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SPECIAL ARTICLES
Identity,
Communal
Consciousnessand
Politics
Ghanshyam Shah
To what extentdo differentcross-sectionsof society subscribeto the communalideologies whichprovide legitimacyto
communalriots?Toanswerthisquestionwe need to explorepeople 'sperceptionson communaldivisionsand relatedissues.
Anattemptis made in thispaper to examineindividualidentityand communalconsciousnessand theirmanifestationin the
political arena througha surveyof peoplefrom differentparts of Surat city whichwitnessedcommunalriots in December
1992 soon after the demolitionof Babri masjid.
INQUIRIESinto the natureand intensityof
communalriots in Surat and elsewhere re-
supportbase in public life. Such an identity
may also be assigned to an individual by
veal that though agents provocateurs and
census, historians,social scientists and soparticipantsin acts of violence were few, a cial or political leaders and over time may
large number of onlookers occasionally be imbibed by a community and hence its
joined the crowd and extended subtle sup- members.The notion of identity is contexport to the rioters. On the eve as well as tualandkeepschangingwithtime andspace.
duringthe riots in the city, the atmosphere In the complex modernworld one simultawas surchargedwith emotions reinforcing neously has more thanone set identity. For
communalcategories and idioms. To what instance, an individual may be a nagar
extent do the cross-sections of a society brahmin ('jati'), brahmin ('varna'),
share the communal ideology which pro- vaishnava, Hindu, Surati,Gujarati,Indian,
vides legitimacy to such riots? In order to businessman,Congressman,social activist
understandthis, we need to explore percep- and so on at the same time. While being
tions and opinions of the people on the conscious of all these identitiesone expresssubject of communal division and related es themvaryinglyin varyingcontexts.Noneissues. As a preliminaryexercise to under- theless, certain identities within a given
stand the complexities of 'mind-sets' of socio-political milieu have precedenceover
people, let us examine the natureof individ- other identities.
ual identity and communal consciousness
Identityformationwhich is often, but not
and also how they get manifested in the always, a culturalconstruct,is a process of
political arena. The present study is con- 'inclusionandexclusion' of valuesandsymfined to Suratcity which witnessed commu- bols defining 'we' and 'they' or 'us' and
nal riotsin December 1992, soon afterdem- 'others'. In the process boundariesbetween
olition of Babri masjid. The study is based the two takeshapewhose formskeep changon survey research, interviewing 723 per- ing from time to time. Relationships besons in May-June 1993, from various parts tween 'we' and 'they' are not necessarily
always conflicting or competitive.
of the city.*
Acknowledgements of commonality and
overlappings between the two in various
social spheresoften blurthe boundaries.On
Identity
the other hand, when a cultural identity
Individualidentity is not just one's rela- takes a political form, differentiationsbetionship with others. It is not merely an tween 'we' and 'they' get sharperandhardascriptive or achieved membershipof this ened. Conflict andcompetitionbetween the
or thatcollectivity. It is essentially a matter two-particularly for those who give politof being and it is this consciousness of ical meaning to identity and/or vie for the
belonging to this or that collectivity and of control of resources-become sharp and
being a memberof an imaginedcommunity tend to gather a specific shape. In the prothat determines the form of this identity. cess, meaningof 'we' and 'they' also change
Such being or belonging is codified and that of the cultural construct. Prejudices
invented by one's own self or assigned by become pronouncedand boundariesfor inothers.The course of 'invention' and 'imbi- teractionsget redrawnwherein commonalbition' is complex and contextual. Take a ity is ignoredor underplayedanddifferentisimple example of one identifying as a ations are stretchedor reinvoked.
kshatriya.One may inheritthis identityfrom
It is an agendafor the Hindu and Muslim
a family or a social collectivity in which one fundamentalistsalike to ignore occupationsocialises. It is an ascriptive identity. And/ al and internal socio-cultural differentiaor one begins to identify as a kshatriyain tionswithinthereligiouscommunities.Their
spite of the 'jati' being differentin orderto aim is to shape andcarve out unified monogain status and security as well as expand lithic Hindu or Muslim identity of an indione's social sphere or for widening one's vidual. Towards such an end, symbols are
relationshipfor creatingand reinforcingthe evolved, legends are inventedandhistoryis
Economic and Political Weekly
May 7, 1994
reinterpreted. Besides ideological reconstructions,severalprogrammesarelaunched
in order to develop communalidentityand
consciousness of the two religious groups.
Hatred against each other is invoked and
exhorted. People however do not necessarily get carried away by such propaganda
always. Often selective, they get persuaded
by exhortations suiting their material or
psychologicalneeds. Along withotherintragroup social or individual rivalries, such
campaigns nevertheless pave the way to
communal violence. Riots in return reinforce the communalidentity. An individual
who has internalisedcommunalconsciousness may or may not participatedirectly in
riotsbut tendsto legitimise violence. Therefore, understandingthe natureof communal
identity and its associated consciousness
becomes imperative for comprehending
communal phenomena.
In orderto ascertainas to what was uppermost in respondents'mindsabouttheiridentity, we asked open-ended questions:"Different people introduce themselves differently. Given the fact that some introdtfce
themselves by their occupations such as
businessman,worker,teacher,etc. Some by
region such as Gujarati,Tamilian, Bihari
andthe like, some by 'jati' andsome by their
'dharma',how would you introduceyourself to a strangerasking for your introduction?".The question was somewhat repeated to know the second identity. Of course,
one's introduction to a stranger does not
necessarily capture complexities of identity. This is only one tentative clue to unfolding one's identity. A caveat needs to
be entered about the context that people
were interviewed in May-June 1993, soon
afterthe second phase of riots. And respondents were told thatour studywas regarding
the recent communal disturbancesin the
city.
The responses are reportedin Table 1. It
is a cross-tablegiving firstandsecond identity. Since 9 per cent of the respondentsdid
not answer the first question, the second
question was not applicableto them. Onefifth of the respondentsdid not give their
second identity. For them there was no
difference between their first and second
identity.
