Paper for the ECPR General Conference 2011
Section 18, Panel 53: ‘The domestic politics of foreign policy’
Foreign policy and domestic consensus making: the case of the Netherlands
Niels van Willigen and Hans Vollaard, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University
FIRST DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION
Contact information:
Dr. N. van Willigen
Assistant Professor
Institute of Political Science
Leiden University
Wassenaarseweg 52
P.O. Box 9555 Leiden
The Netherlands
willigen@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
Dr. H. Vollaard
Assistant Professor
Institute of Political Science
Leiden University
Wassenaarseweg 52
P.O. Box 9555 Leiden
The Netherlands
vollaard@fsw.leidenuniv.nl
1
Introduction
In the last few decades traditional Foreign Policy Executives (FPEs) in European countries
have to deal with a increasing number of domestic actors when formulating and executing
foreign policy, the policy dealing with the international position of a certain actor (usually
state) and international politics in general. These actors include other branches of government
than the ministry of Foreign Affairs, parliaments, and private actors such as companies,
pressure groups, non-governmental organizations. The growing involvement of domestic
actors has confronted FPEs with a larger variety of conflicting opinions on foreign policy. As
a consequence, FPEs can no longer determine foreign policy themselves and take domestic
consensus, support, acquiescence or indifference for granted. The question is how the rising
number of actors and ensuing disagreements have affected the dynamics of foreign policy
making, not the least because domestic consensus is an important requirement for effective
foreign policy, particularly for small states. The purpose of this paper is to theorize on how
FPEs try to obtain support amidst a pluralistic landscape of domestic actors with a large
variety of preferences. We explore a single case. The advantage of a single case study is that
it allows for a more detailed scrutiny of the strategies hypothesized. A wide variety of sources
can be used (such as surveys, news papers, interviews, electoral manifestos, party documents
and legislative documentation) to cross-validate findings. Here, the FPE in the Netherlands
will be examined to develop a tentative theoretical framework on domestic consensus making
on foreign policy. The focus of the paper is one important foreign policy theme in the
Netherlands: peace operations. The collapse of the Balkenende-IV government in 2010 after
internal disagreements on prolonging a military mission in Uruzgan (Afghanistan) is just a
striking illustration of how a more assertive parliament have increasingly constrained the
Dutch FPE in formulating and executing foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The
main empirical question of the paper is how the Dutch FPE has sought to raise domestic
support for foreign policy in the case mentioned.
Before examining the case of peace operations in greater detail, the paper first shows how
domestic actors have been become more influential in the foreign policy making process since
the 1970’s. Whereas in the past the domestic support for foreign policy making was largely
characterized by permissive consensus and indifference, since about forty years domestic
actors have become more directly involved in foreign policy making and stopped giving
support by default. The second part of paper offers an explanation of the growing significance
2
of domestic politics in Dutch foreign policy making. In other words: what have been the
sources of so-called domesticization of foreign policy (Verbeek and Vleuten, 2008)? This
domesticization resulted in an increasing heterogeneity of actors and preferences in foreign
policy making. Part three discusses how the Dutch FPE may seek consensus and support for
foreign policy among a growing variety of domestic actors. We identify three strategies of
persuasion (incorporation, communication, and compensation), which are examined in greater
detail in the case of peace operations in part four. Finally, the paper discusses the implications
of the empirical findings in its concluding part.
