deciding to initiate a weapons programme. The second aim is to
delay the process towards weapons capacity, in order to increase the
possibilities of the weapons programme being stopped before WMD
capacity has been achieved.
The role of Sweden in the field of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles
Sweden is not a target for any particular NBC threat. At the same
time, isolated attacks on Swedish territory using biological or chemical substances, perpetrated by extremist groups or fanatics, cannot be
excluded. The insecurity and interdependency of today’s world affect
Sweden in many respects, for instance as regards the foreign policy,
the military and economic situation.
The proliferation issue is particularly disquieting since many of the
new states with WMD ambitions are politically unstable and find
themselves involved in or close to conflicts. Proliferation of products
or knowledge from Sweden to offensive NBC programmes abroad
may also cause a loss of prestige and prejudice the foreign policy profile of Sweden, and cause financial or technological damage. Swedish
economy and future defence ability may even be affected, as a result
of companies being blacklisted and Sweden denied indispensable export-controlled goods from other Western countries.
Against this background there is every reason to put effort into an effective Swedish disarmament and non-proliferation work. This is of
particular importance, since much of the material and items in the
field can be acquired in Sweden, and because within small, but important niches, Sweden is one of few possible acquisition sites.
The Swedish market of acquisition – attraction and
vulnerability
Many of the nuclear states of today watch the development of highenergy materials and optronics in Sweden with interest, since this
research can be used to further develop the most sophisticated nuclear arsenals. Moreover, foreign visits to companies producing dualuse items are common, and many acquisition attempts have been
stopped during the last years. For instance, interest has been shown in
15
highly corrosion-resistant pumps and materials, heat-resistant ceramics, underground equipment and maraging steel.
The open Swedish research society is attractive within certain fields
relevant to the current development of weapons of mass destruction. This is the reason why it is important to review the issue of who
gets access to technological expertise that might be used offensively.
Furthermore, certain parts of nanotechnology, virulence and DNA
research are critical from a non-proliferation perspective. The development in fields comprising powder production, inhalators and
nicotine patches may also contribute to more sophisticated dispersion methods.
In some respects, Sweden is more vulnerable and in some respects
less vulnerable than other states to acquisition attempts for WMD
or missile programmes. Limiting factors for the Swedish vulnerability are the small industrial base of Sweden, the short contact routes
between controlling authorities, and a widespread wish – on the part
of politicians, authorities, companies and individuals – to actively
prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Sweden’s
vulnerability, like that of many other states, is mainly due to the following weak points:
• a well-functioning technical infrastructure (offers anonymity and
technical solutions for information retrieval, ordering, transfers,
etc.)
• insufficient awareness in certain companies as regards the complex
issues of NBC weapons
• profit interests
• availability of and lack of control over deleterious NBC substances.
Rather than for quantitative acquisition, Sweden is likely to be used
mainly for high-quality and supplementary acquisition of substances,
items and competence for the WMD programmes of foreign actors.
This is first and foremost due to the fact that Sweden is not an obvious
acquisition country: Sweden has no offensive WMD programme, is
geographically remote, and pursues an active non-proliferation work.
The likelihood that a country with WMD ambitions will use Sweden
also depends on its access to our country, compared to alternative acquisition markets, for example through exile groups, company contacts and diplomatic representation.
16
There is a particular force of attraction in the Swedish
• innovative technological entrepreneurship and cutting-edge expertise
• open research in relevant fields
• high IT maturity for survey and retrieval purposes.
How is the non-proliferation work carried out?
Non-proliferation work in the long term is all about creating an international political climate where weapons of mass destruction do
not constitute an interesting means of power or pressure. In the short
term, non-proliferation work is a question of constructing functioning contact networks inside and outside the country, in order to counteract the ongoing development and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Export control and dissemination of information constitute important parts of this work. This necessitates preventing the use
of Swedish actors, expertise or items in the production of weapons of
mass destruction. For this to succeed, good co-operation between the
authorities and companies in question is indispensable.
Internationally
The keystone of non-proliferation work is the creation of international norms against the production and use of weapons of mass destruction. Even if this has not fully succeeded, it is worth noting that
most have accepted and abide by these norms. The work nevertheless
has to be pursued actively for the current normative state not to be
undermined. Moreover, a number of important actors are unresponsive to these norms. For resolute and global measures to be possible,
international co-operation and direction of the the non-proliferation
work will be required. Here, the United Nations should have a key
position.
International treaties supplement the normative construction, by
creating a system of regulations which counteract both use and continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Experience has
shown this to give good results, even if the end target is not attained,
since a few have chosen not to be party to or not to observe the treaties. Watertight agreements cannot be drawn up, but the results are
sufficiently encouraging and the questions important enough to motivate Sweden’s commitment to a development of these treaties in var17
ious international fora. The leading Swedish actor in this work is the
Foreign Ministry, with technical support from the Defence Research
Agency, the Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the Inspectorate of
Strategic Products.
A series of international control regimes supplement the international
treaties. These co-operations work well, but are not sufficient to curb
the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. They are however important fora for information exchange and
co-ordination.