1133
One-fifth of the population identified
themselves as belonging to specific religious groups. All of them however did not
introduce themselves as Hindus or Muslims. A few expressedtheiridentityby sect.
"I am none but a Swaminarayaniand all
those who follow the Swaminarayansect
aremy brothersand sisters",a businessman
dealing in diamond trade told us. He had a
'tilak' placed on his forehead which is a
distinct markof the sect. Similar instances
were also found among the Muslims. For
example, a Sunni Vohra businessman preferredto be called a Sunni Vohraratherthan
a Muslim. One-fourthof those giving religion as theirfirs. identity also repeatedit to
be their second identity. In this case, they
gave the name of theirsect. That is, the first
identityas Hinduandthesecondas Vaishnava
or vice versa.
A majoritywho placed religious identity
over other identities are workers in white
collarjobs and students. Religious identity
was expressed in larger proportionby the
minority groups. Their number is larger
among the Jains, Christiansand Buddhists
than the Muslims. Among the adivasis expressing religious identity was preferred
only by a handful of persons. The highest
proportion of those who preferred to be
introducedby their religions is found in
middle and uppercaste groups.
Self identity expressed through caste is
pronounced among a sizeable section of
both Hindus as well as Muslims. Those
giving caste as theirfirst identity constitute
the single largest group. Even in terms of
expressions related to the second identity,
caste remainspredominant.Many reiterated their caste status and identification by
placingthemselveswithinspecific sub-castes
as the second identity.In otherwords, while
the first time one identifying himself as a
kshatriyacalled himself koli at the second
level of identity.Thus it appearsthatfor the
majoritythe caste identity is either the first
which precedesreligious or regional identity;or the second, next to regional identity.
Wlhilemany who preferredto express caste
as theirfirstidentityare distributedbroadly
in simiilarproportionacrossall occupational
groups, they are however slightly more
among casual labourers.A large numberof
them belong to the OBCs and only a small
proportion belong to the SCs. In Surat,
OBCs have emergedas a politicaltorce only
recently and are an upwardlymobile group.
One-fifth of the respondents expressed
theirfirstidentityby the placeof theirorigin
either by region or city. Significantly, a
majorityof those inclined to be introduced
in this manner are local Suratis. Twentythreepercent of the Suratisas against 17 per
cent of the immigrants preferredto place
their regional identity over identities like
caste or religion. However, for many of
them the second identity was expressed
1134
through their religion. Thus, to them, regional and religious identitygo together,as
it is the case of caste and religion.
Only a few (9 percent) liked to be identified by theirnamesthatI am so andso. Many
amongthemalso repeatedthatas the second
introduction.A majorityamong this group
are white and blue collar workers and belong to OBCs, SCs and STs. Seven per cent
of the respondents preferred to be introduced as Indiansfirstand a majorityamong
tlhemchose to express their second identity
through religion or caste. This does not
seem surprisingin a situationwherereligion
andnationareseen as co-terminuswith one
another. Only a few expressed their first
identitythroughtheir occupation.They are
mainly factory owners, businessmen and
white collar employees, belonging generally to upperand artisancaste groups.
The natureof economic growthin Indiain
generaland Suratin particularwith a significant portionof its labourforce placed in its
informal sector has had little impact in the
formationof the secular identity. Electoral
politics has helpedin reinforcingprimordial
identities. In such a milieu, it is not surprising for an overwhelming section of the
populationto pronouncecaste as their first
identityirrespectiveof theirsex, age, educational statusandoccupation.The campaign
of the Sanghparivarand Islamicfundamentalists has not succeeded even in weakening
caste and/orsectariandifferences.It is however noteworthythat a relatively large section among the artisancaste groups,SCs and
STs have preterredto introducethemselves
first by their names, occupationsor as Indian ratherthan by castes. This is because a
secularidentitybecomes moreadvantageous
TO A STRANGER
TABLE 1: SELF-INTRODUCTION
(Percenttages)
Second
Religion
Caste
24
44
3
2
19
9
22
23
61
5
2
5
4
36
Religion
Caste
Region
Occupation
-Indian
Indian name
Total
DK, NA excluded.
First Introductionin
Region Occupation Indian Indian Name
5
16
68
11
3
59
18
10
1
10
2
24
5
31
3
11
5
45
7
33
24
6
29
8
8
Total
31
40
6
4
11
8
100
N =575
TABLE 2: COMMUNALCONSCIOUSNESS
(Percentages)
Item
I I am proudof my 'quam'
2 My 'quam' is superiorto the
others in all respects
3 Social, economic and political
interestsof all membersof my
'quam'are the same and for
the protection of these interests
all membersof the 'quam'
should work together.
4 Unity and organisationof the
'quam' are necessaryfor the
protectionof its interests
5 If it is necessaryto acquire
political power in the interests
of 'quam', it should be done.
6 lnterestsof the H4indus
and
Muislimsare mutuallyopposite,
if one gets advanttage,the other
gets disadvantage
7 Problemiis
and difficulties faced
by Hindus/Muslims,people
belonging to Muslims/Hindus
are largely responsible
8 We should not transactwith shopkeeper/factoryowner/vendor
belonging to other 'quam'
9 We should not rent or sell a house
to membersof the other
communityin our locality/
housing complex
Fully
Agree
Somewhat
Agree
Fully
Disagree
Somewhat
Disagree
DK
NA
89
5
1
3
2
40
26
5
26
3
78
15
1
2
4
88
7
1
2
2
41
36
2
16
5
26
24
4
37
9
17
25
9
41
8
14
20.
6
55
5
16
19
6
53
6
Economic and Political Weekly
May 7, 1994
to them than their traditionalcaste identity
which puts them at the lower rungs on the
caste ladder.The question then arises as to
howdoes an individualidentityget reflected
in communalconsciousness?