1: The Foreign Policy Executive and Domesticization in the Netherlands
Since in 1798 the first Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Willem Berend Buys, assumed
office, a small elitist group determined Dutch foreign policy-making throughout the 19th
century and beyond. In addition to the ministers of Foreign Affairs and their mainly
aristocratic and protestant diplomats and civil servants, the group consisted of members of the
royal family, and the ministries of the Colonies, War, and, to a lesser extent, Agriculture,
Finance and Economic Affairs as well as the prime minister. In the making of foreign policy,
the ministry of Foreign Affairs kept a certain suspicion to the involvement of the media and
the greater public. Similar to other European countries, the Foreign Policy Executive (FPE),
defined here as the ‘group of executive policymakers and officials that have primary
responsibility within the government over the determination of foreign policy’ (Ripsman,
2002: 43), thus remained a largely autonomous foreign policy elite (Goldstein and Pevehouse,
2008: 140). Other ministries, parliament, political parties, interest groups, pressure groups,
experts, public opinion leaders, the small-sized attentive public, let alone the mass public
were largely irrelevant (Almond, 1950: 139). Also due to a permissive indifference among the
mass public, decision-making on the means and goals of foreign policy remained largely a
matter of elite bargaining and deliberation behind closed doors (Webber and Smith, 2002: 36)
Admittedly, parliaments occasionally asserted its influence on foreign policy issues in the 19th
century, also in the Netherlands, for example with respect to its control of the colonial budget
and of foreign policy. When the greater public sporadically voiced its demands on foreign
policy, the FPE basically ignored it. Despite large-scale support for the South-African
Republics in the Boer Wars against the British Empire in the late 19th century, the Dutch FPE
prioritized its relationship with Great Britain, for example in its invitation policy for the
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Hague Peace Conference (Hellema, 2009: 50 and 52). However, in the aftermath of WWI
(1914-1918), the Dutch parliament obtained the formal right of approval of international
treaties and declarations of war. The parliament also constituted a special committee on
foreign affairs, a large-sized committee mainly discussing the annual budget of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Fierce parliamentary and public debates on the treaty establishing the
League of Nations, the Belgian-Dutch treaty, and the Dutch embassy at the Holy See reflected
the growing involvement of domestic actors. That held in particular for the Naval Law, on
which conservatives and pacifists clashed in parliament several times, while 1.3 million and
1.4 million citizens (out of a population of about 7.5 million) supported a petition against the
expansion of the navy in 1923 and 1930 respectively. Nevertheless, the impact of parliament
let alone the greater public on daily foreign policy making remained limited until after WWII
(Hellema, 2009: 283).
During WWI, the FPE and Dutch export companies started to work closely together in
managing international trade flows to maintain the neutral position in the Netherlands as well
as access to the markets of the neighbouring countries. Following the protectionist 1930s, the
FPE, Dutch business and the major parties in parliament perceived international agreements
on trade and monetary stability as well as a low-wage policy and larger productivity of
agriculture (the main export sector) and industry as the necessary means to enhance the Dutch
economy. The expansion of the welfare state provided a compensation for employees to make
the low-wage policy acceptable. As a result, ministries other than of Foreign Affairs,
agricultural interest groups, employers federations, trade unions and policy experts in
parliament became involved in making foreign economic policy since the late 1940s.
Meanwhile, WWII provided the fatal blow to the Dutch policy of international neutrality. In
response, the Dutch FPE and the major parties in parliament accepted international security
cooperation as necessary and unavoidable. Discussions on the conditions of international
agreements on trade and security remained largely restricted to the FPE, and to a lesser extent,
to policy experts in political parties. Parliament often discussed foreign policy only when
treaties had to be ratified or the government’s budget had to be approved. Despite initial
hesitations about giving up sovereignty in the process of European integration and East-Asian
colonies, a widespread domestic consensus on foreign policy emerged in the 1950s with
transatlantic unity, American nuclear hegemony, anti-communism, inclusion of Germany, an
economic, supranational European Community without dominance of the larger states, and
British EC accession as the key words. The Dutch FPE used a proactive media strategy
4
towards the greater public by using the newsreels in cinemas and by feeding information to
journalists (Baudet, 2011). The greater public expressed strong opinions on German war
compensation and de-colonisation, but its deference to authorities and focus on domestic
affairs (such as wages and housing) allowed the FPE to act fairly autonomously. The FPE,
however, expanded in size. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs faced increasing competition
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and to a lesser extent of Agriculture, Finance and
Defence in the making of foreign policy (Hellema, 2005). Slowly but gradually also the Prime
Minister obtained a larger role within the FPE due to a more prominent role of government
leaders in the European Communities.
The FPE’s autonomy faced pressure from the late 1960s onwards. Parliament, parties,
pressure groups, the attentive public, the media, and even parts of the greater public tried to
assert greater influence on foreign policy following a growing desire for democratization and
political engagement. Parliament investigated government’s purchase of weapons.
Furthermore, among the public at large there was a growing awareness that the political,
social and economic interdependence made the nation state an anachronism (Kennedy, 1995).