Nationally
The work pursued in different countries as regards information
gathering and information dissemination to companies and authorities is a mainstay in the work against proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles. In Sweden this work is mainly conducted by the Inspectorate of Strategic Products, the Nuclear Power
Inspectorate, the Customs Service, the Defence Research Agency and
the Security Service, but the Armed Forces and other authorities also
contribute information.
Export control is another central component of the activities pursued to prevent equipment and items suitable for the production of
weapons of mass destruction from leaving Sweden. The Inspectorate
of Strategic Products and the Nuclear Power Inspectorate are tasked
with this.
Apart form these measures, assistance in setting up security measures,
control functions, destruction facilities, etc. in other countries are important dimensions of the non-proliferation work. One measure, which
strongly contributes to preventing proliferation of knowledge, technology and equipment in the field of weapons of mass destruction,
is the support to Russia and other CIS states previously taking part
in the WMD programme of the Soviet Union. The Nuclear Power
Inspectorate and the Defence Research Agency take part in several
support projects with the objective to:
• promote awareness of the need of good security measures, and to
set these up
• establish relevant legislation
• contribute to the reconstruction of functioning export control,
nuclear material control and physical protection of e.g. weaponsgrade uranium and plutonium.
18
Examples of averted acquisition attempts in Sweden in
recent times
• Some time ago, a country with ambitions to develop weapons of
mass destruction tried to acquire vibration test equipment subject
to export control. Such technology may be used in the production
of missiles but also in the development of nuclear weapons. The
country’s representatives in Sweden commissioned a local businessman to make the purchase. The end user would remain secret,
and the Swedish company, which was asked for a quotation, was
to be deceived. The Security Service received information about
the deal, contacted the company, and the deal was off.
• During 2002, measures were taken at a foreign mission in
Stockholm in order to conceal the export of merchandise subject
to a Swedish export ban. A front company in Sweden would buy
and smuggle the equipment in question through a third country
before it would reach its destination. The front company used in
this case was an export-import company usually trading in completely different items. The end user could be connected to the
WMD programme of the country.
• During 1999, a restaurant in the Swedish town of Halmstad purchased a thyratron made in the US through a Swedish company,
using a false end-user certificate. A thyratron is a dual-use product
which may be used in the ignition mechanism of a nuclear weapon. The Customs Service could however intervene and prevent the
thyratron from leaving Arlanda airport. The intended recipient
country was known to have a nuclear weapons programme.
How can the non-proliferation work be improved?
All the measures described above are connected with difficulties. In
the current state of international technology flows, it is impossible to
completely stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles, as long as there are actors with strong incentives for acquisition. The fact that much of the interesting technology can be found
as dual-use items is yet another aggravating circumstance.
Curbing the development of weapons of mass destruction is nevertheless possible. Identification and close monitoring of critical components for the production of weapons of mass destruction are efficient means of prevention. This work is pursued already today within
the framework of the control regimes, but can probably be improved
19
in its national follow-up. One method is to identify the actual critical
items and expertise available in Sweden, and actively prevent these
from being proliferated to unwanted actors.
Greater awareness of the intentions of different actors is necessary
to understand their ambitions, strategy and tactics. Knowledge is
needed to make the right priorities as to where to put our stakes for
the best efficiency. Reasoning in terms of potential damage may be
meaningful when assessing actors, substances and items. Potential
damage here refers to threats to the security of the Realm and international security.
Many acquisition attempts however never come to the attention of
Swedish licensing authorities, since most companies reject suspicious
clients immediately. This practice is acceptable and understandable,
but it would be helpful if more companies in this situation would
share the information with the relevant licensing authority or the
Security Service, since this may provide valuable information on the
actors and their mode of action. Please refer to the contact directory
to find out what type of information is of interest to the different authorities, appendix 3.
20
Advice & recommendations
What follows is a collection of advice and recommendations for companies, research institutes and authorities who want to contribute to
the Swedish non-proliferation effort. In each field, only a few checklist points are mentioned. Awareness of these may however make a
great difference to the Swedish non-proliferation work. Should you
have questions about these or other fields, we advise you to contact
the relevant authority (appendix 3).
Transfer of expertise
Reflect on what information is given to what recipient. Do not underestimate the ability of an actor with WMD ambitions to puzzle
out certain information by putting pieces together. There are even
examples of persons who through their own negligence have given
away all critical information of secret projects, without even realizing
it until the damage was done.
Are citizens from countries with ongoing WMD programmes allowed to participate in projects involving competence or technology
of significance to the offensive R&D of this country? In this case, how
is this justified? Is this something which warrants scrutiny? It should
be borne in mind that there are examples of defensive and civilian
R&D in Sweden which might be of great consequence to the offensive R&D of another country.
When travelling to countries aspiring to produce or further develop
weapons of mass destruction, it is important to think of the contents
of the information conveyed or brought along. For instance, intelligence officers are sometimes instructed to participate at interesting
university seminars. Invited lecturers or guest workers may have their
luggage and rooms searched. Telephones may be tapped. There is no
reason to be paranoid, but persons with cutting-edge expertise in the
field should be aware that this is a possible scenario.