Consciousness of one's 'quam' or the organisations too do the same thing. They
communal consciousness in this context is inculcatecommunalconsciousness through
not just a question of belonging to his/her various means. Symbols and legends are
community, but also the intensity of one's invented and history fabricatednot only to
identificationwith it. In a 'communalised' glorify the past, but also to raise hopes for
situation,intensityof communalconscious- a betterfuture.This has been the mission of
II
ness is related with one's perceptionabout the RSS since the 20s. Hindu religious
'others' who areconsideredrivals.We have leadershave given themselves the responsiCommunal Consciousness
examined five dimensions of this complex bility of 'reviving and rejuvenating'Hindu'Quam' (in Gujaratiit is pronounced as state of mind. They are (i) identification ism and Hindu political leaders have creat'kom') or 'jat', thatis commune or commu- with one's 'quam'; (ii) commonality of ed various symbols, festivals and idioms to
nity, is more often than not understoodand interestsof the membersof the 'quam' and foster unity among Hindus.They harpupon
referredto in day-to-dayparlanceas caste or hence the need of their protection; (iii) the greatness of their religion and the conclusterof castes in India.While referringin perceptions about 'others'; (iv) economic tributions that it has made towards world
this manner,one imagines having an imme- relations with others; and (v) political civilisation. This mission of developing a
Hindu consciousness has continued. The
diateor a distantsocial relationship,sharing power for the 'quam'.
One gets socialised in 'jati' dharmafrom BJP and the Sangh parivarhave been greatcommon heritage and 'sanskar' (culture)
and fraternitywith membersof the 'quam'. childhood. Even those traditionallyconsid- ly successful in this task in recent years.
Such notionof 'quam' is not only prevalent ered as 'shudras'or 'ati-shudras'and treat- Like elsewhere in the country, they also
among the caste-Hindus, but also among ed as subordinateby those above are taught launched massive campaigns in Suratdurvarious Muslim social groups. We have to perform the dharma sincerely so as to
already seen that in the midst of religion- improve their positions in the next birth.
TABLE 5: INDIVIDUALIDENTrY OF INTENSE
based communal polarisations,many caste Those unhappywith theirascribedposition
COMMUNAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
Hindusand Muslims preferto identify their invent legends and sanskritise their rituals
(Percentages)
'quam'as 'jati' or 'jamat'. Even while the and life style to establish new status.Tradiof Intense
Proportion
Muslims as a minority are forced to join tionallyascribedpositions,as acknowledged
CommunalConsciousness
Identity
hands as Muslims on religious ground for in society, are often disowned and the asFirst
Second
their security and survival, a number of piredposition becomes real. All caste asso37
23
them (28. per cent) continue to identify ciations in theirmeetings, conferences, fes- Religion
24
30
themselves as maleks, memons, vohras, tivals andjournalsrepeatedlyask theircaste Caste
5
40
members to be proud of their 'quam/jati' Region
khojas,more salams Garesiyas and so on.
5
1
This does not mean that religiobs 'quam' and to get united and organisedto preserve Occupation
8
Indian
15
as Hindus or Muslims do not exist at their and advancetheirinterestsand 'asmita', i e, Indian name
4
22
collective consciousness. The above data identity and dignity. Leaders of religious
show that after caste, most of.thermidentified with the religious 'quam'. This is beOFHIGH
CHARACTERISTICS
COMMUNAL
TABLE
3: SoCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC
CONSCIOUSNESS
(Percentages)
cause of a variety of reasons. It is partly
becauseof theirreal or imaginaryhistorical Sex
Occupation
heritage, linked with other social groups
withinthe largercaste structurein the Hindu
24
26
Factory owners
Male
framework. Certain, commonality among
27
43
Professionals
Female
members of the 'same' religion through
24
Traders
27
White-collarworkers
sharingof festivals, chanting name/s of the Age
28
Factory workers
same god/s, performanceof certain rituals,
29
25
Vendors
15-25 years
consideringcertain texts and scripturesas
27
22
Casual
labourers
26-35
years
to
a
contribute
comdeveloping
holy, etc,
28
29'
Others
36-46 years
monreligiousidentity. State,religious lead24
47-55 years
ers and intellectuals codify people as Hin28
Above 55 years
Caste/Community
dus or Muslims for at least the last two
centuriesand see them as 'juxtaposed' in Education
28
Upper castes
22
Middle castes
relationto one another.Significantly, social
25
25
Artisancastes
Illiterate
andreligiousreformersand political leaders
33
29
Low castes
Primary
who mobilised various 'jatis' and 'jamats'
32
22
Scheduled castes
Secondary
at various regional levels amongst Hindus
31
32
Scheduled tribes
College
as well as Muslims since the mid- 19th cen16
Other Hindus
turyalsohelpedin strengtheningsuchbound29
Muslims
anes.
37
Christians/jains/buddhists
Both meaningsof the term 'quam', 'jati'
or 'jamat' and Hindu or Muslim seem to
exist almost simultaneously at a cognitive
TABLE 4: PERCEPT`ONOF FAMILY'S ECONOMICCONDMON AND COMMUNALCONSCIOUSNESS
(Percentages)
level. Within a milieu of communal riots,
both the meanings interfuse and overlap Perceptionof
Level of Consciousness
when one speaks to respondentson issues Economic Condition
N
Total
Low
Moderate
High
related to 'quam' without specifying any
14
33
100
55
53
Very
bad
religiouscommunity.It hence becomes dif100
397
52
25
23
ficult to conclude as to what exactly by the Bad
27
100
24
49
176
Not bad
term 'quam' encompasses.