Particularly higher educated, Christian or leftwing, citizens became also increasing concerned
with the wider world beyond their own local community, ideological or religious subculture,
and the Netherlands (Hellema, 2009: 285). Through demonstrations and organized activism
they expressed their views on issues such as solidarity with the Third World, the Vietnam
War, the nuclear arms race, and human rights. Growing individualisation undermined
citizens’ previous deference and organizational loyalty. In response, organisations losing
members, such as the mainline churches and the communist party, adopted the new issues
with great fervour. Large-scale demonstrations against nuclear armament followed in 1981
and 1983. Even though foreign policy barely determined people’s vote, political parties
adopted the new issues raised out of fear they might yet lose any support in an increasingly
volatile electoral market. Parties filed parliamentary questions, and made stronger statements
in election campaigns on issues such as developmental aid, NATO membership and nuclear
disarmament (Hellema, 2009: 241). The vulnerability of several governing parties to antinuclear constituencies limited the FPE’s leeway in negotiations on the nuclear defence in the
transatlantic alliance. No less than three times the Dutch government postponed the decision
to allow 44 American nuclear armed cruise missiles on its soil as part of NATO’s nuclear
deterrence. Although it can be questioned whether the Netherlands really suffered from socalled Hollanditis (a preference for pacifism and neutrality) (Laqueur, 1981), it is clear that
5
domestic politics had a strong influence on Dutch foreign policy in this matter (Eichenberg,
1983).
In the 1970s, the FPE decided to launch a more pro-active PR policy, while it incorporated
parliamentarians and pressure groups in the preparation and implementation of policy-making
on issues such as the developmental aid, human rights and the environment. Although the
Dutch FPE faced more and more domestic actors in foreign policy making, its policy
principles (Atlanticism; international free trade) remained largely untouched. In the 1980s,
consensus strengthened when the major leftwing party accepted a mild version of neoliberalism as the necessary response to economic decline in the Netherlands (also to prevent
exclusion from government with the pivotal Christian-Democrats), while arms negotiations
between the Soviet Union and United States rendered the issue of nuclear missiles on Dutch
soil to irrelevance. The manifold choices to be made on foreign policy after the end of the
Cold War largely remained an issue of the FPE and the policy experts in parliament and now
also of interest and pressure groups. In the 1990s, only policy debacles such as the failed
attempt to launch a unified, pillar-less European Union (1991) and the Srebrenica massacre
(1995) raised considerable attention from the greater public. Nevertheless, the FPE’s
autonomy diminished, because the continuing European integration and international
cooperation covered more and more policy areas, involving more ministries, parliamentarians,
pressure and interest groups. The growing speed and size of cross-border contacts also
involved more domestic actors more closely in foreign policy, since the FPE had to take into
account wide-ranging issues such as the international competition the Dutch industry faced
from emerging economies, pension funds’ dependence of international financial markets, the
repercussions in Dutch neighbourhoods as well as the Middle East of anti-Islam activism, to
the scale of drug criminality and terrorism.
Meanwhile, progressive engagement with the rest of the world declined simultaneously with a
further decline of ideology and religion. Nevertheless, domestic consensus remained on the
necessity of international (not necessarily European) cooperation for a small trading country
facing the challenges of organised crime, climate change, and international terrorism until
today. Subscribing to the idea of international cooperation does not mean that the Dutch
accept them in practice if they perceive it as ineffective to pursue national interests (cf.
Ridder et al., 2011). The effectiveness of peace operations in far-away regions and
developmental aid has been increasingly criticised. That particularly holds for European
6
integration, which also increasingly touches upon identity-related policy areas such as the
national currency. Most Dutch also agree the Netherlands is now losing influence in an
enlarging and deepening EU. And many criticise the EU for being inefficient and ineffective.
The response to this widely shared diagnosis is diverse, however. Nationalists at the cultural
right and social-economic left regret the loss of Dutch power, and perceive migration and an
enlarging and deepening EU as a threat to Dutch identity, democracy, power, or solidarity.
