Primary Election Systems and Representation
Author(s): Elisabeth R. Gerber and Rebecca B. Morton
Source: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Oct., 1998), pp. 304-324
Published by: Oxford University Press
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304 JLEO,V14N2
Primary Election Systems and Representation
ElisabethR. Gerber
San Diego
Universityof California,
Rebecca B. Morton
Universityof Iowa
Weexaminehowdifferencesinthe institutionsthatregulatecandidatenomination
procedures,specificallydirectprimaryelection laws, affect the types of candidates elected innonpresidential
Americanelections. Wehypothesizethatin more
closed primarysystems, controlover candidatenominationsby ideologicalextremistswilltranslateinto a higherlikelihoodthat extremecandidateswin in the
by a
generalelection. We hypothesizethat in moreopen systems, participation
widerspectrumof the electoratemeansthatcandidatesmustappealto moremoderatevoters,leadingto the electionof moremoderatecandidates. Usingpooled
cross-section time-seriesregressionanalysis, we findthat U.S. representatives
fromstates withclosed primariestake policypositionsthatare furthestfromtheir
district'sestimatedmedianvoter'sideal positions. Representativesfromstates
withsemi-closedprimariesarethe most moderate.Weconcludethatthe costs of
strategicbehaviorcreatedby electoralinstitutionshave importantconsequences
forelectoraloutcomes.
1. Introduction
In recent years, several American states have changed or consideredchanging their proceduresfor nominatingcandidatesfor elected office.' In 1984,
for example, the ConnecticutRepublican Party changed its bylaws to permit independentsto participatein its previously closed primaries. After the
SupremeCourtruledin Tashjianv. RepublicanPartyof Connecticut[479 U.S.
208 (1986)] that the state's interest in requiringa closed primarywas insubstantial, the state legislaturepassed legislation allowing the partiesto permit
participationby independentsin their primaries.2 More recently, California
1. In this researchwe consider nominationsto offices other than the presidency. Presidential
nominationsare characterizedby a unique sequentialstate-by-statenominationprocess. Nominationsvia direct primaryto congressional,state legislative, state executive, and local offices are
characterizedby common procedureswhich we describebelow.
2. Ironically,aftertheTashjiandecision, theRepublicanPartyremovedthequestionableprovision
from its bylaws and at the time of this writing,none of the state's majorpartieshave optedto allow
independentsto participatein theirprimaries.
) 1998 OxfordUniversityPress
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PrimaryElection Systems and Representation
305
voterspassed the OpenPrimaryAct of 1996 by directvoterinitiative,replacing
the state's restrictiveclosed primarywith a more open variety. All of these
changes have attractedvigorous legal scrutinyand scholarlydebate,and at the
time of this writing, the constitutionalityof California'smost recent changes
(and by implication,Alaska's and Washington'sprimaryelection systems) is
still unresolved.3
Proponentsand opponentsof these changes in primaryelection laws agree
thattheirconsequences are likely to be profound.4Some of the consequences
of these changes are easy to predict. For example, few doubt that opening
nominationproceduresto previouslyexcluded nonpartisanswill increasemass
participationin the nominationprocess. Other consequences, however, are
more difficultto anticipate. For example, will more open nominationsinduce
candidatesto compete for the electoralcenter,therebyproducingmore centrist
elected representatives,or will they create opportunitiesfor partisanmischief,
allowing partyadherentsto "spoil"the otherparties' nominationsand leading
to the election of extremist representatives?Further,even when proponents
and opponentsagreeon what the electoralconsequencesof changes in election
laws will be, the normativeimplicationsof those changesareoften unclear.Are
votersmade betteroff by, for example, increasedparticipation?Are the parties
made betteroff? Are some voters or groupsmade betteroff thanothers?
Much of the ongoing debate over the likely consequences of changing a
state'sprimaryelection laws resultsfrom the virtualabsence of any systematic
analyses of candidatenominationprocedures. The literaturethat does exist
focuses on how partyorganizationinfluencesthe choice of nominationprocedures (Ranney, 1975; Eldersveld, 1982; Jewell, 1984; Epstein, 1986); on the
roles of the media, voter information,and candidatecharacteristicsin presidentialprimariesandcaucuses (Aldrich, 1980;Bartels, 1988); on the effects of
presidentialprimaryelection systems on voterbehavior,particularlycrossover
voting (Wekkin, 1988; Southwell, 1991); and recently on the effects of primary systems on the election of U.S. senators (Grofmanand Brunell, 1997).
Togetherthese studies informour understandingof some aspects of candidate
nominations,especially presidentialnominations.However,none of these existing works provide a systematic analysis of the electoral consequences of
nonpresidentialcandidatenominations.
In this researchwe empiricallyexamine how differencesin candidatenominationproceduresin nonpresidentialelections affect one importantaspect of
election outcomes: the relationshipbetween winning candidates'policy positions and their constituencies' preferences. In other words, we study how
primaryelection systems affect the representationof citizen preferences. We
3. Californiaadopted a blanket primarysimilar to that used in Washingtonand Alaska. See
below for a descriptionof the blanketprimary.
4. But see Riker (1983) who arguesthat since institutionsare themselves the productof social
choices, theirindependenteffectson politicaloutcomes(especiallystability)arelikely to be minimal
in the long run.
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306 TheJournalof Law,Economics,&Organization,
V14N2
focus on "dyadic"representation-the extent thatthe positions of a single representativereflectthe preferencesof his or her district-because it reflectsthe
primarylegislator-citizen relationshipin a system of single memberdistrict
representation. Dyadic representationis in contrastto collective representation, which refers to the extent that an individual'sor group'spreferencesare
representedby the entirepolicy-makingbody (see Weissberg,1978).
We analyze the representationalconsequencesof the most common mechanism for nominatingnonpresidentialcandidatesin the United States: direct
primaries.Primariescome in severalvarieties,dependinguponhow theyrestrict
participationby the electorate. A primaryis consideredopen if participantseither do not need to declare party affiliationas a prerequisiteto participating
in a primaryelection or may do so on election day. Two variantsof the open
primaryare blanketprimaries,in which voters receive a single ballot listing all
candidatesfrom all partiesand may participate,office by office, in all or some
of the parties' primaries;and nonpartisanprimaries,in which voters choose
among candidatesin a primaryregardlessof the partymembershipof the candidate or the voter.5 A primaryis defined as closed if participationis limited
to voterswho declaretheiraffiliationto the partya specifiedperiodpriorto the
election.6 Withinthe broadcategoryof closed primaries,statesexhibitvarying
degreesof"closedness,"dependingupon the comprehensivenessof the preregistrationrequirement.A primaryis defined as semi-closed if new registrants
are allowed to both registerandchoose theirpartyon the day of the primaryor
if independentsare allowed to participate.7Table 1 reportsthe primarysystem
used to nominatecandidatesfrom state legislative and executive and federal
legislative offices for the 50 states.