Economicand Political Weekly
May 7, 1994
1135
ing 1989-90 with the aim of making Hindus
conscious of their Hindu identity and to be
proudof being Hindu. "Why should they
feel shy of or inhibited from calling themselves Hindus?",the leaders asked. 'Garva
se kahohumHinduhai' ('say with pridethat
we are Hindus') was popularisedby shouting of slogans, writing on walls, pasting
postersand stickersin every nook and corner of the city. It was an aggressive, campaignduringthe 1990 and 1991 assembly as
well as parliamentary elections by the
VishwaHinduParishad.A small section of
Hindusecularistsattemptedto counterHindu pride throughstickers that said, 'garva
se kaho hum insan hai'. It was however
confined to a small segment of various
sections of the society. Hindu communalists retorted by saying that "yes we are
'insan',but we are also Hindus and what is
wrongwith being a Hindu?"There were no
efforts at discussing the implications of
suchpositions.Those who startedthis campaign simultaneouslyalso talked about superiorityof theirreligion over others. They
keptemphasisingtheirpride as membersof
theircommunity and projecting their religion to be greaterthanothers in all matters.
They talked about strengths of Hinduism,
andits 'glorious'past and statedthat, "Hindus and Hindustanwill rule over the world
and the futurebelongs only to us" in their
pamphletsandcolum'nsin newspapers.The
questionthusarises as to how far the people
have imbibed this ideology?
An overwhelmingnumberof persons irrespective of occupation, sex, income or
political affiliation expressed that "I am
proud of my 'quam' " Since we did not
specify the term Oquam'as a religious community or a caste, it is difficult to say to
which 'quam' they referred.For some the
'quam' meant caste and for others their
religious identity. However, all those who
clearlyprofessedbeingproudof their'quam'
do not subscribe to the Sangh parivar'sor
thenon-Hindufundamentalists'ideology of
superiority of their 'quam' over others.
Thirty-one per cent refused to take such a
position and said thateach community has
good as well as bad aspects.
While trying to ascertain the extent of
agreement with statementsregardingcommon interests of the 'quam' and need for
unity to protectsuch interests,except for a
smallminority(3 percent), all subscribedto
the view of havingcommon socio-economic interests among all the members of a
'quam'.It is truethatthe idea of 'quam'and
itSiinterestsare not understoodsimilarly by
all, While the respondentswere not asked to
clarify their concept of 'quam', some explained as to what they understoodby the
term. For a majority, it was a caste-based
community.But at the same time a few also
identifiedits meaning with a religiouscommunity. A similar pattern emerged while
1136
examining the aspect of common interests
of a 'quam'.
All castes and religious organisations
propagatethattheirmembershave common
interestsand thatthey should work together
for the protectionof their interests.During
the last assembly and parliamentelections,
the VHP, manyof the sadhusandsaints,and
severalfrontorganisationsof the BJPissued
statements and distributed posters asking
people to vote for the party which would
protect the interests of Hindus. A question
arisesas to whetherall membersof a 'quam'
have common social, economic and'political interests.Heretheunderstandingof common interestsvaries from individualto individual and no neat answer emerges. At a
normativelevel, they wish to have as well as
perceive common interestsof the members.
They believe in belonging to the same social
group and thereby inherit a common culture-the culture of caste or the culture of
religion. Political interests for them are
either political dominance or protection.
While economic interests mean economic
upliftment of all members in the 'quam'.
This meansjob opportunities,businessprospects, betterliving conditions,etc. They do
not consider,at least while thinkingin terms
of common interestsof the 'quam', thatthe
factory owners and the labourers or the
landlordsand the tenantsbelonging to the
same 'quam' have conflicting interests.
To a question as to what they consider as
common interests of th'e members of the
'quam',a postgraduatestudentwrote, "Iam
proud to be al Hindu because 'Bharatiya
sanskriti'(culture)is very old andthe Hindu
religion is consideredto be 'mahan'(great)
in the entire world. Geeta, our religious
book, providesinspirationto us, to thecountry, to humansociety, to all individuals,and
to the whole world. I greatly adore and
respect the Geeta. Bharatis a Hindu nation
and it is Hindustan.We should work in the
direction of improving the social and economic condition of our Hindu brethrenand
for that we should get ourselves organised
and united so that others cannot harm our
interests."
Anotherrespondentwho also understood
the term'quam'in termsof a Hinduidentity,
while elaboratingwhat he meant by common interests,extendedrepetitiveandfuzzy
answers. He said that, "dominanceof the
other 'quam' should not be upon us"; and
that"ourinterestsmay be endangeredby the
other 'quam'" or that we are one and
thereforeour interestsare the same.
A Muslim said that the "socio-economic
and political interestsof people in my communityare equal and none in our community shouldbe higheror lower.They all should
workfor the protectionof the interestsof all.
But in reality this is not seen to be practised."
AnotherHindu belonging to a Scheduled
Caste group said that "according to the
Constitutionof India, interestsof the members of our 'quam' are not opposite to each
other. They are equal. However, there is
inequality as far as economic interests are
concerned and that ought not to be so.
ThereforeI believe that we all should work
togetherfor the protectionof our interests."
A memberof a Scheduled Caste, who read
'quam' as caste said that his 'quam' was
socially, ec6nomically andpolitically backward than the others and they should try to
get equality with others. Another respondent from OBC said that, "in my village,
membersof certaincastes own landsandare
educatedandpowerfulwhereasmembersof
our 'quam' are poor and illiterate".
The communality of economic, cultural
and political interests of the membersof a
TABLE7: RELIGIOSITY
AND
COMMUNAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
(Percentages)
(N = 723)
Communal
Consciousness
Low
Low
Moderate
High
Total
N-
28
49
23
100
230
Religiosity
Moderate
High
18
53
29
100
317
19
53
28
100
62
TABLE8: POLMCALPARTICIPATION
AND
COMMUNAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
(Percentages)
(N = 723)
Communal
Consciousness
Political Participation
Low
High
Low
Moderate
Intense
Total
22
51
27
100
25
53
22
100
DK, NA excluded.
TABLE 6: PARTnCIPATnON
IN RELIGIOUSAcrlVITnEs
(Percentages)
(N = 723)
1
2
3
4
5
Visiting mandir/masjid/church
Attending bhajans/discourses
Reading sacred books
Providingfinancial supportHad gone on pilgrimage
Hardly
Occasionally
8
24
33
21
48
26
35
21
42
28
conomic
Sometime Regularly
29
28
28
30
20
35
12
16
4
2
'quam' as perceived by the respondentsin
this context seemingly indicates two things.