Material
Are there any microorganisms, chemical or radioactive substances at
your workplace which could be made improper use of? If the answer
is affirmative, are the security measures adequate (considering risks of
purchase and theft)? The aspect of terror attacks should also be borne
in mind in this context, since also small quantities and less sophisticated devices may be concerned.
21
Products
It is a clear trend that the countries with WMD ambitions have become more skilful in upgrading products just below the export control limits to become usable in the production of weapons of mass
destruction. This means that more products have become export sensitive, and the ‘catch-all’ legislation has gained in importance.
Examine whether your web site contains information of particular interest to an actor who wants to produce weapons of mass destruction.
If the answer is affirmative, can this information be rephrased to become less sensitive? Alternatively, can new procedures be introduced,
for instance so that someone interested in a dual-use item cannot remain anonymous during the survey and purchase process? It should
be noted that legal provisions in the non-proliferation field nowadays
also apply to electronic transfer of expertise, with the Inspectorate of
Strategic Products as the controlling authority.
22
Appendix 1:
Dual-use items
The following is a listing of categories of merchandise which might
be subject to export authorisation. In doubtful cases, the Inspectorate
of Strategic Products (ISP) should be consulted. Export authorisation decisions on certain nuclear products are taken by the Nuclear
Power Inspectorate. The Customs Service is tasked with ensuring the
observance of export restrictions. Current regulations can be found in
the ISP Handbook of strategic products and in the Customs Service’s
regulation handbook for export of strategic products. The list of products can also be found on the ISP website: www.isp.se/SP/prodlist.
htm
• Vibration test equipment
0 Nuclear material, facilities &
equipment
• Balancing equipment
• Heat exchangers
1 Certain material, chemicals,
• Reactor vessels
microorganisms & poisons
• Fermenters
• Fibres
• Centrifuges
• Uranium and tungsten alloys
• Crucibles
• Radar absorbent material
• Induction furnaces
• Protective equipment
• Pressure gauges
• Metallic powders
• Vacuum pumps
• Superconductors
3 Electronics
• Maraging steel
• Precursors for chemical weap• Circuits with radiation protecons
tion
• Bacteria, viruses and toxins
• Temperature-resistant circuits
• Composites
• A/D and D/A converters
• Beryllium
• Microprocessors
• Lithium
• Microwave and millimetre
• Magnesium
wave components
• Zirconium
• High-voltage condensers
• Tritium
• X-ray flash equipment
• High explosives
• Frequency converters
• Mass spectrometers
2 Materials processing equip• Ignition units
ment
• Blasting caps
• Machine tools
• Pulse generators
• Isostatic presses
• Mass spectrometers
• Measurement devices
23
4 Computers
• Radiation-resistant computers
5 Telecommunications & information security
• Radiation-resistant systems
6 Sensors & lasers
• High-speed cameras
• IR cameras
• Lasers
• Radar
7 Navigation & avionics
• Accelerometers
• Gyros
• Navigation systems
• GPS
• Positioning equipment
24
8 Naval
9 Propulsion systems, space
launch vehicles & related
equipment
• Rockets
• Space launch vehicles
• Gas turbines
• Components for rocket systems
• Separation equipment
Appendix 2
International treaties
International agreements
The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CWC) bans
the use and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In October 2002,
CWC had 147 member countries, but states such as Israel, Egypt,
Syria, North Korea, Libya and Iraq are still not parties to the convention. The CWC contains provisions on the destruction of chemical
weapons and production facilities for chemical weapons. Further, the
CWC provides for inspections of chemical industries to prevent new
chemical weapons from being produced. More information on the
CWC can be retrieved from the website www.opcw.org.
The OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons)
in the Hague has the mission of implementing the convention. In
Sweden, the ISP (National Inspectorate of Strategic Products) is
tasked with the implementation of the CWC. The website www.isp.
se will give further details.
Under the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons (BTWC)
of 1972, the member states pledge never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or in any other way acquire biological agents
or toxins of forms or quantities that cannot be justified by prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Likewise, the convention
prohibits weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use
biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes. The states party to
the convention also undertake not to support transfer of such items
to other recipients. The BTWC however lacks a control regime. The
ISP is the Swedish inspection authority.
The non-proliferation treaty (NPT) aims at countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Under this treaty, the states in possession of
nuclear weapons at the establishment of the treaty (the US, Russia,
Great Britain, France and China) pledge to work towards a disarmament of their stockpiles and to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Remaining signatory states undertake not to acquire
nuclear weapons or assist other states in doing so. More information
can be found on the website of IAEA: www.iaea.org.
A non-nuclear state party to the NPT should have signed a safeguard
agreement with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency),
25
giving the IAEA the mandate to verify that nuclear substance is not
diverted from its peaceful use. The SKI (Swedish Nuclear Power
Inspectorate) is the authority responsible for export control of items
with specific nuclear use, and the ISP (National Inspectorate of
Strategic Products) is responsible for export control of remaining
items. More information on the role of the SKI can be found on
www.ski.se.
States party to the convention on physical protection of nuclear material have pledged to take steps to protect nuclear material from
theft while in international transport. There is ongoing work aiming
to broaden the scope of the convention, i.e. to increase demands on
protection during domestic use, storage and transport of nuclear material. This includes also an improved protection against sabotage at
nuclear facilities.