We expect institutionaldifferencesin primaryelection systems to influence
the positions of winning candidates. In the following two sections we review
a body of theoreticaland empiricalwork that forms the basis of our research.
The analysesimply severalempiricallytestablehypothesesaboutthe effects of
the degreeof closedness of primarysystems on the types of candidateselected.
In particular,we hypothesizethatin closed primarysystems, the likelihoodof
extreme general election winners is highest. In more open primarysystems,
5. A majordifference between blanket primariesand nonpartisanprimariesis that in blanket
primaries,the top vote receiver from each party becomes the party's general election nominee,
while in nonpartisanprimaries,the top vote receiverin the primarywins the seat outrightif he or
she receives over 50% of the primaryvote. Otherwisethe top two vote receivers, regardlessof
party,meet in a runoffelection. This raises the possibilitythattwo candidatesfrom the same party
may meet in the runoff. In its recent decision in Fosterv. Love, 96-670, the SupremeCourtruled
thatthe timing of these nonpartisanelections, but not theirstructureper se, is unconstitutional.
6. Unlike the Court-imposed30 day maximum registrationdeadline for voting in a general
election [see Dunn v. Blumstein,405 U.S. 330 (1972)], partyregistrationdeadlinesvary in length
from 10 days in NebraskaandNew Hampshireto a year in New York(Bott, 1990).
7. During the period understudy, 10 southernstates also used runoffs when no candidatereceived a majorityin the primary.See Gerber,Morton,and Rietz (1994) for an analysis of runoff
requirements.
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307
Election
andRepresentation
Systems
Primary
Table1. Primary
SystemType,U.S.States,1990
State Primary
State Primary
System
System
MT Open
AL
Open
NE
Closed
Blanket
AK
NV Closed
Closed
AZ
NH Closed
AR
Open
NJ
Semi(independent)
CA
Closed
NM Closed
CO Closed
NY Closed
CT
Closed
NC Closed
DE
Closed
ND
Closed
FL
Open
OH Open
GA Open
OK Semi(newandindependent)
HI
Open
OR Semi(new)
ID
Open
Closed
PA
IL
Open
RI
Semi(independent)
IN
Open
SC
IA
Open
Open
Closed
SD
KS
Closed
TN
KY Closed
Open
TX
LA
Open
Nonpartisan
ME Semi(independent) UT
Open
VT
MD Semi(new)
Open
MA Semi(independent)VA
Open
WA Blanket
Ml
Open
WV Closed
MN Open
WI
MS Open
Open
WY Open
MO Open
Source: Bott. 1990.
the likelihood of moderatewinners is higher. We then presentempiricaltests
of our hypotheses. Analyzing data from'a series of recent U.S. congressional
elections, we findthatrepresentativeselected underclosed primarysystems do
not as accuratelyreflectour estimatesof the medianvoter'spreferencein their
districtsas do legislatorselected undermore open primarysystems. We find
thatrepresentativeselected undersemi-closed primarysystems most accurately
reflect their district'smedian voter's preference. These results are robustto a
varietyof alternativeempiricalspecifications.
Ourresearchhas importanttheoretical,political, and practicalimplications.
Froma theoreticalperspective,understandingthedynamicsof primaryelections
will provide insight into how these and other multistage elections function.
Froma politicalperspective,changinga state'selection laws meansshiftingthe
balanceof politicalpower,giving an advantageto some interestsat the expense
of others. In other words, it creates winners and losers. Understandingwho
wins and who loses underdifferentelection laws allows us to betteranticipate
these political dynamics. And from a practicalperspective,studying election
laws will help the courtsand policymakersbetterdesign institutionsto achieve
socially desirableoutcomes.
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ofLaw/,
308 TheJournal
&Organization,
V14N2
Economics,
2. Primary Voter Preferences and Candidate Positions
2.1 Closed Primaries
Most Americanelections are three-stageelectoralprocesses. In the firststage,
votersaffiliatethemselvesorregisterwithaparticularparty.In thesecondstage,
voters choose a partynominee from the subset of candidatesrunningin their
party'sprimary.In the thirdstage, voters choose between the partynominees.
A number of models have considered how this multistage electoral process
affects candidatepositions (Coleman, 1971, 1972; Aranson and Ordeshook,
1972; Wittman, 1977, 1983, 1991; Aldrich, 1983; Aldrich and McGinnis,
1989).8 In these models, there are typically two parties, each of which field
two candidateswho compete in closed partyprimaries.Partymemberschoose
betweenthe candidatesin theirprimary,andthe winnersof eachparty'sprimary
meet in the general election. These parties are assumed to be dominatedby
members or party elites who have preferencesover policy, that is, they seek
electoral victory in order to enact their preferredpolicies. Accordingly, we
referto this literatureas the "partyelite"literature.9This assumptionof policymotivatedpartymembersis in contrastto the Hotelling-Downsianassumption
of party competition in which parties instrumentallychoose policy positions
strictlyfor the purposeof achievingelectoralvictory (Hotelling, 1929; Downs,
1957).
In the partyelite theory,partymembersare assumedto have policy preferences thatare distinctfrom the preferencesof nonmembers.Preferencesof the
membersof each partyare also assumedto divergefrom those of membersof
the otherparty,with the ideal policy position of each party'smedianmember
located on opposite sides of the ideal point of the median voter in the electorate. Candidatesfor office choose policy positions in the primaries"as if"
they aremaximizingthe expectedutilityof the medianvoterin theirpartyrather
than the expected utility of the median voter in the electorate. When there is
some uncertaintyabout the general election outcome, the expected utility of
the party's median voter may be maximized by a position that diverges substantiallyfrom the ideal point of the median voter in the generalelectorate.0l?
8. Most of these works model electoralcompetitionin a unidimensionalpolicyspace. NWittman
(1983) generalizes the basic multistage model to a multidimensionalpolicy space. To obtain
divergenceresults in multipledimensions,however,additionalassumptionsabout the underlying
utility functionsand candidates'election probabilitiesare required.
9. By "partyelites"we meancommittedmembersof theparty.This may includecaucusactivists,
partyleaders,and regularmemberswho affiliatewith the party.Partyelites, by our definition,are
in contrastto primari voters who participatein partyactivities (includingprimaries)not because
of a strongattachmentto the partybut ratherbecause of transientor strategicinterests.