Firstly, most of them are vague and talk
about 'common interests' without specifying as to,what they mean by it. They very
nearly repeatwhat politicians say in public
meetings-more of rhetoricthan facts. It is
yox et practerea nihil. Secondly, many
visualise and consider 'comnmn interests'
only at a normativelevel for which they feel
that members of their 'quam' should work
together.Thirdly,those who interpret'quam'
as caste, perceive their 'quam' as 'social
class' having social ties, uniform life style
as well as similareconomic statusamong its
members.
In order to protect the interests of a
'quam', caste leaders and religious
organisations often refer to the need of
capturingpolitical power. For instance, the
Rana Samaj or the Koli Mandal of Surat
repeatedlyappealedto theircaste members
to vote for a Rana or Koli candidate in
differentelections for the protectionof their
interests.Similarly, tribals,Dalits, Patidars
and others who are numerically large urge
upon their caste members the need to acquire political power in order to improve
theircondition.Religious communaliststoo
follow the same logic. The BJP and the
Sangh parivarrepeatedlypropagatethatthe
Congress has always pampered minority
communities and therebyneglected the interestsof the majorityand the Hindus have
to, therefore,get united and capturepower
by defeatingthe Congress-the protectorof
the Muslims. In the absence of this, they
emphasise that the day is not too far when
they will have to appear as a minority.
Duringthe 1991 assemblyelections, several
Sadhus and Saints appealed to Hindus to
vote for thatpartyor candidateclaiming "to
protect the interestsof Hindus".
Those believing in commonalityof interests among members of a 'quam', do not,
however, necessarily subscribe to a view
that there is a need to capture political
power.As muchas 18 percent of the respondentsdid not agree with the view thatit was
necessaryto obtain political power for protecting their interests. On the other hand,
more than three-fourthsdid express a need
to have political power for the interests of
the 'quam'.However, we do not know as to
whattheyactuallymeantby 'capturingpower' and wonder whether it meant voting in
elections for a member of their 'quam' or
forminga politicalpartyor it was a pureand
simple empty expression.
Communalistsoften invoke among members of their 'quam' feelings against other
'quam'. Tribals against non-tribals,
kshatriyas against patidars, upper castes
against backwardcastes and so on. Hindus
are told that they face various problemsfor
which Muslims are responsible.To a set of
two questions aimeedat ascertaining the
Economic and Political Weekly
views of respondents about the extent to
which they thoughttheirinterests(we specified in thelquestionas Hindusor Muslims)
conflicted with the interests of the other
'quam' while' some did not reply, there
were others who felt thatit was difficult for
them to say anythingcategorically.However, 50 percent of the respondents,expressed
a view that the interestsof the two 'quam'
were antagonistic.Some among them shifted their position by not blaming the other
'quam' for theirproblemswith 42 per cent
holding the other 'quam' (Muslim/Hindu)
responsiblefor the problemsbeing faced by
their 'quam'.
Duringthe riots,the Sanghparivarandthe
BJPas well as some otherlocalorganisations
and individualsappealedto people through
public meetings, street-corner\\gatherings
andby distributingleaflets to boycott goods
manufactured or sold by the Muslims.
Hindus were asked to boycott Muslim
autorickshawalas.In one case, a professor
apparently looking like a Hindu woman,
stopped an autorickshawfor going to the
railway station.The driverasked "Madam!
I am a Muslim, would you mind hiring my
rickshaw?"The professorwho did not subscribe to communal segregation was emotionally moved by the question. A few
reportedcases suggest that Muslims were
asked or forced to vacate theirhouses located in predominantlyHindu localities. Even
before riots, other things being equal, there
has been a general tendency to prefer
neighbours of similar social background.
Living clusters of Jains, Vanias, Marwadis,
Punjabis, low castes, etc, within the same
colony is a testimony to this. Nonetheless,
except among a few havingaversionto nonvegetarian food habits, tendency of segregation on the basis of caste and community
in newly constructedapartmentsand colonies did not seem to exist. This situationhas
however changed for the Muslims, particularly after the riots. Communalists from
both groups now talk openly that the 'others' shouldnotbe allowed to acquirea house
in their localities. Let us attemptto ascertain to what extent the people of Surat
subscribe to such views.
A majorityof the people (nearly 60 per
cent) do not supportthe idea of economic
boycott.Thoughsoon afterthe firstphaseof
riots, Hindusavoided Muslim shop-keepers
or vendors, an act determined partly by
emotional anti-Muslim feelings as well as
rumoursabout poison being mixed in food
and the like, it did not continue for long.
Even those believing in boycott, did not
necessarily put that into practice owing to
the intricateeconomic relationships.Similarly, a majority(69 per cent) did not supportthe idea of segregatinghouses on communal lines.'
To get a clearerpictureabout the overall
communalconsciousness an index based on
the nine variables was prepared.The 92
cases not respondingto any of the questions
have been droppedfrom the index. Each of
the items has a four-point scale. Anyone
strongly agreeing to all the propositions is
given 36 points, and the one strongly disagreeing is given 9 points. Based on such
scores, respondentshave been divided into
three categories. Those getting 22 or less
pointshave been consideredto have a lower
degree of communal consciousness as
against those getting 29 or more points and
treated as highly communally conscious
persons. Even while this is an arbitrary
decision, accordingto the score, 51 per cent
havemoderatecommunalconsciousnessand
26 per cent high communal consciousness.
TABLE 9: FOR WHOM WOULD YOU VOTE IN FORTHCOMING
ELECTIONS?
