ROMANIA‐ANEWGEOPOLITICALACTOR
INTHEBLACKSEAENERGYGAME
Alin‐DoruCodoban*
Abstract
TheBlackSea(BS)regionisthespacewherearesituatedthelastfor‐
mercommuniststates,whichonewayoranotherarewillingtojointheEu‐
ropeanUnionortobecomemorecompatiblewithWesterneconomicandso‐
cial standards. The paper discusses the idea of model countries, of how,
basedontheconcentriccirclesprinciple,newwavesofcountriesarebecom‐
ingclosertotheEU,asnowitistimeforthenewmemberstatestooffertheir
expertiseandsupporttocountriesfromtheBSregionandtheBalkans.Itisin
thiscontextthatRomania’sroleasanintermediarybetweenthesecountries
isanalyzed,givenitsgeographicalpositionintheabove‐mentionedregions,
interesting for specific sectorial cooperation such as energy. Through the
AGRIproject,Romaniacouldbecomethesecondlargestenergyplatformfor
the EU, after Turkey; and could become, making use of its membership, the
EU’s main energy player in the region, becoming a nodal point for Caspian
hydrocarbonstransittoCentralEurope.
Keywords:geopolitics,Romania,Poland,Hungary,AGRI,energy.
Özet
KaradenizbölgesişuveyabuşekildeAvrupaBirliği'nekatılmakisteyen
veyaBatı'nıniktisadivetoplumsalölçütleriyledahauyumluolmayıarzulayan
son eski komünist devletlerin bulunduğu yerdir. Bu makale model ülkeler
fikrini,şimdizamanyeniüyedevletleriçintecrübevedestekleriniKaradeniz
ve Balkan devletlerine sunma zamanı olduğundan, eşmerkezli çevreler ilke‐
sinedayalıolarakyenidalgaülkelerinAB'yenasılyaklaştığınıtartışmaktadır.
Romanya'nınbuülkelerarasındabiraracıolarakrolü,enerjigibiözelsektö‐
rel işbirlikleri için ilgi çekici olan anılan bölgelerin coğrafi konumları göz
önündetutularak,iştebuçerçevedetahlilediliyor.AGRIprojesiyleRomanya
AvrupaiçinTürkiye'densonraikincienerjiplatformuveüyeliğinikullanarak,
Hazar hidrokarbonlarının Orta Avrupa'ya aktarılmasında AB'nin bölgedeki
başlıcaenerjioyuncusuolabilir.
AnahtarKelimeler:jeopolitik,Romanya,Polonya,Macaristan,AGRI,enerji.
*PhDCandidate,FacultyofEconomicsandBusinessAdministration,“Babeş‐Bolyai”Universi‐
tyofCluj‐Napoca,Romania,alincodoban@yahoo.com
KaradenizAraştırmaları•Yaz2012•Sayı34•1‐9 Alin‐DoruCodoban
INTRODUCTION
One could consider that in the 90s Europe was divided into several parts,
according to the openness of the national economies to market principles
and the democratic functioning of their societies. If Western Europe, and
namely the European Community, behaved as a model for the remaining
countriesofourcontinent,inCentralandEasternEuropetherewasagroup
ofcountriesthatwereheadingtowardswesternstandards.IntheVisegrad
countries (and to some extent in the Baltic states that were neighboring
with Scandinavia), that were directly connected to Western Europe – ac‐
cording to the principle of concentric circles (Morozov 2008: 45) – the transfor‐
mationofeconomiesandsocietieswentfaster,thaninthecountriesofthe
second wave, as Romania or Bulgaria, which were neighboring only with
other postcommunist states. Certainly, one could consider that there is a
thirdwaveofcountries,madeoftheformersovietrepublics,stillremaining
under Russian influence, where significant changes were blocked by the
elitesoftheformercommunistparty.
IfthefirstgroupofcountriesjoinedtheWestin2004,3yearslaterEU
accepted as members the remaining Romania and Bulgaria, getting even
closer to post‐soviet countries, that where geographically situated in the
extendedBlackSea(BS)region.Thankstothelastenlargement,onecould
say that the BS status changed from a “Russian lake” 1 to that of a “Mare
Nostrum”.
Followingthispathofthinking,themainquestioniswhetherWestern
Europeisgoingtoexpandfurther,atthepointwhereEuropemeetsAsia.This
dilemmastillworriesEuropeanelites,whichgenerallyturnacriticaleyeto
Turkey,whichhasbeentryingformorethan50yearstotieitsdestinywith
thatofEurope.Butthefactisthatinthecurrentsituation,thatofagrowing
dependenceonRussianenergyresources,theEuropeanUnionhastocreate
a courtesy policy towards Black Sea countries, because their geopolitical
meaningisdecisivelygreaterthanthatofothers(e.g.thoseofNorthAfrica),
asaresultoftheirroleintheextractionandtransitofoil andnatural gas
fromtheCaspianandMiddleEastregions.