10. Note that in thes- models, candidateswill only diverge from the generalelectoratemedian
voter's ideal point if there is uncertaintyabout the general election outcome. If, conversely,
candidatesknowall aspectsof the game forcertain,theycan anticipatethegeneralelection outcome
and maximize the expected utility of the party's median voter by maximizing its probabilityof
winningin the generalelection, thatis, by convergingto the generalelectoratemedianvoter'sideal
point. These models typically assumethatthe sourceof uncertaintyis the ideal pointof the general
electorate median voter due to variationsin turnoutor some nonpolicy candidatecharacteristics
that are revealed between the candidatenominationstage and the general election (see Aranson
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Election
309
Primary
SystemsandRepresentation
Thus,as a consequenceof divergentpartymemberpolicy preferencescombined
with uncertaintyaboutthe genei al election outcome,candidatepositions in the
multistagemodel do not converge'. the ideal point of the Hotelling-Downsian
medianvoter in the generalelectorate. ' Theirpositions are insteada function
of the ideal point of the median voter ill their party's primary. Thus the further the ideal point of the median voter in a party'sprimaryfrom the general
election medianvoter,the more extremethe position of thatparty'snominated
candidate.12
A key assumptionin these models of multistageelections is thatthe position
of the median voter in a closed primaryis likely to diverge substantiallyfrom
the position of the median voter in the general electorate. Several studies together provide empiricaljustificationfor this assumption. One set of studies
suggests thatvoter participationin closed primariesis lower than in open primaries,ceteris paribus.For instance,Jewell (1984) shows thatvoterturnoutin
gubernatorialprimariesfrom 1952 to 1982, as a percentageof partyvote in the
subsequentgeneralelection, is lowerin closed primariesthanin open primaries,
even after controlling for other institutionaland election-specific factors that
can affect turnout.This result suggests that of the set of voters who may vote
for a party's nominee in the general election, the subset that participatesin
choosing thatnominee in the party'sprimaryis smallerin closed thanin open
primaries.
A second set of studies shows thatvoters with strongpartisanties are much
more likely to participatein political activities than are other voters. For example, Beck and Sorauf (1992) note that in 1988 total voter turnoutwas approximately50%, but for strong partisansit was over 80%.13 A thirdbody
of work establishes that one group of party elites-convention delegates and
caucus participants-have more extremeissue positions thanthe generalelectorate. Buel and Jackson (1991) review studies of national convention delegates thatconsistentlyshow thatthese delegateshold moreextremeviews, with
Democratssubstantiallymore liberaland Republicansmore conservative,than
the averagevoter. Abramowitz,Rapoport,and Stone (1991) study participants
at the 1988 Iowa caucusesandthe 1984 Iowa, Michigan,andVirginiacaucuses
andshow thattheseparticipantsaresignificantlymoreextremethanthe general
and Ordeshook, 1972; Wittman 1977, 1983, 1991; Aldrich, 1983; Calvert, 1985; Aldrich and
McGinnis, 1989; Londreganand Romer, 1993).
11. Morton(1993) shows in laboratoryelections thatwhen such uncertaintyexists, policy divergence does indeedoccur.
12. These models use the partyelite approachto explain the observed policy divergenceof the
two parties. It should be noted that thereare also a numberof theoreticalvoting models in which
partiesor candidates are primarilymotivatedby electoral considerationsand policy divergence
occurs. In those models, equilibriamay exist with partiesor candidateschoosing divergentpolicy
positionsundera varietyof assumptionsandconditions(see, for example,Palfrey,1984;Bernhardt
andIngberman,1985;Austen-Smith,1987;Morton,1987;CameronandEnelow, 1992;Feddersen,
1992; Ingbermanand Villani 1993).
13. See Beck and Jennings(1979, 1984) andAbramson,Aldrich,andRhode(1991) foradditional
studies of partisanpolitical participation.
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310 TheJournal
ofLaw.Economics.
&Organization.
V14N2
electorate.Togetherthesestudiessuggestthatvoterswhoparticipate
in closed
primariesarelikely to be a subsetof the electoratewith strongpartisanties
andextremepolicypreferences.Thisimpliesthattheidealpointof theclosed
fromtheideal
primaryelectionmedianvoteris likelyto divergesubstantially
pointof the generalelectionmedianvoter. By competingfor theirparties'
nominations,
then,candidatesnominatedin closedprimariesareexpectedto
be moreextremethancandidates
nominated
in otherprimarysystems.
2.2 MoreOpenPrimaries
Whilemost existingtheoreticalandempiricalanalysesof primaryelections
assumeclosedprimaries,
we canapplythelogic of thoseanalysesto generate
about
voter
preferencesandcandidatepositionsin otherprimary
hypotheses
as
well.
The
key insightof the extanttheoryis thatprimariesaffect
systems
theidentityof themedianvoterin theparties'primaries
voter
by constraining
When
members
with
extreme
onlyparty
participation.
policypositionsparticipatein thenomination
process,as in thetheoretical
analysesdescribedabove,
thepreferencesof the medianvoterin a party'sprimarycandivergesubstanof themedianvoterin thegeneralelectorate.When
tiallyfromthepreferences
and/ornew votersparticipate
in the nomination
nonmembers,
independents,
the
the
in
of
median
voter
a
process, preferences
party'sprimarymaybe closer
of themedianvoterin thegeneralelectorate.
to thepreferences
Primarysystemrulesaffectthe identityof the medianvoterin theparties'
formsof
primariesby affectingthe cost to votersof engagingin particular
strategicbehavior. Specificallythey affectthe ease with whichvoterscan
engagein crossovervoting(i.e., votingin the primaryof a partywithwhich
thevoterdoesnotnormallyidentify).Crossover
votingcaneitherbe "sincere,"
in whichvotersvotefor theirmostpreferred
candidatesin theotherparty,or
candidates
inwhichvotersvoteforlesspreferred
whosenomination
"strategic,"
in theirown
to a morepreferred
wouldprovidea strategicadvantage
candidate
party.14Whenvotersengagein sincerecrossovervoting,moderatesfromthe
otherpartycrossoverandmovetheprimaryelectoratemedianvoter'sposition
closerto thatof the generalelectoratemedianvoter.Whenvotersengagein
strategiccrossovervoting,extremistsfromthe otherpartycross over. The
effectof strategiccrossoveris moredifficultto anticipate.If a relativelysmall
numberof votersengagein strategiccrossover,the idealpointof the median
voterin thatparty'sprimarybecomesmoremoderate,
butif strategiccrossover
electoratebecomesmore
themedianvoterin theparty'sprimary
is substantial,
extreme.
Weexpecttheclosednessof a primarysystemto affectvoters'costsof en14. Ourdefinitionof sincere crossovervoting allows for voting for the most preferredcandidate
whose ideal point is closest to the voter's and voting for a candidatewhose ideal point is further
from the voter's but whose electoralprospectsarebetter. Both of these forms of sincerecrossover
voting are distinguishedfrom strategiccrossover voting for a candidatethe voter hopes will lose
in the generalelection.