(Percentages)
(N -723)
Communal
Consciousness
Congress
Low
Moderate
Intense
Total
N=
24
46
30
(100)
162
BJP
17
53
30
(100)
316
Religiosity
Others
32
56
12
(100)
25
Undecided
DKIWould
Not Vote
41
60
19
(100)
67
41
44
15
(100)
61
OF ISSUES ACCORDING
TO THEIR IMPORTANCE
TABLE 10: PRIORITISATION
Sr No
First
Second
1 Constructionof Ram mandir/
mosque at Ayodhya
2 Price rise
3 Unemployment
4 Corruption
5 Populationrise
N=
13
40
9
9
29
200
9
20
31
18
21
150
May 7, 1994
Priority
Third
Fourth
3
18
30
24
25
169
7
16
23
39
17
114
Fifth
Total
68
6
7
10
8
55
100
100
100
100
100
688
1137
Intensityof communalconsciousness was
found to be more or less uniform among
malesas well as females. The patternis also
the same among all age groups. There is,
however,some variationwhen we examine
theireducation;?5 per cent of the illiterates
as against 32 per cent of college educated
personswe found to have a high degree of
communalconsciousness (Table 3).
Intense communal consciousness was
found more or less in the same proportion
among various religious groups, though it
was found to be more pronounced among
the Christians,Jains and Buddhists comparedto the Muslims and the Hindus. They
are 37, 29 and 26 per cent respectively.
Among Hindus, the proportion is higher
among the dalits, adivasis and other backward castes compared to the upper and
middlecastes (Table 3). Among the dalits
and adivasis the phenomenon seems perplexing, for as seen earlier the tendency
among them to opt for secular individual
identityis generally high. The data suggest
that collectivity, be it through religion or
caste, is felt by them as necessary for their
mobilityor protectionof interests. It seems
to be a dilemmafor many dalits or adivasis,
for at one level they tend to shun theircaste
identitybut at the same time need to inculcate communalconsciousness while aspiring for political power and economic benefits.
Seemingly, communal consciousness is
widespreadin different degrees among all
occupationalgroups. Twenty-four per cent
of the factoryowners or big businessmenas
well as pettyshop-keepersand27 percent of
white-collaras well as blue-collar factory
workershave intense communalconsciousness.The case of self-employed professionals like doctors and lawyers suggests a differentpatternwith 43 per cent among them
falling rnthe categoryof intensely communalindividual.However,theirnumberin the
samplebeing too small, it might be hasty to
draw conclusions.
The trendis more or less similar among
the economically well off and contented
and those having difficulty even in making
both ends meet (Table 4). Proportion of
intenselycommunalpersonsis slightly higher (33 per cent) amongthose who are worse
off than those who are contented (27 per
cent).
The highest proportionof intensely communalpersonswerefoundamongthose who
preferredto identify themselvesby regions.
But as mentionedearlier,regional and religious identities are not mutuallyexclusive,
for a majoritywho gave regionalidentityas
their initial introduction,stated religion to
be theirsecond identity.Thus, if we take the
firstand second identities together,the pattern emerges as expected. Table 5 shows
thatintensely communal persons are strikingly low among those who preferredto
1138
identify themselves by their name or as
being Indian. And it is significantly lower
among those who identify themselves in
terms of their occupation.
HI
Religiosity and Communal
Consciousness
tive. We shall examine the second aspect of
the problem, i e, relationship between communal consciousness and political participation.
Three indicators have been used to measure political participation, viz, (i) interest
TABLEI 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS
OF THOSE WHOGAVE FIRST PRIORIT TO
CONSTRUCTIONOF RAM MANDIR/MASJID
Some scholars consider that religion
breeds communalconsciousness. For them Occupation
Percentage
religion and secularismcannotexist together. Forsome otherscommunalismis a polit- Sex
Male
12
ical constructand is not related to an indiFemale
12
vidual's faithin a religion. In orderto probe
into these propositionsfive questions were Age
asked about participationin various reli15 - 25 years
13
gious activities. Table 6 shows that one26 - 35 years
12
36 - 46 years
10
thirdof the respondentsvisit religious plac47 - 55 years
16
es regularly.Most of them did not however
Above 55 years
15
participatein other religious activities like
attending'katha'or discoursesregularly.A
Education
majoritydid not read the sacred books and
Illiterate
10
only 2 per cent had gone regularlyon pilPrimary
12
grimage, i e, 'jatra'or 'haj'. A low propor- High School
8
tion of only 4 per cent regularlydonatedfor
9
College
various religious activities.
In order to get an overall pictureof their Social groups
9
Upper castes
participationin religiousactivities, an index
Middle castes
12
of five activities was prepared.Those reArtisancastes
15
ceiving 16 or morepointshave been considLow castes
20
ered to be relativelymore active in religious
Scheduled castes
19
activities. (They may be called personshavScheduled tribes
ing high religiosity.)Only I I percent of the
Other Hindus
16
respondentshave shown such high level of
Muslims
14
religiosity and40 per cent have low level of
Christian/jains / parsi,etc
2
participationin various religious activities.
Table 7 shows thatit is hazardousto say that Occupation
14
Factory owners
religiosity and communalconsciousness go
14
Professionals
That
is
together.
religious persons are not
Shopkeepers
15
necessarilycommunaland vice versa. ProWhite-collar employees
8
portionatelysmallernumberof persons ( 19
Factory workers
15
per cent) having low communalconsciousII
Vendors
ness are found among those who are active
Casual labourers
19
in religiousactivities.Nevertheless,it seems
that if other things are constant,religiously
active persons tend to become communal.
TABLE 12: POLMCAL
AND RELIGIOUS
This may be because meaning of religion PARTICIPATION.PARTY AFFILIAnON AND COMMUNAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
OFTHOSEWHOGAVEFIRST
has undergonechange in which identity of
TOCONSTRUCnON
PRIORITY
OFTEMhwEdMosQuE
being 'we' against 'they' is getting sharper
andcomposite folk religionis getting weak- Level of Political Participation
er. Moreover,religiousplatformshave been
23
High
used in invoking communalpolitics during
Low
10
the recent times.