They want to reclaim power from a dysfunctional EU. To the cosmopolitan Greens and
Social-Liberals, nationalism is condemnable and also outdated in a globalising world. They
consider a more effective and stronger EU necessary to face the challenges of globalisation
and to spread progressive values such as individual freedom, a green environment, and
multiculturalism. The pragmatists in-between (mainly the established governing parties) seek
to defend national interests and national identity, but accept a multicultural society as a given
(not as desirable). In addition, they perceive European supranational cooperation on certain
cross-border issues as necessary and inevitable, and therefore worth to be made more
effective and efficient. Their pragmatic view also allows repatriating competences from
European to national level if it would make the EU more efficient or if certain problems can
be tackled more effectively at a lower level. Despite the relative consistency in preferences
regarding foreign policy among the electorate, the Dutch lack of party loyalty and the nonsalience of foreign policy in voting facilitate quick shifts in the parliamentary representation
on the diverging three views of foreign policy (nationalist; cosmopolitan; pragmatic). The
FPE therefore cannot take support for its foreign policy for granted, further limiting its
autonomy.
The larger involvement of domestic actors does not mean that the FPE can no longer operate
autonomously. First of all, in some policy areas the executive might have successfully resisted
a loss of influence or might have even strengthened its position. Moravcsik, for example,
claims that European integration strengthened the executive branches of the state.(Jørgenson,
1998: 91). Secondly, the FPE may have several instruments at its disposal to gather sufficient
support for its foreign policy. Before discussing these instruments in greater detail, the next
section explains the sources of domesticization of foreign policy in the Netherlands.
2: Explaining domesticization
7
Domestic politics have always been important for foreign policy in the last two centuries.
Foreign policy-making has relied on taxation, conscription, national reputation, economic
power, and education of its staff among other things. Foreign policy also involves quite a
number of domestic constituencies, such as the armed forces and the “developmental aid
industry”. Nevertheless, actual foreign-policy decision making have remained a matter of a
relatively small, elitist group for a long time. The near absence of formal legislation on
foreign policy and the secrecy of international negotiations also hampered the involvement of
domestic actors. Nevertheless, domesticization has taken place. What are its main causes?
The first cause of domesticization is simply that there is more international politics. The more
issues become subject of international political decision-making, the more also domestic
actors may become involved in foreign policy. More international politics (in terms of number
of international agreements, organisations and policy-areas involved) means more choices to
be made about which domestic actors may have diverging views. More international politics
also means that more domestic actors are affected, motivating them to become involved,
particularly when it touches their daily life and identity. More international as well national
politics also means growing interconnectedness of foreign and domestic politics, involving
more domestic actors with foreign policy. For example, domestic welfare policies in the
Netherlands obtained an international dimension when it was confronted with labour
migration and international regulations regarding social security from the International
Labour Organization and the European Union. The same held for the domestic fight against
crime, when they faced international arrangements and organisations such as Interpol, the
United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Benelux. It required domestic actors to take
the international position of the Netherlands and developments in world politics into account.
A second cause of domesticization is political emancipation. The Dutch parliament, the Dutch
parties, interest groups, pressure groups and also the greater public have become more and
more involved in all politics, including foreign policy. Political emancipation also resulted in
declining deference to the authorities, including the FPE. As a consequence, the FPE
depended increasingly not only on the sources but also on the support from domestic actors.
Domestic actors and the FPE exchanged sources and support for influence. Since electoral
volatility has increased in the 1960s and particularly in the 2000s, parties have to take voters’
views on foreign affairs into account to prevent losing electoral appeal. Moments of more
choice in international politics provided windows of opportunities for emancipating domestic
8
actors to enhance their say in foreign policy. The end of WWI, WII, and the Cold War, but
also détente and decolonisation offered the FPE more leeway and targets in international
politics. As can be seen in the history of the FPEs declining autonomy, domestic actors
asserted their influence at these moments.
3: Mechanisms for gaining domestic support
Domesticization makes creating consensus for foreign policy an increasingly difficult task for
the FPE. The main empirical question of the paper is how the Dutch FPE has sought to gain
domestic support for peace operations over the last twenty years. An important question that
needs to be answered in advance is: ‘support from whom?’. In spite of mass public agitation
and involvement in the 1970s and the 1980s, the general public remained rather ignorant
about, disinterested in, and detached from foreign policy making (Everts, 2008: 4) Disinterest
in and ignorance about foreign policy does not only occur in the Netherlands, but for example
also in the United States. Even after 9/11, only 26 percent of the Americans followed the
foreign news “very closely” and 45 percent said that there lives are unaffected by
international events (Deibel, 2007: 93) Recent data from the Dutch Social and Cultural
Planning Agency indicate that 50 percent of the Dutch public follows international politics
regularly and only 5 percent (the attentive public) does so intensively (Ridder et al., 2011:25).