Now,afewyearsaftertherecentEUenlargementtotheEast,thetime
hascomefornewmemberstatestobehaveasmodelsforcountriesofthe
third wave, or in other terms, to act as a kind of a magnet that will draw
themclosertoWesternEurope–perceivedastheEU–inchoseneconomic
sectors. This should be seen as a duty, not only because of their common
historical ties coming from the recent past, (and as a result a deep
knowledgeofsocialconditionsofthosenations),butmostofallasawayof
creatingconsumermarketsfortheirownproducts–lesscompetitiveinthe
1Duringthe2005visitoftheRomanianpresidentBăsescuintheUS,hesaidthattheRussians
areusedtoconsidertheBSasbeingaRussianlake.
2
Romania:ANewGeopoliticalActorInTheBlackSeaEnergyGame
oldEU,simultaneouslygettingaccesstoenergyresources.Poland–thanks
totheEasternPartnership–becametheleadingcentral‐Europeancountry
engaged in Eastern Europe, its main interests being Ukraine and Belarus.
However,thePolish‐SwedishEasternPartnershipisalsofocusingoncoun‐
tries of the BS shore, to which Polandhas no direct territorial access, and
forwhichanewPoland–geographicallyandculturallyclose–isneededto
giveanexampleofimplementingEUcriteriaanddemands.
Consequently,theCentral‐EuropeanexperienceofjoiningtheEUcould
bebeneficialforcountriesfromtheBalkansandBSregionplanningtobe‐
come part of the enlarged EU in the next decades. A constant contact and
cooperation between them is needed in order to achieve such a goal, and
theEU’sBSmemberstatesareinthepositionofintermediatingsuchacon‐
tinuouscontactandsupport.
THEROMANIANDIMENSIONOFTHEPOLISH‐HUNGARIAN
GEOPOLITICS
The biggest EU country of the BS shore, Romania took the initiative of
strengtheningcooperationintheregion.RomanianpresidentBăsescu,for‐
mercaptainofcommercialships,activelyexpandedRomanianengagement
in different regional cooperation projects at the BS. However, as noted by
JamesSherrfromLondonRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,the„real‐
politik[…]isback”(seeSherr2008:141‐153)intheBSregion,andinsuchacontext
itwouldhavebeeneasierforRomaniatoactasaprominentactorifduring
the privatization process of the 90s it hadn’t lost its commercial fleet, the
fourth largest fleet worldwide largest, after that of the USA, USSR and the
UK.
Thepost‐sovietBSareaisimportantforRomania,sinceinthesecoun‐
tries there is an significant Romanian speaking minority, whose identity
maybethreatened.If,intheUkraine,theRomanianlanguagehasbeenre‐
movedfromtheschools’curricula,whilemostpupilshaveRomanianroots
andifKievstillusestheoldStalinistdivision(asanassimilationstrategy)
betweenRomaniansandMoldovans,inMoldova2throughconsciousRoma‐
nian policy, every year there are more Moldovans that are being offered
Romanian citizenship. A significant impact on the transformation process
that is undergoing in Moldova has the Moldova’s young intelligentsia
strongly connected with Romania and with Romanian values. Often this
new intellectual elite has studied or been beneficiary of scholarships at
Romanianuniversities.Therefore,todayChişinăuperceivesRomaniaasits
gatewaytotheEU,contrarytotheofficialpolicythatwaspursuedtill2009
2ItisherethecaseoftheRepublicofMoldova,whoseterritoryisapartofBesarabia,asub‐
province of the Romanian province of Moldova, which became from 1940 one of the USSR
republics.
3
Alin‐DoruCodoban
by the communist government of the former president Voronin, who con‐
sidered Romania as “the last empire of Europe” (see See “România, ultimul imperiu al
Europei”).
AfterthedemocraticchangesthattookplaceinGeorgia,Bucharestac‐
tivated its Caucasus policy: in 2004‐2008 Romanian exports to the region
grewby254%whileimportsdecreasedbyonly0.83%inthesameperiod3.
GeorgiaisthelargestconsumerofRomaniangoods,whileAzerbaijanisthe
region’smostimportantsupplierfortheRomanianmarket.Nowit’stimeto
develop projects that would also allow an increase in Romanian energy
importsfromtheabove‐mentionedregion,mainlyfromAzerbaijan,anen‐
ergy‐rich country, as well as to create conditions for importing Georgian
wineandcitrus.
Generally,RomaniaisnotpopularamongEuropeancitizens.Noteven
in Poland, a country that has the most common interests with Romania,
especially in South‐Eastern Europe. Romania is neighboring not only with
theBSregionandCentralEurope(throughTransylvania),butalsowiththe
Balkans–aregionwithabetterperspectiveofjoiningtheEUthanUkraine
andBelarus–inotherwords,witharegionthathasbeengenerallyignored
byPolishforeignpolicy(seeKaczorowski2010).
Except for several scandals about the nomadic gypsy minority4 in
FranceandItaly,Europeanmediaareveryrarelypresentingnewsfromand
about Romania, and maybe this is one of the reasons why Romania is the
quietestEUmemberstate.