International control regimes
Swedish export control results from the Swedish participation in several different international arrangements for export control, consisting in a continuous consultation process. This entails an important
coordination and harmonisation between Sweden and other countries, mainly the other EU member states. The following control regimes can be regarded as a complement to international agreements,
to supply these with updated and current substance, or fora where
like-minded can agree to take further steps in certain areas of the export control where this may be needed.
The Zangger committee was established to define equipment and materials subject to international control according to the NPT. Sweden
is one of the participants, alongside some thirty other countries producing nuclear-related technology, jointly drawing up guidelines for
the interpretation and enforcement of the treaty.
The NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) should be seen as a complement to the NPT co-operation, in order to prevent countries trying
to acquire nuclear weapons from getting access to nuclear equipment.
The group has agreed on a set of guidelines for export control of fissile
material, equipment and material for nuclear activities, nuclear technology, and equipment necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. If one member country refuses an export licence (“denial”) for a
certain company, the co-operation signifies that no member country
has the right to make this shipment to the same customer. A denial is
26
followed by a notification to the arrangement secretariat, which then
informs all other member countries of the denial.
The MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) draws up joint export guidelines for critical equipment and technology related to missile production. The MTCR applies the same system of denials and
notifications as the NSG.
The Australia group strives to co-ordinate the export control of chemical precursors, biological agents, and production and laboratory
equipment which may be used for the production of biological or
chemical weapons. The Australia group also applies a system of forwarding denials to other members, but within this co-operation, the
members themselves may then decide whether they want to export a
similar item to the same customer.
The main objective of the export control arrangements is to develop a
consensus on tendencies and risks relating to the trade in items which
may be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction. This
is considered an important objective, since no country can act forcefully on its own on this issue of high political priority. If, on the other
hand, the highly industrialised countries act jointly by adapting common guidelines, the chances of succeeding improve significantly. This
also reduces the risk of unfair treatment of one country’s industries to
the advantage of competitors in other countries. From this stems the
large interest in participating voluntarily in the regimes and following
adapted guidelines, the implementation of which is up to the member
countries. The arrangements are not aimed at any particular state, but
should be applied non-discriminatorily and globally.
27
Appendix 3
Presentation of authorities
In March 1992, a seminar on co-operation in non-proliferation
matters brought together representatives from the Prime Minister’s
Office, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and
certain authorities. The meeting led to the creation of an informal
co-operation group – the small reference group – which since then
meets twice a year, unless events call for additional meetings. The
main objective is to create and maintain efficient and informal contacts between authorities.
A short presentation of the authorities and contact persons taking part
in the small reference group will follow. As will be evident from the
presentations, the authorities concerned are export control authorities, expert authorities, law enforcement agencies, intelligence authorities, and authorities with special tasks in case of NBC accidents
or incidents.
Swedish Defence Research Agency – FOI ............................................30
National Defence Radio Centre – FRA .................................................31
Swedish Armed Forces – FM .................................................................32
National Inspectorate of Strategic Products – ISP ...............................33
Swedish Emergency Management Agency– KBM ..............................34
Swedish Coast Guard – KBV ..................................................................34
National Police Board – RPS. .................................................................36
Swedish Maritime Administration – SJÖV ...........................................37
National Board of Health and Welfare – SoS .....................................38
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate – SKI..........................................39
Swedish Rescue Services Agency – SRV ................................................40
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority – SSI ....................................41
Swedish Security Service – SÄPO ..........................................................42
The Customs Service ..............................................................................43
28
Swedish Defence Research Agency – FOI
(Ministry of Defence)
The FOI has a special responsibility as a centre of expertise on NBC
issues. The relevant knowledge is acquired by e.g. FOI’s own research,
contacts with the research community and processing of intelligence
information. In proliferation issues, the international network of
contacts is large. The FOI supplies technological and other expertise
for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, as
well as for a number of authorities within the total national defence.
Support is also supplied to international organisations, as the UN and
the OPCW.
• The FOI provides background material and support for legislative
work and export control issues.
• The FOI is prepared to make experts and equipment available to
responsible authorities in case of incidents, terrorist threats or similar situations.
• The FOI has the competence and measurement equipment also
to perform field-studies, for example materials investigation.
The FOI
NBC protection
172 90 Stockholm
Phone 08-401 26 00
Phone 08-555 030 00
901 82 Umeå
Phone 090-10 66 00
Contact persons:
N
B
C
Lena Oliver,
1st Researcher
Phone 08-555 034 42
Mob. 070-151 07 88
Roger Roffey,
Chief Engineer
Phone 090-10 66 05
Phone 08- 405 42 08
Mob. 070-927 70 69
Anders Lindblad,
Researcher
Phone 090-10 66 03
Mob. 070-207 77 67
29
National Defence Radio Centre – FRA
(Ministry of Defence)
The function of the FRA is to engage in signals intelligence to meet
intelligence requirements within different areas. In the context of
preventing and detecting proliferation of NBC weapons, FRA plays
a supportive role.