The aloofness of the mass public does not mean that public opinion does not play any role.
Whereas the larger part of foreign policy making may remain unnoticed by the general public,
specific topics (such as the war in Vietnam and the nuclear arms race in the 1970s, or 09/11
and the subsequent War on Terror more recently) have received extensive media coverage,
and drew the attention of the greater public. This also holds for the case discussed in this
paper: peace operations. The Srebrenica massacre (1995) raised considerable public interest.
The theoretical purpose of this paper is to find out how the FPE seeks support for foreign
policy, also among the greater public, particularly in an era of declining trust in public
authorities. As far as we know, the scholarly attention to the way the FPE does so, has been
limited. Foreign Policy Analysis has focused on the impact of domestic actors on states’
foreign policy at the international level, rather than on how FPEs try to build consensus or
gain support domestically among an increasing number of actors with potentially diverging
views. This paper therefore rather draws on the account of Dutch foreign policy above to
distinguish three strategies to gain support: incorporation, communication, and compensation.
9
Of course, governments may gain support for any policy by these three strategies. Literature
on creating consensus and gaining support in other policy-areas may therefore be helpful. At a
later stage, comparisons between foreign policy and other policy-areas offer insight in how
creating consensus may actually deviate from the other policy-areas. As a first step in
theorising, however, this paper explores the two cases of peace operations and European
integration. How did the FPE formulate and execute a foreign policy that could count on
support and consensus in those two cases? As said, three strategies might be available.
A first strategy of gaining support and creating consensus is to incorporate domestic actors
into the foreign policy-decision making. In a corporatist and consensual country, the exchange
between influence for support is a very common way to increase consensus (Bovens et al.,
2007: 158) (Andeweg and Irwin, 2009: 169). For example, developmental aid organisations
have become included in Dutch foreign policy-making, by their representation in
government’s advisory boards and their permanent role in implementing developmental
policy. A second strategy is effective, persuasive communication. Whereas the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs kept distance to media and the greater public in the 19th century, since the
1970s it increasingly sought to adapt its rhetoric (not necessarily its policies) to the public
desires to gain and maintain support for its foreign policy. This is also a well known
mechanism that can be found in the public policy literature (Herweijer, 2008:114 {Bovens,
2007 #3785: 160). A third strategy is to compensate (potential) losers of foreign policy. Just
after WWII, for example, employees obtained an expansion of welfare state to obtain their
support for the low-wage policy to maintain Dutch international competitiveness. This
strategy is drawn from welfare theory. Welfare theory claims that those suffering from
societal inequalities produced by the market should be compensated by the government
(Bovens et al., 2007: 96) Compensation might not only be motivated because of concerns
about a just society, but also more instrumentally to gain support. There may be more
strategies, but these three strategies are just selected as a start to explain how FPEs gain
support for foreign policy.
4: Gaining support for peace operations
The above mentioned strategies are used by the FPE in foreign policy making processes. We
will show this by focusing on a contentious issue of foreign policy: peace operations. In this
case there are heterogeneous opinions both among the mass public and the attentive public.
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The first question to be answered is whether we observe the use of incorporation to win
support. Incorporation is an instrument that has widely been used by the FPE in relation to
peace operation and European integration. After the disaster of Srebrenica (1995) the role of
Dutch parliament in peace operations increased. The most important development in that
respect was the establishment of the Frame of Reference (Toetsingskader) in 1995. The Frame
of Reference was meant to structure the deliberations between government and parliament
and to improve the quality of decision-making about peace operations.1 In 2001 the Frame of
Reference was further refined and included the new ‘article 100 procedure’. The procedure
refers to article 100 of the Dutch constitution which obliges the government to inform
parliament prior to any peace operation. Although formal approval of parliament is not
required, there have been no peace operations decided upon without support of the majority in
parliament. Parliament gained a de facto decision-making authority. Table 1 provides an
overview of parliamentary support for the largest and politically most controversial peace
operations since 2000.