Supporters
Congress
IV
BJP
Politics and Communal
Consciousness
to
15
Other parties
Political leaders and social scientists often assert that communalism is a political
issue. It may meantwo things.One, political
leaders appropriatecommunal issues in order to obtain larger support in mobilising
people of one or the other community in
electoral politics and second, thatintensely
communal persons are also politically ac-
Communal Consciousness
Low
Moderate
High
6
15
15
Religiosity
Low
Moderate
High
Economic and Political Weekly
6
17
14
May 7,1994
high as 68 per cent gave it the last priority.
Many among those giving first priorityto
the construction of the temple did so because it was a question of faith and dignity
for them. One of them said, "Iknow thatthe
BJPis not going to solve the problemsof our
community and is in no way differentfrom
the Congress. It aspires for power. But who
is really bothered abbut solving problems?
... at least the BJP would unfurlthe saffron
flag on the Lal Killa. This is more imporV
tant."Anotherrespondentsaid thattheBabri
masjid
was a symbol of slavery anda beginConstruction of Mandir and
ning of Muslim rule.Babarbuiltthe mosque
Communal Consciousness
by destroying the temple. Constructionof
the Ram mandir would be a new era for
Another political dimension of comHindutva and it would bring prosperity.
munalisation is reflected in people's views
on the constructionof the Ram mandir or Thereforewe should not talk aboutpoverty
Babri masjid at Ayodhya. Communalriots or unemployment.Once the temple is conin Suratareclosely relatedwith the BJP and structed, other problems would be solved.
Sangh parivarcampaignfor constructionof The Muslims giving priority to the conthe Ram mandir. The campaign had been struction of the mosque felt that by the
built up brickby brickfor the last five years. demolition of the Babri masjid, "we were
And the riots followed soon afterthe demo- badly insulted. This was a direct assaulton
evidence: is there depoliticisation in electoral politics of the intensely communal lition of the Babri masjid. Though in its our very existence, and on our dignity.'?
individuals? Or would it mean thatpolitical campaign the BJP raised other economic Another Muslim respondent said that the
participationin electoral politics tends to and political issues, it essentially banked reconstructionof the mosque on the same
soften communal consciousness? These upon the issue of temple construction.This site was necessary for secularism and that
important-questionswith wider theoretical intensified communal division in society. the minority community was protectedby
We tied to assertainas to how a cowmon the Indian state. However, a handful of
relevance need furtherexamination.
respondents gave priority to the c9^strucIt is now widely accepted that there is person viewed the priorityof the temple.
In order to probe into this question, re- tion ot the templejust to end the commun-al
hardlyany differencebetween the Congress
and the BJP as far as communal politics is spondentswere askedto prioritisefive prob- problemonce and for all. A medical doctor
concemed. The Congress distributesparty lems according to the importancethat they said that once the temple was constructed
tickets in elections and positions on caste gave to each of them. The problems were: the series of communal riots of the last few
andcommunitylines, sharesplatformswith (1) constructionof the Ram mandir/mosque years would come to an end and the country
religious and caste leaders who speak in a at Ayodhya; (2) price rise; (3) unemploy- would be able to concentratertioreon the
communal idiom. Their support is often ment; (4) corruptionin public life; and (5) other pressing issues.
Supportersof the constructionof the temsoughtto mobilise voters.The Congresshas the rising population.
About 5 per cent of the respondentsdid ple/mosque over other prioritiesare found
not made any effort to develop secular politics in the country, except for chanting not reply to this question. Some responded in small proportionamong both males and
populist slogans of secularism or Hindu- that they did not understandas to what was females; variousage groupsandalso among
Muslimunity. As mentionedearlier,several more importantand there were others for educated and illiterate (Table l1). They
Congress leaders hold similar views about whom the day-to-dayproblemswere more belong to all varieties of occupationaland
the Muslims, believe in the dominance of pressing than bothering about questions social groups. Contrary to general belief,
the majority community and 'over-protec- which fall in the domainof political leaders. theirnumberhoweveris smallamongwhiteAmong those prioritisingthe five issues collar workersand uppercaste individuals.
tion' to minorities.BJP politics in this matter is open. In such a situation how far are (Table 10), only a small proportionof 13 per It is also significant to note that none
BJP and Congress supportersdifferent in cent considered construction of the Ram among the respondents from Scheduled
theircommunalconsciousness? In orderto mandiror mosque at Ayodhya as the most. Tribes gave priorityto the constructionof
identifyCongressandBJPsupportersaques- importantissue to be solved, whereas as the temple.
tionwas asked"whomwould you vote forin
the next elections?"50 per cent respondents
MATRIXOFITEMSREGARDING
ANDCOEFFICIENT
CORRELATION
APPENDIX:
reportedthat they would vote for the BJP,
CONSCIOUSNESS
COMMUNAL
An overwhelming number (88 per cent) of
9
4
7
8
2
3
5
6
1
them were committedvoters who voted for
the same party in the 1991 election too. 1 Prideto be
- .6173 .6646 .3791 .2045 .3720 .1247 .1766 .1599
Thus, the BJP has gained 10 per cent more 2 Conmnunalityof
.5730 .3623 .2735 .2650 .2285 .2077 .2307
.6173
interests
supporters.The Congress has more or less
- .3813 .2307 .3696 .2010 .2050 .2017
retained26 per cent supporterswhich was 3 Unity Oforganisation .6646 .5730
- .3178 .1728 .2778 .1381 .1442.
.3791 .3623 .3813
4 Political power
the case during the last election.