National Defence Radio Centre
Box 301
161 26 Bromma
Phone 08-471 46 00
E-mail: fra@fra.se
Website: www.fra.se
Contact person:
Anders Wik
Phone 08-471 48 90
30
Swedish Armed Forces – FM
(Ministry of Defence)
The Swedish Armed Forces has the overall responsibility to organise
the country’s defence. In peacetime, one of the governing tasks of the
armed forces is to engage in different types of international peacekeeping missions. The Armed Forces also organise various qualified
resources to support society in case of critical peacetime situations,
such as accidents or natural catastrophes, or when important public
utilities fail.
Within the Armed Forces, the Joint Military Intelligence and Security
(MUST) handles the intelligence and security aspects of proliferation
issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, or their components
in the form of chemical, biological or nuclear substances as well as
missile technology. MUST also makes threat assessments of our immediate surroundings and other regions where Swedish personnel or
detachments are working or may be deployed.
MUST works closely with other authorities in proliferation issues,
e.g. SÄPO, the Customs Service, the ISP and the FOI.
Within MUST, the Transnational section (part of the Intelligence section) handles all issues connected to proliferation.
Armed Forces
Emergency Service
Telephone
MUST
UND TN
107 86 Stockholm
Fax 08-788 80 89
Situation centre MUST
Phone 08-788 81 59
Encrypted 08-788 81 79
Contact persons
Per Andersson
Phone 08-788 80 79
Bertil Höckerdahl
Phone 08-788 80 53
31
National Inspectorate of Strategic Products – ISP
(Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
The National Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) is tasked with
the control of exports from Sweden of war equipment and dual-use
items (civilian items and technology with a possible military use). The
ISP is also the national authority responsible for the implementation
of the UN convention on chemical weapons.
The ISP decides on issues concerning licences, prohibitions and exceptions in individual cases pursuant to the Military Equipment Act
(1992:1300) and the Act (2000:1064) on Control of Dual-use Items
and Technical Assistance. The same is valid for Council Regulation
(EC) No 149/2003, amending and updating Regulation (EC) No
1334/2000, setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology. If an individual case may form
a precedent or otherwise is of particular importance, the ISP should
forward it to the government for ruling.
The authority also has a technical and scientific board with six members appointed by the government. The board is to give advice in matters relating to the fixing of boundaries between civilian and military
equipment, as well as between different types of military equipment.
The ISP has extensive knowledge and close contacts with a large
number of Swedish industrial enterprises, many of which have widespread international contacts. The ISP also has information on buyer
countries, items, etc.
National Inspectorate of Strategic Products
Box 70232
107 22 Stockholm
Phone 08-406 31 00
E-mail: isp@isp.se
Website: www.isp.se
Contact persons:
32
Military equipment
Other strategic items
Chemical weapons
Stefan Hansson,
Colonel
Phone 08-406 31 27
Egon Svensson,
Chief Engineer
Phone 08-406 31 15
Annmari Lau
Eriksson,
Dept. Director
Phone 08-406 31 07
Swedish Emergency Management Agency – KBM
(Ministry of Defence)
The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (KBM) co-ordinates
the work to develop the preparedness of Swedish society to manage
serious crises. Together with municipalities, county councils and government authorities, as well as the business community and several
organisations, the KBM works to reduce the vulnerability of society
and improve the capacity to handle emergencies.
The main tasks of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency
within the NBC area are to:
• co-ordinate and direct the activities for protection against nuclear,
biological and chemical warfare agents
• initiate and support co-operation between actors with tasks relating to the NBC area
• contribute a comprehensive view of the NBC area.
Swedish Emergency Management Agency
Box 599
101 31 Stockholm
Website: www.krisberedskapsmyndigheten.se
Contact persons:
Karin Måwe
Phone 08-593 711 96
Karin Börjesson
Phone 08-593 713 77
33
Swedish Coast Guard – KBV
(Ministry of Defence)
The Swedish Coast Guard is a civilian authority tasked with maritime
surveillance, other supervision and control activities, as well as with
environmental response operations at sea. The surveillance territory
is geographically delimited to the Swedish economic zone, territorial
waters, inner waters, Lake Vänern and Lake Mälaren.
The surveillance and control activities include the supervision of
maritime traffic rules, fishing control, customs regulations, military
restricted areas, environmental protection regulations, water pollution and dumping regulations, maritime search and rescue operations, and border control. To fulfil its tasks, the Coast Guard works
closely with other authorities in the maritime sector, such as the
Police, the Customs Service, the Armed Forces, and the Swedish
Maritime Administration. The surveillance of the Coast Guard is
conducted round-the-clock within Swedish territorial waters and the
Swedish economic zone. The patrol service uses vessels, hovercraft
and aircraft.
To strengthen and co-ordinate the surveillance activities at sea, the
Coast Guard has joined forces with corresponding organisations in
the Nordic countries and other states with a Baltic Sea border.
Swedish Coast Guard
Central management
Stumholmen
Box 536
371 23 Karlskrona
Phone 0455-35 34 00
Contact persons:
Henry Nilsson
National Liaison Office
Phone 08-401 37 68
34
Staffan Kvarnström
Coastguard director
Phone 08-789 79 22
National Police Board – RPS
(Ministry of Justice)
The main task of the National Police Board is to create the best possible conditions in the short and long term for good police work, in
accordance with the directives issued by the parliament and government. The board is to follow up and analyse the police work so that it
meets the standards set forth by Government authorities.