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ElectionSystemsand Representation 311
Primary
gaging in crossovervoting. In closed primaries,both types of crossovervoting
are costly since voters must resolve to participatein a given party'sprimarya
fixed period before the election and register as a memberof that party. The
"cost"of crossover voting for closed primaryvoters, then, involves the difficulty of anticipatinghis or her strategicopportunitieslong before the election
and reregisteringin the otherparty.We thereforeexpect closed primaryvoters
to participateon the basis of theirunderlyingpartisanaffiliationsratherthanthe
immediateelectoral circumstances. To the extent that membersof the parties
are ideologically distinct, we thereforeexpect the ideal point of the primary
electoratemedianvoter in closed primariesto reflect the ideological positions
of the party'selite and to divergesubstantiallyfrom the ideal point of the general electoratemedianvoter. In semi-closed primaries,crossovervoting is less
costly for voters who affiliate with one party but are either not registeredor
are registeredas independents. Those voters can participatein either party's
primarywithoutprecommittingto thatparty,therebymaking the cost of both
forms of crossovervoting quite low.15 Which form of crossovervoting dominates in semi-closed primariesthereforedependson the ideological positions
of independentsand new voters. To the extent that these potentialcrossover
voters are close to the ideological center, we expect them to engage largely in
sincere crossover voting. To the extent that independentsand new voters are
ideological extremists,we expect them to engage largely in strategiccrossover
voting. Althoughsurveyevidence suggests thatthereis substantialheterogeneity among independentvoters, especially between "PureIndependents"and
partisanleaners, most pure independentsare, by a variety of measures, ideologically moderate(Keith et al., 1992). We thereforeexpect these potential
crossovervotersto engage mostoften in sincerecrossovervotingin semi-closed
primaries,and for their behaviorto move the ideal point of the primaryelectoratemedian voter closer to the ideal point of the general electoratemedian
voter. In open primaries,voters can engage in crossover voting by choosing
a party on election day without incurringthe costs of reregisteringwith the
other party. However, crossover voters are constrainedto participateonly in
that party'sprimary.This constraintmay reduce the attractiveness(i.e., raise
the opportunitycosts) of both sincere and strategiccrossover voting for one
race since voters cannot then vote for candidatesof their own party in other
races. We thereforenote the possibility for both sincereand strategiccrossover
voting in open primariesbutcannotanticipate,on the basis of ourtheory,which
will be more important.Finally,in blanketandnonpartisanprimaries,the costs
of both types of crossovervoting are lowest since voters can choose in which
primaryto participatein the voting booth (i.e., they need not incurthe costs of
reregistration)and can switch partiesrace by race (i.e., the opportunitycosts of
crossovervoting are low). Again, however,we cannotanticipatewhich type of
crossovervoting will dominatevoter behavior.
15. As in closed primaries,however,voters who are registeredwith a party must change their
registrationpriorto the election.
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ofLavw.
V14N2
&Organization.
312 TheJournal
Econormcs,
A numberof studies have attemptedto measure crossovervoting directly.
Ranney(1975), Adamany(1976), Hedlund,Watts,andHedge (1982), Hedlund
and Watts(1986), and Wekkin(1988) all examine voting behaviorin Wisconsin's presidentialprimaries,with differingconclusionsabouttheextentto which
such crossovervoting occurs.16These studies,however,focus on only one state
and are thereforeunable to demonstratethat crossovervoting is substantially
greaterin open primarystatesthanin closed primarystates. Jewell (1984) compares limited survey data on voter behaviorin open and closed primarystates
and concludes that while voters seem more likely to identify with a partyin a
state with closed primaries,"[t]he availableevidence does not supportthe assumptionthatmany votersfrequentlyshift betweenprimariesin open-primary
states.'17 Finally, Southwell (1991) finds the prevalenceof "strategicvoting"
to be aboutthe same in closed, semi-closed, and open primarystates.18
3. Hypotheses
The theoreticalresults summarizedabove can be restatedas a series of empirically testable hypotheses about the consequencesof primarysystem type on
election outcomes.
* Ho: Primaryelection system has no relationshipto the policy positions
of generalelection winners.
* HI: Closedprimarysystemswill producemoreextremegeneralelection
winners,relativeto theirconstituencies'generalelection medianvoter,
thanmore open primarysystems.
The mainhypothesisis thatclosed primarieswill producegeneralelection winners whose policy positions diverge substantiallyfrom their district'sgeneral
election median voter. We hypothesize that in the most closed systems, winning candidatepositions will be most extreme,and that in more open systems
they will be more moderate. However,given the differentcosts of crossover
voting createdby the varioussemi-closed, open, blanket,and nonpartisanprimaryelection systems, the relationshipbetweenclosedness andextremitymay
not be linear. Since we expect sincere crossovervoting to dominatein semiclosed primaries,we expect the primaryelectoratemedian voter to be closer
to the general electoratemedian voter in those primariescomparedto closed
primariesandfor those votersto vote for the most moderatecandidatesin their
16. As Wekkin(1988) notes, some of the differencesin results are a consequenceof variations
in the methodsused to measurecrossovervoting. He arguesthat independentswho have partisan
leanings are often not counted correctly. He also points out that measuringcrossover vote as a
percentof the entireprimaryvote understatesits impacton a particularprimarysince such voting
tends to be one-sided.
17. Jewell notes that there is evidence of voter shifting in Alaska and Washington,which have
blanketprimarysystems.
18. Southwell differentiatesbetween "positive strategic voting" in which a voter votes for a
less preferredcandidatebecause her most preferredcandidate'schances of winning are low, and
"negativestrategicvoting,"in which a voter votes for a less preferredcandidatein the primaryto
increasethe chance of her most preferredcandidatefacing the weakest possible opponent.
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ElectonSystems
andRepresentaton313
Primary
primaries. Hence we expect the most moderatewinners (relative to the district'sgeneral election median voter) to be elected from semi-closed systems.
Since the costs of both sincere and strategiccrossovervoting in open, blanket,
and nonpartisanprimariesare low, it is possible thatstrategiccrossovervoting
may negate some of the moderatingeffects of sincere crossover voting. We
thereforeexpect winnerselected from those systems to be more moderatethan
winnerselected from closed primarysystems, but perhapsnot as moderateas
semi-closed winners.
* H2: Semi-closed primarysystems will producethe most moderategeneral election winners.
* H3: Open,blanket,andnonpartisanprimarywinnerswill be more moderate thanclosed primarywinners.
4. Data Analysis
We test hypothesesHi, H2, andH3 with datafromU.S. congressionalelections
from 1982 to 1990. The variableof interestis thepolicy position of the winning
congressionalcandidate,Winneri,,from each congressionaldistricti, i = 1 to
435, at time t, t = 1 to 5. For each of the i districts at each election, we
estimate Winneri,as the winning candidate'sADA score averagedover the 2
yearsimmediatelyfollowing theelection, correctedfor abstentions.19We chose
this time period because the districtlines were constantthroughoutas a result
of the 1982 redistrictingand no states significantlychangedtheirelection laws
duringthis period.