- .0105 .4345 .2386 .2348
Table9 shows thatboth the Congress and 5 Antagonistic interests .2045 .2735 .2307 .3178
- .0363 .1270 .1883
.3720 .2650 .3696 .1728 .0105
6 One's superiority
the BJP have almost equal proportion of 7 Others
responsible
conhave
intense
communal
supporterswho
- .4658 .4216
.1247 .2285 .2010 .2778 .4345 .0363
for plight
sciousnessandtheirsize is not insignificant. 8 Boycott
- .6892
.1766 .2077 .2054 .1381 .2386 .1270 .4658
Togetherthey add up to 30 per cent of the 9 Segregation
.1599 .2307 .2017 .1442 .2348 .1883 .4216 .6892
respondents.The numberof such personsis
in politics; (ii) participation in meetings/
processions;and (iii) working for a partyin
election campaigns. Though one-fourth of
the respondentsreportedtaking interest in
politics, only 4 per cent had a great deal of
interestin such matters.All those interested
in politics do not necessarily participatein
variouspolitical activities. Twelve per cent
of the respondents participated in public
meetings and/orprocessions, and a smaller
number worked for any party in election
campaigns.Taking these activities together,
only 11 per cent may be identified as politically active. Table 8 shows thatthere is no
relationshipbetween political participation
and communal consciousness. A vast majority of politically active persons do not
have intense communal consciousness and
vice versa. What is strikinghowever is that
the proportionof intensely communal persons is more among those who arepolitically inactive. The question naturally arises
here what can one infer from the above
Economic and Political Weekly
significantly low among the supportersof
JanataDal, the CommunistPartyand other
parties.Even among the undecidedor nonvoter individuals, prpportionof intensely
communalconscious personsis significantly lower than among the BJP and the Congress supporters.Does it suggest that they
find no difference between the Congress
and the BJP on communalissue or they are
fed up of these parties?
May 7, 1994
1139
As is apparentfrom Table 12, those who
give first priorityto constructionof temple/
mosqee arein equalproportionamong those
who have moderateor high communalconsciousness, but are expectedly in smaller
proportiotn
amongthose who have low communal consciousness. Similar pattern is
found among people with different rates of
participationin religious activities. They
are fewer among those who rarely participatein religiousactivities thanthe ones who
participatein such events more actively.
Constructionof the mandiror masjid has
become a political issue. However, a large
proportion (23 per cent), of politically
acfive individualsgave priority to the construction of temple/mosque. This means
thatfor them the Ram mandiris a pblitical
issue. This is furthersubstantiatedby the
fact thatdespite equal proportionof highly
communal persons in both the parties, a
largernumber of BJP than Congress supportersgave priorityto the constructionof
the temple. This is not surprising, for the
BJP has made it a political issue.
so economic differentiationswithin a caste, issues, people do notgive preference to,
if they exist, are noticed but do not seen as religious issues over the economic ones.
antagonistic.But it is not so in the case of Even soon after the riots when communal
religion-based community consciousness. passions were high, an overwhelmingnumEconomic and culturaldifferences between ber of them did not give preferenceto concaste Hindus are so sharp and antagonistic structionof the Ram mandiror masjidover
that 'communityof interests' as Hindus or price rise or unemployment.Thus, though
Muslims is vague and rhetorical.
communalconsciousness is widespreadand
Caste or religious communal conscious- people are susceptibleto communalslogans
ness is widespreadin Suratamong people in and symbols and may indulge in riotingfor
all walks of life irrespective of their sex, the time being, they do not continuouslyget
age, educationandplace of belonging (local swept away by communal categories and
or immigrants).All of them, however, do issues. They see thatas the game of politinot share communal consciousness to a cians.
similarextent.Most do not ascribesuperiority to one's own communityover others or
Note
economic polarisationbetween the communities. Nearly one-fourthof the population [I thankAnjanaDesai andBiswarQop
Das for
(of course not insignificant,especially with giving commentson the draftof the paper,
potential of being fanatic) were found to MarziaCutpicewalaand SatyakamJoshi for
have high communal consciousness which theirassistancein supervisingthe field work.]
may tend to be fanatical.They are found in
all social and occupational groups with * Surathas 36 municipalwards.The biggest
wardhas 49 pollingboothsandthe smallest
only slight variation in their proportion.
ward has just 3 polling booths. We have
High communal consciousness is neither
selectedminimumone or 10 percentof the
particularcaste or class, local or immigrant,
pollingboothsfroma ward.Fifty-three
pollliterate.orilliterategroup phenomena.SigVI
ing boothswereselectefd.Fromeachpolling
nificantly neither religiosity nor political
Overview
booth 25 voterswere selectedwith help of
participationis relatedto intense communal
randomtablefor interview.Totalnumberof
Caste identity is uppermostin the minds consciousness.Thismakestheproblemmore
respondents
were1,325.Fromthem,wecould
of most people even in urbanarealike Surat. complex than is generally recognised; and
interview723. Numberof themwereeither
Itis moreso among the OBCs thanthe dalits requires multipronged strategies to deal
wrongly listed or shifted their residence.
and the members of the upper castes. The with it.
Some werenotavailableat thetimeof interOBCs in Surathave recentlyimprovedtheir
Despite predominanceof caste and reliview, theyeitherleft the areaor wereoutof
conditionand are upwardlymobile through gious individual identity and communal
stationornotavailableaftertwovisits.A few
caste idioms, organisationand solidarityin consciousness, when it comes to choice on
avoidedus.
economic and political spheres.-Thereis a
tendencyamongthe dalits to underplaytheir
caste identity and opt for secular identity
throughoccupation.This is more common
amongthose who have highereducationand
areengaged in white collarjobs or as entrean internationaldevelopmentorganizationis
preneursfor they feel that they have very
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tanttonotethatdespiteacall andprogrammes
for a Hinduor a Muslimunity, sectarianand
at AURANGABAD (Maharashtra State).
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Selected Candidate is likely to be a person
andreligiousidentity,however, is not oppobetween age 25-30 years.
site or contradictoryat a personallevel. For
Fluent in English & Marathi. A post graduate in
many, religious identity is but a continuaany of the Social Sciences from reputed
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University.
thoughtheiremphasischanges with varying
contexts.
Have understanding of ruiralarea and / or poorer
Individual identity based on caste and
communities.
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ness-the consciousness of being member
experience.
of one's 'quam'. The connotation of the
termincludes both caste and religious comInitialappointmentfor a period of one year.
munity.But for manya notionof caste based
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Economic and Political Weekly
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May 7,1994