Table 1: Peace operations and parliamentary support
Peace operation
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR)
2
3
Seats against
113
37
129
21
4
126
24
5
127
23
78
72
Taskforce Uruzgan 1
Taskforce Uruzgan 2
Kunduz
Seats in favour
6
1
The Framework includes specific criteria which need to be checked before a decision can be taken about
starting a peace operation, such as clear objectives, an exit strategy, and support from allies.
2
On 18 October 2000 PvdA, VVD, D66, GL, and RPF/GPV supported the UNMEE mission. Against were:
CDA, SP and SGP: ‘Kamer akkoord met Unmee-missie’, Reformatorisch Dagplad, 18 oktober 2000.
3
On 31 June 2003 CDA, D66, VVD, PvdA, LPF, CU, SGP voted in favour. Against were: SP, GL and four
dissenting MPs from the PvdA, and one dissenting MP from D’66. ‘Kamer stemt in met missie naar Irak’, NRC,
26 juni 2003. ‘Opstandje in PvdA over Irak’, Trouw, 27 juni 2003.
4
On 2 February 2006 CDA, VVD, CU, SGP, PvdA, and LPF voted in favour. Against were: D66 (in spite of
being a part of the coalition government), SP, GL and one dissenting MP from the PvdA. ‘Debatteren met gejoel
en hoongelach’, de Volkskrant, 3 februari 2006.
5
In December 2007: CDA, PvdA, VVD, CU and SGP voted in favour and SP, PVV, GL, D66, PvD, Verdonk
were against.
6
On 27 January 2011: VVD, CDA, CU, SGP, GL, and D66 voted in favour. Against: PVV, PvdA, SP, PvD, and
one dissenting MP from Groen Links (Ineke van Gent). Actually, 100 MPs voted against a proposal from PvdA
and SP to cancel the operation. Also the PVV voted against the proposal (adding 24 MPs to the 76 (2 MPs were
absent during the vote) MPs in favour of the mission. In spite of being against the Kunduz mission in general,
the PVV voted against the proposal, because its motives for being against differed from the motives of the PvdA
and SP. ‘Politiemissie naar Kunduz gaat door’, de Volkskrant, 28 january 2011; ‘SP wil hoofdelijke stemming
over Afghanistan’, de Volkskrant, 27 januari 2011.
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The table shows that in all five peace operations were supported by a parliamentary majority
(although a small majority in the case of the Kunduz mission). In none of the cases there was
a large public support though. Apparently, the incorporation of parliament in the decision
making process allowed the FPE to ignore low public support for specific missions. In terms
of democratic legitimacy this is worrying. The government’s Advisory Council for
International Affairs (Adviesraad International Vraagstukken, AIV) emphasized that a large
public support is needed in case of large and risky peace operations (Adviesraad voor
Internationale Vraagstukken, 2006) Nonetheless, the FPE seemed to focus on parliamentary
support instead and does so quite successfully.
Broad parliamentary support was ensured by giving parliament a substantial role via the
article 100 procedure. This resulted in a practice in which parliament is almost fully
incorporated. The practice consists of the following: first the government writes a policy letter
(the so-called ‘article 100 letter’). Then parliament questions the government by way of
written questions. Thirdly hearings with national and international experts take place. There is
a wide diversity of participants including representatives from military trade unions,
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks, as well as
journalists, academics, and politicians and officials from the area where the mission will take
place. The hearings include the participation of the domestic attentive public, incorporating
them in the decision-making process. Parliament uses the information gained from the
hearings to successfully influence the mandate and composition of the missions. And finally,
a debate (Algemeen Overleg) is organized during which parliament decides whether it lends
its support or not (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2007-2008).7
In all peace operations listed in Table 1, parliament exercised large influence on the
composition of military mission and the mandate. In the case of UNMEE for example, there
was a lively discussion about force protection. Although it was a classic peacekeeping
operation (making use of interposition) and therefore relatively low risk, parliament (at the
initiative of the PvdA) demanded that four Apache combat helicopters would be send along
with the troops. Initially, the government declined and the military chief of staff voiced that
7
Normally parliament does not vote on the mission (an exception was the Kunduz mission in which there was a
roll call vote). Instead, the political parties represented in parliament issue statements in which they express
support or disproval.