19. Therearenumerousways to measurerepresentatives'policy positions. Perhapsthe two most
widely used measuresareADA scores (votingindicesconstructedby the AmericansforDemocratic
Action) and NOMINATEscores [constructedwith Poole and Rosenthal's(1985) Nominal Threestep EstimationProcedure]. Severalscholars have arguedthatNOMINATEscores are preferable
to ADA scores as measures of legislators' policy positions because they are based on a formal
spatial model (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), account for a great deal of variancein roll call votes
(Cox and McCubbins,1993), are based on a large numberof roll call votes (Cox and McCubbins,
1993), and are comparableacross years (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder, 1998). While we agree
that NOMINATEscores may be preferablein some applications,we believe ADA scores are at
least as appropriatefor ourcurrentpurposes,for severalreasons. First,ADA scores aredeliberately
constructedto reflect a single liberal-conservativedimension. The purposeof the ADA scores is
to rateeach representative's"liberalness":'
Hence the ADA bases its scores on a set of votes thatare
selected specifically because they deal with left-right issues. NOMINATEscores, by contrast,are
constructedfromthe full set of (nonunanimous)roll call votes andso, to the extent thatotherpolicy
dimensionsunderliea legislature'sagenda,the resultingscores naturallypick up moredimensionality. Furthermore,to the extent thatthese additionaldimensionsare not strictlyorthogonalto the
primaryleft-right dimension,our estimatesof the firstdimensionwill be biased. Second, many of
the criticismscommonly made of ADA scores do not apply to our application.Most importantly,
as Jackson and Kingdon (1989) argue, ADA scores may be inappropriatemeasuresof legislator
ideology in statisticalmodels explainingroll call voting behavior.In the analysis that follows, we
use the ADA scores as our dependentvariable, so we need not be concerned about introducing
bias by explainingvotes with votes. Third,while the distributionalpropertiesof ADA scores may
be problematic,particularlyarbitraryscaling, such issues are relevantfor all other voting indices,
includingNOMINATEscores. Fourth,we are able to treatabstentionsagnostically by removing
them from the ADA's calculations(see Franciset al., 1994).
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&Organization,
314 TheJournal
ofLaw,
V14N2
Economics,
We employ a multivariatemodel that provides the frameworkfor testing
Hi, H2, and H3 against Ho while controllingfor otherfactors that may affect
candidatepositions. Conceptuallythe model allows us to directlyestimatethe
proximity of winning candidates'policy positions to estimated voter preferences in their districts and to compare this relationshipfor general election
winnerselected underdifferentprimarysystems. We hypothesizethatwinning
candidatepositionsin elections with closed primarieswill be extremerelativeto
the district's(generalelection) medianvoter. We hypothesizethatthe positions
of winnersfrom open, nonpartisan,andblanketsystems will be moremoderate
relativeto the generalelection medianvoter, and that the positions of winners
from semi-closed primarieswill be the most moderate.20
Formally,we describethe base empiricalmodel as follows:
= ao + a Semii+ ct2Openi
IWinnerldeolitDistrictIdeolil
+ a3 NP/Blanketi + u i
(1)
Winnerldeoli,is thewinningcongressionalcandidate'sADA score,corrected
for abstentions,as describedabove. Districtldeoli is an estimateof districti's
medianvoter'spolicy position. We operationalizeDistrictldeol as the average
of the percent in the district voting for Mondale in 1984 and for Dukakis in
1988. Districtldeol thereforemeasuresthe district'sideological composition
as the percentof liberalsin the district.21
20. Our cross-sectionalapproachto estimatingthe effects of primaryelection systems on the
extremityof legislatorpolicy positionshas severaladvantagesoveralternativeapproaches.Perhaps
most importantly,none of the states institutedsignificantchanges in their primaryelection laws
during this period (except Connecticut,but as explained in footnote 2, the partieschose not to
use semi-closed primariesafter the state allowed them). Thus we are able to treatthe effects of
those institutionsas strictlyexogenous. The main disadvantageof our approachis that theremay
be other sources of cross-sectional variationin the extremity of legislator policy positions that
we inadvertentlyomit from our analysis, leading to potentialomitted variablesbias. Of course,
however, such omissions will affect our inferences about the effects of primaryelection laws
only if the omitted variables are also correlatedwith the state's electoral institutions(Gujarati,
1995:204-7). An alternativeapproachto estimatingthe effects of primaryelection systems is to
comparethe relationshipbetweenlegislatorpositions andconstituencypreferencesbeforeandafter
states changedtheir primaryelection laws. While this time-seriesapproachhas the advantageof
eliminatingthe possibilityof cross-sectionalvariationin legislatorpolicy positionsacrossstates, it
has two importantdisadvantages.From a theoreticalperspective,we can no longer treatelectoral
institutionsas exogenous. Infact, since manyof thesame factorsarelikely to affectbothinstitutional
change and the natureof representationin a state, unbiasedestimationwouldrequiremodelingthe
process of institutionalchange explicitly. And from a practicalperspective,few states actually
changed their nominationproceduresin the way requiredto test our theory (i.e., from closed
to open, open to closed, etc.). Rather,most of the changes in candidatenominationprocedures
that states have implementedsince their initial adoptionof direct primarieshave involved other
restrictionson participation(especiallyverbalpledges of allegiance),changesin ballotaccess laws,
and uses of conventionsand endorsements.
21. By averagingthe percentin each districtvoting for Mondale in 1984 and Dukakisin 1988,
our measureof districtideology is less sensitive to election-specificfluctuationsin districtvoting
behaviorthana single election's percentage.As a proxy for the district'smedianvoter'sideology,
our operationalizationrequiresthatthe distributionof voterpreferencesin each districtis roughly
symmetricandsingle peaked. Ourapproachis comparableto the approachestakenby Eriksonand
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Election
315
Primay
SystemsandRepresentation
The independentvariablesin the base model include threedummyvariables
designed to capturethe effects of the primarysystem. The dummy variables
indicatewhetherthe state uses semi-closed primaries,open primaries,or nonpartisanor blanketprimaries.22The excluded category is the closed primary.
Thereforethe dummy variablesare interpretedas the change in the dependent
variablefor states with each of the threeprimarysystems, relativeto the effect
of having a closed primary. Thus if more open systems lead to more moderate winners, the distance between the winner and the median voter will be
less (i.e., the signs will be negative)on Semi, Open, and NP/Blanket. If semiclosed systems produce the most moderaterepresentatives,as hypothesized,
the magnitudeof the negativecoefficient will be largeston Semi.23
4.1 EstimationProcedures
Several factors complicateestimationof Equation(1). Most significantly,although Winnerldeoland Districtldeol are both boundedby the range [0, 100],
it is readily evident that the two variablesfollow very differentdistributions.
Winnerldeol,measuredas a winning candidate'sADA score in the following
Wright(1993) and Kennyand Morton(1993) to estimatingstate voterpreferencesfrom state vote
returns.Otherapproachesto estimatingaggregatevoterpreferencesin the politicalscience literature
include employing aggregatestate demographicsas proxies of state voter ideology (Matsusaka,
1995) or estimatingstate voter preferencesdirectly from survey data (Gerber,in press). While
estimatingdistrictvoter preferencesfrom survey data would providea more directapproachthan
proxying them from district vote returns,existing surveys lack an adequatesampling framework
for drawinginferencesaboutaggregatevoter preferencesin differentdistricts.