Other tasks of the National Police Board include:
• keeping central police records
• drawing up police emergency plans
• organising a national counter-terrorist unit with the main assignment to fight possible terror attacks in the country
• constituting the national unit for Interpol and Europol
• constituting the national contact hub for the Schengen co-operation.
The Policing Management Division (POL) of the National Police
Board consists of three sections: the sections for surveillance, for legal
proceedings and for police law. The division receives a constant flow
of cases concerning e.g. proposals for amendments and opinions on
proposed measures. Co-operation with other authorities and organisations in matters which put special demands on functioning public
services is another of the division’s assignments. The responsibility in
matters of general character in e.g. the NBC area rests, as far as the
police force is concerned, with the section for surveillance.
National Police Board
Policing management division
Box 122 56
102 26 Stockholm
Website: www.polisen.se
Contact persons
Vivian Soest, superintendent
Phone 08-401 77 25
E-mail: vivian.soest@rps.police.se
Peter Lindberg, inspector
Phone 08-401 90 25
peter.lindberg@rps.police.se
35
Swedish Maritime Administration – SJÖV
(Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications)
The Swedish Maritime Administration is a public enterprise within
the transport sector. The administration is responsible for important
parts of maritime infrastructure in the form of sea lanes and the safety
of these, as well as the safety aboard vessels.
The tasks of the administration involve pilotage, ice-breaking, publication of nautical charts, tending to light-houses, maintaining fairways, maritime search and rescue operations, and vessel inspections.
Merchant shipping is the main concern of the activities, but navy
interests, leisure and fishing boat traffic are also taken into consideration. The headquarters of the Swedish Maritime Administration are
located in Norrköping. Regionally, there are seven maritime traffic areas, three inspectorate areas along the coast, and one maritime search
and rescue centre.
Swedish Maritime Administration
601 78 Norrköping
Contact persons
Börje Sjöquist, head of protective security
Phone 011-191354
Fax 011-160579
36
Torbjörn Edenius, head of division
Phone 011-191256
Fax 011-101949
National Board of Health and Welfare – SoS
(Ministry of Health and Social Affairs)
Within the policy area Civil Defence, the National Board of Health
and Welfare has the responsibility, in collaboration with county councils and municipalities, to establish and sustain the preparedness of
civilian health care and social services (within the sphere of activities
of the Board) in response to incidents involving NBC substances,
including disease prevention and health protection. Preparedness is
improved through competence and knowledge development in a
number of knowledge centres. Furthermore, the Board has medical
expert groups in the different fields. The infectious-diseases physicians organisation is tasked with the continuous surveillance of the
epidemiological situation in Sweden and the surrounding world. The
organisation has elaborated practices for the handling of incidents in
the field of biological weapons.
The knowledge centres work to identify substances and methods with
a potential aggressive use. In order to use the information adequately,
the work is conducted in co-operation with the Security Service.
The National Board of Health and Welfare intends to enter special
procurement agreements with institutions involved in the different
knowledge centres. A security records check must be performed on
the experts taking part in the medical expert groups.
National Board of
Health and Welfare
Emergency
Service Telephone
The unit for emergency preparedness
106 30 Stockholm
Website: www.sos.se
Officer on standby
Phone 060-10 90 10
Contact persons:
Peter Kulling, Head of Unit
Phone 08-555 530 49
Mobile 0708-83 30 49
Jonas Holst, Special Adviser
Phone 08-555 530 17
Mobile 0733-54 68 44
37
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate – SKI
(Ministry of the Environment)
The tasks of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate in the field of
nuclear non-proliferation are to:
• ensure that all nuclear facilities and nuclear material in Sweden or
under Swedish jurisdiction are protected against intrusion, sabotage and theft (physical protection)
• ensure that the use of nuclear technology and nuclear material in
Sweden or under Swedish jurisdiction comply with Sweden’s international commitments as regards non-proliferation of nuclear
material and technology
• actively work to develop and strengthen the international work on
nuclear safety and non-proliferation.
The SKI is the responsible authority pursuant to Ordinance
(2000:1217) on Control of Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance,
in questions concerning export of items listed in Annex 1, category 0
of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000.
The government has commissioned the SKI to support nuclear nonproliferation work in the former Soviet states. The support includes
measures in the fields of nuclear substance control, physical protection and export control.
Swedish Nuclear Power
Inspectorate
Emergency Service
Telephone
106 58 Stockholm
Phone 08-698 84 00
Fax 08-661 90 86
E-mail: ski@ski.se
Website: www.ski.se
(outside office hours)
Inspector on duty
Phone 08-654 24 69
Contact persons:
Monika Eiborn,
Head of Dept.
Phone 08-698 84 26
monica.eiborn@ski.se
38
Göran Dahlin,
Deputy Head of Dept.