12
he would prefer transport airplanes instead. Nonetheless, in order to gain support for the
mission the government complied with the parliamentary demand. Due to Ethiopian concerns
the Apaches could not be stationed in Asmara and were stationed in Djibouti (6 hours flying
from the operational area) instead (de Volkskrant, 20 November 2000) They would only come
into action in case an evacuation was necessary; a task which relevance raised some further
debate (NRC Handelsblad, 20 februari 2001) A second demand related to force protection
was that the government was asked to get guarantees from large countries (i.e. the USA and
France) to help Dutch troops in case things would go wrong. Also in this case parliament got
its way: both France and the USA were included in the contingency planning (Ministerie van
Defensie, 2001) Thus, by demanding the presence of attack helicopters and contingency
planning with Allies, parliament essentially got involved in the operational planning op the
mission.
The debate about the SFIR mission was dominated by security concerns too. First of all,
parliament demanded a more robust risk assessment which would take into account changing
circumstances in the nearby future. Hearings were organized to inform parliament about
potential risks (NRC Handelsblad, 13 juni 2003) During the hearings it became clear that
most experts agreed that Iraq would be a dangerous mission (NRC Handelsblad, 20 juni 2003)
Again, like in the case of UNMEE, the government was demanded to get guarantees from
Allies in case evacuation would be needed (de Volkskrant, 19 juni 2003) (de Volkskrant, 18
juni 2003) In the end parliament proved satisfied with the guarantees offered by the
government and supported the mission.
Similar discussions as with UNMEE and SFIR were held in the cases of Taskforce Uruzgan (I
and II) and the Kunduz mission. Every time parliament got its way. In the case of the Kunduz
the government went as far as redefining the entire mission. Pressured by GroenLinks, which
was crucial for getting a majority in parliament, the police mission was ‘demilitarized’ and
got a more civil character. Summarizing, the analysis presented above shows a large influence
of parliament to the extent that it even deals with operational details. In the quest for a broad
parliamentary support, even opposition parties were allowed to amend the mandate and
composition of the mission if necessary. De facto parliament had become part of the
executive by exchanging its support in return for influence.
13
The second strategy, communication, is clearly observed as well. The strategy to convey
above mentioned messages is carefully chosen. First of all, the ministries of Foreign Affairs,
of Defence and other public institutions (such as the Social and Cultural Planning Agency)
track public opinion. Based on that, media strategies of public diplomacy are formulated. An
important strategy in the case of peace operations was to allow journalists to report from
within the military (embedded journalism). With respect to the contents of what is being
communicated there is a mix of arguments based on international idealism and arguments
based on the national interest.
With respect to peace operations the FPE regularly refers to the above mentioned foreign
policy tradition of internationalist idealism. This tradition is institutionalized in the sense that
the Dutch constitution contains an article which obliges the Netherlands to promote the
development of the international legal order (Article 90). In debates about deploying peace
operations, the government regularly refers to the Dutch commitment to multilateralism,
international peace and security, and international law and order. The fact that the
Netherlands has a pro-active public diplomacy which brands The Hague as the world’s capital
of international justice (because of the many international legal institutions based there) also
refers to the tradition of internationalist idealism. It explains why the government persisted for
a long time that the political support it gave to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was in
line with United Nations Security Council resolutions. It also explains why the government
did its best to argue that the mission in Uruzgan would not be a war fighting mission, but one
of reconstruction and development. A similar standpoint was taken in the discussion about the
Kunduz mission.
Next to the arguments based on the international idealist position, the FPE clearly uses
arguments based on the national interest too. Particularly in the last few years, the government
tries to explain that peace operations are in the best interest of the Netherlands (Ridder et al.,
2011: 35) This interest is defined in different ways. The most straightforward explanation is
that a particular peace operation leads to stability in a certain region. This stability might be
relevant in political terms (preventing terrorism) and/or economic terms. In a more indirect
way the interest is defined as being related to the international position of the Netherlands.