22. Since the numberofcongressmenelected undernonpartisan,blanket,andthethreevarietiesof
semi-closedprimariesaresmall, we combinetheobservationsfromnonpartisanandblanketprimary
states,and fromthe threetypes of semi-closed primarystates,respectively.Note thatby comparing
the relationshipbetween the ideology of winning candidates and their districts from different
primarysystems, our implicit dependentvariableis whethercandidateswith moderatepositions
relative to their district's median voter are more likely to prevail in districts with open versus
closed primaries. Our data are not sufficient for testing hypotheses about intrapartycompetition
underdifferentnominationrules. In other words, we are unable to test whethercandidateswith
more moderatepositions relative to the other candidatesfrom their own partyare more likely to
prevailin districtswith open versusclosed primaries.This second questionrequiresdataon losers'
ideologicalpositions,which areavailableonly on an ad hoc basis, such as when a loser is eventually
elected in a subsequentelection. As interestingas the questionof intrapartycompetitionis, it does
not addressthe immediateconcern of this article.
23. Of course, it is possible that some of the effects picked up by the primarysystem dummy
variablesmay be due not to the independenteffects of the state's primarysystem on representative's policy positions, but ratherto the fact that states with moderatevoters may elect moderate
representativesand adopt more open primaryelection systems. In other words, the estimatedrelationshipbetween institutionsand policy positions may be spurious. While election laws may
be partiallyendogenous, we note two factorsthatjustify our treatmentof electoral institutionsas
largely exogenous. First, citizen preferencesvary a great deal among states with similar primary
systems. In other words, it is not just states with moderatevoters, for example, that adopt open
primaries-open primarystates may have moderateor extremevoters. Second, we are interestedin
the relationshipbetween representatives'positions and voters' positions. Therefore,even if there
were some relationshipbetween voter preferencesand primarysystems, this relationshipwould
not necessarilytranslateinto a closer (or weaker)correspondencebetween voter preferencesand
the representativesthey elect.
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V14N2
ofLaw.
316 TheJournal
&Organization,
Economics,
withonemodeatthelowerendof
term,followsa stronglybimodaldistribution
therangeandonemodeatthehigherendof therange.Districtldeol,measured
as the averageof the district'sMondaleandDukakisvotes,exhibitsa single,
betweenthetwo variablesis therefore
highlyskewedmode. Therelationship
to
be
and
so
standard
aboutnormality
nonlinear,
inherently
likely
assumptions
of the errorsareclearlyviolated. The possibilityalso existsthatone of the
at differentpoints.24Further,the
or botharetruncated
variablesis truncated
areat differentpoints.25
meansof thetwodistributions
Toreducethepossibilitiesof biasorincorrectinferencesdueto violatonsof
we generalizeourspecification
to allow
the standard
regressionassumptions,
Tocapturethispotential
andDistrictldeol
toberelatednonlinearly.
Winnerldeol
nonlinearity,we remove the absolutevalue from the dependentvariable,move
totheright-hand
sideof theequation
Districtldeol
byaddingit tobothsides,and
This
addsecond-andthird-order
terms.
polynomial
polynomialspecification
betweenWinnerldeol
andDistrictldeol,
allowsus to estimatethe relationship
for
the
nonlinearities
introduced
distributions
of the
by
accounting potential
betweenWinnerldeol
andDistrictldeol
two variables.Thusif therelationship
is characterized
by a second-order
polynomial,we will estimatea significant
effecton thesecond-order
term.If it is capturedby a third-order
polynomial,
termas well.
we will estimatea significanteffecton thethird-order
Table2 reportspreliminary
OLS regressionestimatesfor the relationship
between Winnerldeoland Districtldeol, Districtldeol2, and Districtldeol3on
one
thefull dataset.Thedataarestackedsuchthateachobservation
represents
districtin oneelection,witha maximumof 435 * 5 = 2175observations.26
In
eachestimation,the dependentvariableis WinnerIdeolit.The threecolumns
of therelationship
betweenWinnerldeol
specifications
reportthreealternative
and Districtldeol.
betweenWinnerldeolandDistrictldeolreported
The bivariaterelationship
in column1 is strong,positive,andsignificant.Districtldeolplustheconstant
togetheraccountfor 44%of the variancein Winnerldeol. The second-order
whiletheaddition
effectsestimatedin column2 arealsostrongandsignificant,
effectsdoeslittleto improvethemodel.Onthebasisof this
of thethird-order
of therelationship
analysis,we limitourpolynomialspecification
preliminary
betweenWinnerldeolandDistrictldeolto a second-order
polynomial.
betweenWinnerldeol
andDistricWhilesolvingtheproblemof nonlinearity
tIdeol, moving Districtldeol (and Districtldeol2)to the right-handside of the
Recallthatthe originaldeequationcreatesanotherproblem:directionality.
pendentvariable,IWinnerIdeol- Districtldeoll, was expressedas an absolute
value.Thisallowedus to measuredeviationsfromthedistricts'medianvoter's
24. Many legislatorsare clusteredat the endpointswith ADA scores of 0 (very conservative)or
100 (very liberal). However, if there is diversity in ideology among legislators at the endpoints
(thatis, some legislatorswith scores of 100 are actually more liberalthan others), then assigning
all the same score may attenuatethe variancein distancemeasures.
25. The mean of Winnerldeolis 51.34; the mean of Districtldeolis 43.61.
26. The actualnumberof observationsis fewer (2170) because of missing data.
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PdmaryElectionSystemsand Representation 317
Table2. RegressionCoefficientsRelatingWinner'sADAScore and District'sAverage
VoteforMondale1984 and Dukakis1988, U.S. CongressionalDistricts,1982-1990
IndependentVariable DV= Winnerldeol DV= Winnerldeol DV= Winnerldeol
-92.12**
-133.36**
-35.34**
Constant
(17.18)
(5.86)
(2.14)
1.99**
(.05)
Districtldeol
Districtldeol2
6.06**
(.23)
3.46**
(1.05)
-.04**
.01
(.00)
(.02)
-.0003**
Districtldeol3
(.0001)
.45
2171
R2
N
.52
2171
.52
2171
** p < .05, two-taiedtest.
StandarderrorsInparentheses.
ideal points in either directionwith a single distance measure. By removing
the absolute values to allow for the polynomial specification, however, it is
now possible that deviations in either directionwill cancel out, leading to the
appearanceof no relationship.Therefore,to capturethese directionaleffects,
we estimatethe model two differentways. First,we note thatmost Democrats'
ADA scores aregreaterthantheirdistricts'estimatedmedianvoter'sidealpoint,
and that most Republicans'ADA scores are less than their district'sideology
scores. This allows us to capturedirectionalityby simply adding a variableto
indicate the winner's party (scored 1 for Democrats, -1 for Republicans)and
to interactthe independentvariablesof interestwith this party variable,as in
Equation(2).