Phone 08-698-84 42
goran.dahlin@ski.se
Stig Isaksson
Case Officer
Phone 08-698 84 49
stig.isaksson@ski.se
Swedish Rescue Services Agency – SRV
(Ministry of Defence)
The Swedish Rescue Services Agency is a central administrative
authority competent in matters relating to accident and damage
prevention measures pursuant to the Swedish Rescue Services Act,
land transports of dangerous goods, construction of shelters, rescue
services, and decontamination following a release of radioactive substances from a nuclear facility, when this is not a task for another authority. The Rescue Services Agency is also the responsible authority
for the function Population protection and rescue service, under the
Emergency Planning Ordinance.
The Agency makes risk assessments and conducts development activities in the field, for instance the development of alert procedures
to warn the population in case of a heightened state of alert and in
case of peacetime accidents.
The Agency co-ordinates the emergency planning for nuclear accidents and other serious accidents. It also has government mandate to
prepare to assist the government following serious accidents, by obtaining expert opinions and supporting material from other authorities and organisations.
The Agency is tasked with the supervision of the regional emergency
planning for rescue service and decontamination following the release
of radioactive material, as well as with supplying information in the
field of activity.
During the last years, international co-operation has increased, particularly as regards the Nordic and Baltic countries. The commitments to organisations as the IAEA, NATO, PfP and the EU are also
increasing.
Swedish Rescue Services Agency
650 80 Karlstad
Phone 054-13 50 00
Website: www.srv.se
Contact persons:
Ingemar Malmström
Phone 054-135064
Monica Rhodin
Phone 054-135372
39
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority – SSI
(Ministry of the Environment)
The Swedish Radiation Protection Authority has the task of protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation.
The SSI ensures that the risks and benefits are evaluated to minimise
the risk involved for the individual. Activities involving radiation are
regulated by a special Radiation Protection Act and by regulations issued by the SSI. Activities involving radiation usually necessitate an
authorisation from the SSI.
The Swedish Radiation Protection Authority:
• issues regulations and ensures that they are observed, for example
through inspections
• carries out research projects to increase radiation knowledge
• provides information, training and advice
• monitors radiation in the environment
• keeps a round-the-clock preparedness for radiation injuries
• participates in national and international collaborations, e.g.
through organisations such as the ICRP, the IAEA, OECD-NEA
and UNSCEAR.
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority
171 16 Stockholm
Phone 08-729 71 00
Website: www.ssi.se
Contact persons:
Birgitta Svahn
Phone 08-729 72 42
40
Peter Hofvander
Phone 08-729 72 45
The Swedish Security Service – SÄPO
(Ministry of Justice)
The Security Service has a responsibility to prevent and investigate trade
in items where it can be suspected that these items are intended for use in
the production of weapons of mass destruction, and to prevent intelligence
activities aiming to support such activities. The Security Service has an indirect responsibility to prevent groups and individuals monitored as part of
its regular activities (terrorists, extremists, agents and others) from breaking
the law as concerns the spreading of contagion or poison, the planning of
murder, sabotage, activities endangering the public, devastation, etc., using
NBC substances. SÄPO also has a co-ordinating function for the small and
large reference groups.
In order for the Security Service to perform well in this field, a good cooperation and functioning information channels with companies as well as
ministries and authorities are of utmost importance. Examples of the kind
of information we are grateful to receive from companies, research institutes, etc., are:
• suspected acquisition attempts and procedures, also when they have not
been carried out, since they can provide interesting information on practices and current actors in the field
• purchases of items that only just meet the criteria for exemption from
export restrictions, since these items may be intended for the production
of weapons of mass destruction
• exactly the same inquiries from different actors about dual-use items
• persons willing to pay large amounts of money for simple services
with possible connections to the acquisition of items for WMD programmes
• potential losses of radioactive sources, which could be used for terror
purposes.
The Swedish Security
Service
Emergency Service
Telephone
PO Box 8304
104 20 Stockholm
Phone 08-401 90 00
Website: www.sakerhetspolisen.se
Communications centre (round the clock)
Phone 08-401 26 00
Fax 08-401 48 85
Contact persons:
Håkan Forsström
Detective Superintendent
Phone 08-401 26 76
Åsa Eriksson
Detective Inspector
Phone 08-401 88 92
41
Swedish Customs Service
(Ministry of Finance)
The Swedish Customs Service collects duty, taxes and other fees at
import and supervises that regulations for import and export of commodities are observed. In the field of crime-fighting, high priority is
given to drug smuggling, large-scale alcohol and tobacco smuggling,
and organised crime.
The non-proliferation work is carried out alongside with other authorities concerned, nationally as well as internationally. The task of
the Customs Service to identify unauthorised items in the flow of
goods (4,714,000 customs declarations for import and export during
2001) is facilitated if the Customs has/receives up-to-date information on:
• projects for the development of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles
• key items in great demand for the projects
• importers, exporters and middlemen
• methods to circumvent export control, including information on
transhipment countries and ports.
Swedish Customs
Service
Emergency Service
Telephone
PO Box 2267
112 98 Stockholm
National communications centre
(round the clock)
Tel. 08-10 79 00
Website: www.tullverket.se
Contact persons
Hans Johnsson
Phone 08-405 02 11
hans.johnsson@tullverket.se
42
Peter Kröjs
Phone 08-405 03 45
peter.krojs@tullverket.se
Appendix 4
Measures when finding NBC
material
Measures when finding radioactive material
The transport of radioactive material takes place daily on a fully legal
basis, and should be carried out in respect of current legislation in the
area. Transport containers, labelling and transport documents must
conform to applicable regulations.