Non-participation in a peace operation carried out by Allies is explained in terms of hurting
Dutch political and economic interests. A clear example was the discussion about extending
the mandate for Taskforce Uruzgan in 2010. The FPE repeatedly argued that non-extension
14
would hurt the Dutch position within NATO. It would lead to a loss of influence. After the
decision was taken not to extent the mandate, some observers made a link between that
decision and the non-invitation for the G20 summit.
The final strategy which is used by the FPE is compensation. Those who lose out because of a
certain policy are being compensated. In the case of peace operations compensation takes
place by better care for the about 111,000 Dutch military veterans (Ministerie van Defensie,
2011a) An effective veterans policy can be seen as a societal recognition of the dangers which
individual soldiers encounter when they participate in peace operations (Ministerie van
Defensie, 2010) In general troops get more support from the general public than specific
peace operations. For example, the Dutch public was largely against the Uruzgan missions,
but a majority of 57 percent supported the individual troops (Ridder et al., 2011: 29)
However, veterans increasingly find that they get less support from society and in the media
(Ministerie van Defensie, 2011b). A sound and effective veteran policy becomes therefore
even more important than in the past. Policy for troops returning from peace missions was
largely absent until the end of the 1980’s. It was only then that the government recognized
that not only war fighting missions, but also peace operations could lead to serious
psychological problems. This became more than clear when it was discovered that about 20
percent of the Dutch troops which had served in the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon
(UNIFIL, 1979-1989) suffered from psychological or psychosomatic problems (Klep and Van
Gils, 2000: 142). Since the early 1990s the ministry of Defence took several steps to improve
cthe care for veterans. Moreover, specific institutions such as the Veteranen Instituut
(Veterans Institute, since 2000) and a Veterans Day (since 2005) were established.
Conclusions and reflections
The analysis above shows that the necessity for the FPE to actively win support for foreign
policy has increased with the domesticization of foreign policy making. The FPE used
incorporation, communication and compensation as strategies to win support. We showed that
when the FPE uses incorporation the focus is on parliament, rather than on the general public.
Thus, when the FPE claims to find as much support as possible for its foreign policy, it means
primarily parliamentary support, not public support. The peace operations approved in
parliament could not necessarily rely on large support among the greater public. A clear
example with respect to peace operations was the Taskforce Uruzgan which gained a (small)
15
majority in parliament, but rather low support among the general public. As far as
communication is concerned the FPE uses a mix of legal internationalism and national
interests to convince parliament and the general public of the merits of peace operations and
European integration. Even when peace operations involve war fighting such as in
Afghanistan, the emphasis has been put on reconstruction and development. Also, the
government frames peace operations as part of the obligation found in article 90 of the
constitution which states that the Netherlands has to promote the development of the
international legal order. Compensation is the least used instrument. Nonetheless, we
observed that in the case of peace operations the veteran policy can be explained as the result
of compensation.
What are the implications of these findings? First of all, since (democratic) countries differ
with respect to opportunities to create consensus, foreign policy will vary across (democratic)
countries (cf. Risse-Kappen, 1991; Ripsman, 2002). Second, the findings raise the question
why the FPE can relatively neglect declining public support for peace operations. Does the
non-salience of foreign policy in elections provide the FPE (and the parliament) still some
leeway to ignore public opinion in contrast to salient issues such as healthcare and crime?
Third, the definition of FPE may have to be modified. Ripsman’s definition limited it to the
executive. However, in the case of operations, parliament became de facto co-executive.
Should the concept of FPE therefore include also those actors that (occasionally) co-decide on
foreign policy, and if so, does the concept its distinctive value? In relation to the previous
point, shouldn’t the focus be rather on creating consensus within the often internally divided
FPE than on the FPE gaining support elsewhere? And if so, wouldn’t it be more helpful to
examine the creation of consensus on foreign policy per se, rather than how a (divided and
less autonomous) FPE tries to do so? Fifth, further research would be needed to explore other
potential strategies of persuasion. One may think of exclusion of political actors from
decision-making (for example, parties from government or interest groups from corporatist
arrangements) to force them changing their opinions. Sixth, the effectiveness of the various
strategies should be examined in greater detail, also across countries. A lack of financial
means may hamper the compensation strategy, while a divided FPE may be less effective in
conveying a convincing message than a centralised one.
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