+ B3Party,i
Winnerldeolit= P0 + f,1Districtldeoli+ jB2Districtldeol2
+ p4Semii* Partyi, + ftsOpeni* Partyi,
+ fBNP/Blanketi * Party,, + u2it
(2)
Interpretationof the coefficients in Equation(2) is as follows. The coefficients on Districtldeol,Districtldeole,andPartyestablishthe baselinerelationship between the averagerepresentative'sADA score from each partyand his
or her district'sideology in a closed primarystate. The coefficients on Semi,
Open,andNP/Blanketreflectthe averagedeviationfromthis baselinerelationship for representativesin each primarysystem. Negative coefficientson Semi,
Open, and NP/Blanket are interpretedas indicatingless policy divergencein
those systems from a member'sdistrictideology-in a negative directionfor
Democratsand in a positive directionfor Republicans.Positive coefficientson
Semi, Open, and NP/Blanketindicatemore policy divergence.
While Equation(2) solves the problems of nonlinearityand directionality,
thereremainseveralproblemswith the estimatesit produces. Most importantly,
the specificationof Equation(2) masksdifferencesin the effects of primarysys-
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318 TheJournalof Law,Economics,&Organization.
V14N2
tems on Democraticand Republicanmembersof Congress. These differences
may arise due to organizationaldifferences in the parties, national partisan
forces, and idiosyncraticfeaturesof each party'scandidates. To account for
potential partisandifferences, we next estimate Equation (3) separatelyfor
Democraticand Republicanwinners:
Winnerldeolit= Yo+ yl Districtldeoli + y2 DistrictIdeolI
+ Y3Semii + Y4Open, + ys NP/Blanketi + u3it
(3)
of theDistrictldeolcoefficientsis comparableto thatfor EquaInterpretation
tion(2). Weinterprettheprimarysystemcoefficientsas follows. ForDemocrats,
negative coefficients on Semi, Open, and NP/Blanket mean that Democrats
elected underthose systems are more moderate(conservative)thanDemocrats
elected underclosed primaries.ForRepublicans,positive coefficientson Semi,
Open, andNP/Blanketmean thatRepublicanselected underthose systems are
more moderate(liberal)thantheirclosed primarypartisancounterparts.
Giventhe panelnatureof the data,with multipletime observationsfromeach
cross-sectionalunit(congressionaldistrict),we employanestimationprocedure
thatallows us to test and correctfor likely featuresof the errorstructurein the
data. In particular,we estimate Equations(2) and (3) with the pooled crosssection time-seriesestimationprocedurein Stata5.0 thatallows for bothserially
correlatedandcross-sectionallyheteroscedastic(butindependent)errorsacross
observations(i.e., we allow both between and within districtrandomeffects).
4.2 Results
Table 3 reportsthe pooled cross-section time-series regressionestimates for
Equation(2). All of the regressionanalyses in Tables3 and4 use Winnerldeol
as the dependentvariable.The firstcolumnof Table3 reportspooled regression
estimates of a baseline model using Districtldeol, Districtldeol2,Party,Semi,
Open, and NP/Blanketas the independentvariables. Subsequentcolumns add
independentvariablesto controlfor otherpotentiallyimportantfactors.
In the base modelin the firstcolumn,thepositivesignificanteffect on Districtldeol indicates that membersof Congress elected from more liberal districts
have higher ADA scores and those elected from more conservativedistricts
have lower ADA scores. The negativecoefficient on Districtldeol2shows that
these effects taperoff at higherlevels of Districtldeol. The positive coefficient
on Party shows that Democratshave much higher ADA scores than Republicans. Finally,the significantnegativecoefficientson Semi*Party,Open*Party,
and NP/Blanket*Partyare consistent with hypothesis 1, indicatingthatrepresentativesfrom semi-closed, open, nonpartisan,and blanketprimarysystems
are more moderatethanrepresentativesfrom closed primarysystems.
Columns2 and 3 add independentvariablesto controlfor otherfactorsthat
may also affect a winner's ideology. Column 2 adds a dummy variableindicating whetherthe state uses runoffsin additionto theirotherprimaryelection
institutions. While the extanttheory describedin this articledoes not address
the effects of runoffsdirectly,there are several reasons to believe that runoffs
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ElectionSystemsand Representation 319
Primary
Table3. PooledCross-SectionTime-SeriesRegressionCoefficientsRelatingWinner's
ADAScore and Primary
SystemType,U.S. CongressionalDistricts,1982-1990
DV = Winnerldeol DV= Winnerldeol DV= Winnerldeol
Variable
Independent
Constant
-31.90*
(8.45)
-28.43**
(8.10)
-28.82**
(8.09)
Districtldeol
2.46**
(.33)
2.39**
(.32)
2.41**
(.32)
Districtldeol2
-.01**
(.00)
-.01**
-.01**
(.00)
(.00)
Party
26.62**
(.75)
29.32**
(.80)
30.19**
(.84)
Semi*Party
-7.66**
(1.36)
-9.34**
(1.35)
-9.53**
(1.43)
Open*Party
-2.68**
(.99)
-2.63**
(.97)
-2.44**
(.98)
NP/Blank*Party
-9.07**
(2.60)
-5.00*
(2.58)
-4.81*
(2.57)
-8.95**
(1.01)
-3.96*
(2.10)
Runoff*Party
President*Party
-1.55**
(.40)
OpenSeat*Party
2.10
(.81)
-5.87**
(2.11)
South*Party
-2.63
(1.79)
NewEngl*Party
OverallR2
N
.75
2170
.77
2170
.77
2170
** p < .05, two-tailed
test;*p < .10, two-taiedtest
Standarderrorsin parentheses.
may furtheraffect the types of representativeselected. First, runoffs are used
primarilyin the South, where both voters and theirrepresentativeshave historically been more conservative.To the extent thatDistrictldeol fails to capture
some of the distinctivenessof the AmericanSouth, Runoff may compensate.
Second, runoffs are widely believed to create advantagesfor majoritycandidates, who may be more conservativethantheir minoritychallengers.27
The significantnegativecoefficienton Runoff*Partyshows thatmembersof
Congresselected in primarysystems with runoffsare, indeed, more moderate.
27. See BullockandJohnson(1992)fora reviewof theempiricalliterature
on runoffsandan
opposingviewpoint.
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320 TheJournalof Lavi,Economics,&Organization.
V14N2
In addition,includingRunoff*Partydecreases the size of the Open*Partyand
NP/Blanket*Partycoefficientsandincreasesthe relativesize of the Semi*Party
coefficient, consistentwith hypotheses2 and 3.