1. If suspected radioactive material is found, a police officer or a customs officer should be sent for (Call 112).
2. The police officer, customs officer or coast guard officer should
immediately see to it that measuring instruments are brought to
the site. Measuring instruments are available at most Customs authorities, at all nuclear power plants, at Studsvik in Nyköping, at
Westinghouse Atom in Västerås, at all Environment and Health
Protection Offices and at the Search and Rescue Service. If the personnel present at the site lack training in measuring ionising radiation, the assistance of trained personnel should also be requested.
While awaiting the arrival of measuring instruments to the site,
precautions should be taken to avoid unnecessary exposure of persons to the material.
3. If the measurement gives a result above 0,7 μSv/h (microsievert per
hour), the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) should
be notified on telephone number 08-729 71 00. This applies also
when the dose rate (radiation level) on the surface is higher than
double the background level at the site. Outside office hours, the
radiation protection inspector on call is contacted on 112.
The SSI can give advice and instructions over the telephone. In
emergency cases, the SSI may take a decision to send a radiation
protection inspector to the site.
If the measured dose rate does not give cause to contact SSI, no
special measures need to be taken. The material is then handled
as ordinary goods.
43
4. At high dose rates, the area should be cordoned, alternatively the
radiation source relocated, so that persons are not exposed to dose
rates exceeding 20 μSv/h, awaiting measures taken by the SSI.
When necessary, the Customs office may request the assistance of
the police to cordon off the area. If the SSI representative cannot
come to the site, the representative will give advice and instructions
on how to proceed, for instance as regards radiation shielding.
5. The SSI will provide instructions on how to proceed with the handling of the radioactive material. If the material has to be taken care
of for further transport, the SSI will contact Studsvik RadWaste,
who can take care of collection, transport, destruction or disposal
of the material.
6. If the material consists of nuclear substance (for example uranium
or plutonium), the SSI also has the responsibility to notify the
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). The SKI should investigate the origin of the material, etc.
7. All costs incurred in connection with the disposal of radioactive
material are defrayed by the authority initiating the disposal procedure.
To bear in mind when handling radioactive material:
Time:
Do not spend more time than necessary close to
the material.
Distance:
The radiation level decreases by the square of the
distance.
Shielding:
When necessary – shield as instructed by the
SSI.
Should it be suspected that persons have been exposed to
radiation or have been contaminated by radioactive material,
a hospital should be contacted. The SSI can also give advice.
44
Measures when finding chemical warfare agents or
their precursors
Suspicious chemicals may be labelled or unlabelled. Most chemicals
are probably labelled, since it would be complicated and entail too
great a risk to use a code system for chemical receptacles, also for the
person designing the code. The risk for disastrous mistakes would be
even greater in the absence of labelling.
Chemicals labelled as dangerous goods can be identified. Some
chemical warfare agents will be included in the catalogue of dangerous goods. As a complement to this, police and customs authorities
will keep a list of chemical warfare agents and their precursors.
1. If suspected chemicals are found, a police officer or a customs officer should be sent for (Call 112).
2. If the chemicals found are included on the list of chemical warfare
agents, precautions should be taken to avoid unnecessary exposure
of persons to the material.
3. If the goods have to be moved, and the goods are not safely packed,
personal protection for those who undertake the task is required.
4. If the chemicals found are precursors, the export licence should be
checked with the ISP.
For the further handling of the goods, experts from the FOI NBC
protection or the local rescue service should be contacted. They have
resources for identification, disposal and possible decontamination
of the goods.
Measures when finding infectious material
Transports of infectious material take place on a fully legal basis.
Transport containers and labelling must conform to applicable regulations. There is special legislation as well as regulations on import
and export of certain infectious substances.
Institutions working with highly infectious pathogenic microorganisms are registered, and licences are issued by the Swedish Work
Environment Authority. Keeping highly infectious material in freezers, for instance, does not require registration. For this reason, it is
not known where in Sweden different infectious microorganisms are
stored.
45
1. If suspected infectious material is found, a police officer or a customs officer should be sent for (Call 112).
2. Any goods found containing suspected infectious material should
be handled with precaution and experts should be sent for. In such
cases, support can be given from the FOI NBC protection, the
Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control and the National
Veterinary Institute.
3. If the material is carefully packed and there is no risk of leaks,
it may be handled with precaution and transported to a qualified microbiological laboratory for analysis. This is particularly
important if extremely infectious and dangerous agents may be
suspected. The analysis may be time-consuming if the infectious
substance is not known.
4. Police and customs authorities will keep a list of biological warfare
agents.
5. If suspected infectious material is found in leaking or otherwise
defective containers, qualified microbiological experts should be
sent for. The task force set up by the National Board of Health
and Welfare under the guidance of the Infectious Diseases Unit,
the University Hospital, Linköping, may be of help in such cases,
since they have special protective suits.
46
Swedish Security Service
Box 8304
104 20 Stockholm