Column 3 adds variablesto capturefeaturesof the individualelections and
otherregionalfactors. We see thatrepresentativeselected in presidentialelection years are more moderatewhile those elected from open seats are more
extreme. Representativeselected fromthe Southaremoremoderate,even after
we controlfor whetherthe stateuses runoffs. The additionof these independent
variablesleaves the primarysystem coefficients largely intact, slightly reducing the (negative) effects of Open*Partyand NP/Blanket*Partyand slightly
increasingthe (negative)effect of Semi*Party.
Table4 reportsthe pooled cross-sectiontime-seriesregressionestimatesseparatelyfor Democratsand Republicans. The estimates in column 1 show that
Democraticmembersof Congress elected undersemi-closed, open, nonpartisan, and blanketprimariesare more moderate(conservative)than Democrats
elected underclosed primaries. The effects of Open and NP/Blanketare substantivelymeaningfuland statisticallysignificant.However,the negativeeffect
of Semi is not significant. When we add controls for whetherthe state uses
runoffs,whetherthe memberwas elected in a presidentialelection yearor from
an open seat, and whetherthe districtis in the South or New England,the effect on Open and NP/Blanketremainnegativeand the effect on Semi becomes
significant.28For the most part,then, the resultsfor Democratsare consistent
with hypotheses 1 through3, althoughthose memberselected fromnonpartisan
and blanketprimariesare more moderatethanexpected.
Columns 3 and 4 report comparableestimates for Republican members
of Congress. The estimates in column 3 show that Republican members
of Congress elected from semi-closed primarysystems have more moderate
(liberal) ADA scores than their closed primarycounterparts.However,those
elected from open, nonpartisan,and blanketprimarystates have moreextreme
(conservative)ADA scores, on average,contraryto expectations.The negative
effect on Openpersistseven once we controlfor runoffs,election-specificvariables, andregion,while theeffect on NP/Blanketbecomespositive(as expected)
and significant.Finally,the effect on Semi is large,positive, and significant,as
hypothesized,but smallerthanthe effect on NP/Blanket.29
28. In the full model for Democrats(column 2), we also include a dummy variablefor Washington state. Exclusion of this variableleaves the coefficients largelyunchanged,but the effect of
NP/Blanketis not significant. Similarly,in the full model for Republicans,we include a dummy
variablefor Louisiana.
29. To test the robustnessof our results,we reranthe analysis using the winningcandidate'sWNOMINATEscore (firstdimension)as the dependentvariable.In both the combinedand separate
partyanalyses, the primarysystem variableswere all the same sign and relativemagnitudeas in
the analysis presentedin Tables 3 and 4. Only one primarysystem was statisticallysignificantby
traditionalstandards,however,suggesting thatthe NOMINATEscores containmore variabilityin
individuallegislatorvoting behaviorthan the ADA scores. Complete results of the supplemental
analyses are availableby requestfrom the authors.
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Primary
ElectionSystemsand Representation 321
Table4. PooledCross-SectionTime-SeriesRegressionCoefficientsRelatingWinner'sADA
Score and Primary
SystemType,Democratsand Republicans,U.S. Congress, 1982-1990
Democrats
Republicans
Independent
DV= WinnerldeolDV= WinnerideolDV= WinnerldeolDV= Winnerldeol
Variable
16.29
23.45
-2.14
-36.57**
Constant
(11.11)
(16.94)
(18.49)
(12.79)
-1.13
(.94)
-1.35
(.86)
-.02**
.03**
.03**
(.00)
(.01)
(.01)
-.39
(3.00)
-6.72**
(2.79)
13.12**
(3.18)
9.05**
(2.98)
Open
-7.10**
(2.11)
-3.03*
(1.82)
-4.18**
(1.89)
-3.03*
(1.77)
NP/Blank
-13.81**
(5.17)
-13.69**
(5.98)
-.83
(4.63)
12.13**
(5.74)
Districtldeol
3.75**
(.47)
2.62**
(.40)
Distinctldeol2
-.02**
(.00)
Semi
Runoff
-8.58**
(3.62)
-3.97
(3.85)
President
-3.53**
(.51)
-1.40**
(.51)
OpenSeat
1.97*
(1.16)
-1.38
(.96)
-12.80**
(3.68)
-.54
(3.70)
NewEngl
10.19**
(3.66)
21.55**
(3.74)
WA/LA
15.57*
(8.46)
-20.70**
(8.28)
South
R2
N
.39
1302
.55
1302
.37
868
.48
868
test.
**p < .05, ht;otailedtest;*p < .10, two-tailed
Standarderrorsin parentheses.
5. Conclusions
We find strongsupportfor the hypothesisthatU.S. representativesfrom states
with closed primariestake more extremepolicy positions, relativeto theirdistrict'smedianvoter,thanrepresentativesfrom stateswith moreopen primaries.
We take this as evidence that primaryelection laws systematicallyaffect the
types of candidateselected and the choices they make once in office.
Not all closed primarysystems are created equal, however. Our results
indicatethatsemi-closedprimarysystemsthatallow new votersorindependents
to participatein the candidatenominationprocessproduceRepublicanwinners
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322 TheJoural of Law,Economics,&Organization,
V14N2
whose positions are more liberaland Democraticwinnerswhose positions are
moreconservativethantheirclosed primarycounterparts.This patternsuggests
thatincentivesmay exist for semi-closedprimaryvotersto registerstrategically
as independentsin orderto participatein whicheverparty'sprimaryaffordsa
betteropportunityto affect the general election outcome. This possibility has
real practical implications. Several states are now considering or have just
adoptedchanges in their primaryelection laws. Our researchillustratesthat
the importantfeatureof a system is not just whetherit is nominally open or
closed; rather,the specific institutionaldetails of the system may be critically
important.
Not all open primariesare created equal, either. Our results indicate that
nonpartisanand blanketprimariesproducethe most moderategeneralelection
winnersfrom both parties. We interpretthis result as compelling indirectevidence thatwhile bothstrategicandsincerecrossovervotingarepossible in these
very open primarysystems, sincere crossoverby moderatevoters dominates
and leads to the election of moderatecandidatesfrom both parties. This conclusion is consistentwith preliminaryanalyses by Alvarez and Nagler (1997)
which show minimallevels of strategiccrossovervoting.
Our results also have implications for subsequenttheoreticalanalyses of
multistageelectoral processes. They underscorethe importanceof modeling
the institutionaldetailsof electionsystemsandthe effects thoseinstitutionshave
on voter and candidateincentivesin both the registrationand voting stages.
Finally,while ourresearchdemonstratesthatdifferencesin primaryelection
laws can have significanteffects on the types of candidateselected, it is unclear
which primarysystem is desirablefrom a normativepoint of view. Thatis, the
empiricalresults supportthe conclusion that candidatescloser to the median
voter are more likely to be elected in districts with semi-closed, open, nonpartisan,and blanketprimarysystems. Thus if closeness to the median voter
is viewed as desirable,then open primariesare preferableto closed primaries.
However,in districtsin which importantgroupshavepreferencesdifferentfrom
the medianvoter,more open primariesmay lessen the probabilityof these voters' preferencesreceivingrepresentation.
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