It’s in the Visegrad countries’ interest, and mainly in that of Poland,
thatRomaniabecomeanactivegeopoliticalplayerintheBSregionandin
theBalkans,sinceCentralEurope’sneedforenergysecurityisconditioned
byregionalstability.Thankstothenumberofitsinhabitantsanditsterrito‐
ry–possessingalmostthesamesurfaceasPoland,Romaniashouldbecome
the vector of the EU’s policies towards the countries located in its neigh‐
borhood.However,RomaniaisfacingthesamechallengeasPolanddoes:it
isaEUmiddle‐sizedcountryunabletocreatesustainableandsolidalliances
withcountriesofthesamesizeinwhattheissuesconnectedwiththeEast
are concerned, because of their different geographical interests (similar
3AccordingtoEurostat,RomanianexportstoAzerbaijan,GeorgiaandArmeniaaccountedin
2004forabout70.5mil.Eurosandin2008forabout180mil.Euros.In2004,importsrepre‐
sentedabout126mil.Eurosandin2008only105mil.
4OnFebruary9th,2011theRomanianSenatevotedagainsttheprojectofchangingtheGyp‐
sies name from Roma back to the traditional Tsigane, even if the project was strongly sup‐
ported by the Romanian Academy and by the overwhelming majority of Romanians. The
projectwasaimedtoavoidtheconfusionthatexistsbetweenthewordsRomanian(Român)
and Roma (Rom). Romanian members of the European Parliament are lobbying now to
change the name Roma in the European official documents arguing that inevitably some
unfortunatemisunderstandingwillappearbetweenthewordsRoma,RomaniaandRome(the
capitalcityofItaly).
4
Romania:ANewGeopoliticalActorInTheBlackSeaEnergyGame
countriesareSpainorItaly,situatedinWesternEuropeandthereforemore
interestedinwhatishappeninginNorthAfricaandMiddleEast).
Polish strategies towards the East – if implemented by Bucharest –
could also insure Romania’s strategic objectives. The buffer zone policy in
relation to the Russian Federation, and also energy diversification are im‐
portantforBucharest,becausethereisariskforRomaniatobeleftoutby
Russia’senergyprojectsintheBSregion,whereBulgariaandnotRomania
isseenasbeingMoscow’straditionalpartner–itisaSlaviccountry,after
all.In2010RomaniaandHungary connectedtheirgastransportationsys‐
tems through the Arad‐Szeged interconnector and in the current year Ro‐
maniaisplanningtoopenanewconnectionwithBulgaria,whichisintend‐
edtopreventaneventualnewgascrisis,especiallyintheUkraine.Byinter‐
connecting Romania’s gas system with those of the neighboring EU coun‐
tries,Bucharestcanactasanimportantgasnodefromneutralcountriesas
GermanyandTurkey.
Budapest represents in this context an important player and useful
partner of Romania and Poland, because the new Warsaw‐Budapest‐
Bucharestaxiscouldenhancecooperationandinitiativesofthethreecoun‐
triesinenergyprojectsintheBSregionandtheBalkans.
THEBLACKSEAANDTHECHANGINGPOWERBALANCEOFTHE
REGION
Historically, BS represented the place of confrontation between two mili‐
tarypowers:RussianandTurkish.Thecompetitionbetweenthemwasof‐
ten artificially encouraged by the West, which was supporting Turkey
againstRussia.However,thelatestpoliticalchangesinTurkeyprovedthat,
disappointed with the West and the EU, Ankara created its own “Russia
policy”,evenagainstthewilloftheUS.Thisfactwasprovedbythiscoun‐
try’spositionduringtheRussian‐Georgianwarinthesummerof20085.
TheRussian‐TurkishallianceattheBScouldultimatelyprovefatalfor
the energy diversification efforts of the EU, which is still not prepared to
allowTurkeytobecomeitsmember–asTurkeyisconsideredbymanyto
betoobigMuslimcountrywithanunidentifiedgeographicalidentity.May‐
beinthiscontexttheEUwillgraduallysupportalternativeprojectsatthe
5Iran’sproposalofaAnkara‐Moscow‐Tehranstabilizationtrianglefounditsconcreteexpres‐
sionduringthe2008warinGeorgia:TurkeystayedneutralandprohibitedNATO’smilitary
patrol in its territorial waters and underlined its policy towards Moscow during the prime
ministerErdogan’svisitintheRussiancapitalonthe13thofAugust2008.Asamatteroffact,
actingthisway,AnkaraproveditsdeterminationforstabilityintheCaucasus.FromtheTurk‐
ish prime minister’s speech in Moscow we quote: “I came to prove Turkey’s solidarity with
RussiaintheSouthOsetia’sissue(…)solidaritythathasenormoussignificanceinthisregion”
(seeTribishnaja,2008).
5
Alin‐DoruCodoban
BS,becomingthereforeanactiveplayeroftheregion,togetherwithRussia
andTurkey.
Obviously,theBSgeopoliticalsignificancefromtheenergyperspective
is connected to those possibilities that could be offered by new transport
routesforgasandoilfromtheCaspianregion–mostlyfromAzerbaijan,but
alsofromTurkmenistanorIran–routesthathavetocrossshorecountries,
ortogothroughpipesthataretobebuiltontheBSbottom,orevenonthe
BSbyLNGcargostotheEU.
Insuchacontext,Ankara’snew“Russiapolicy”andwarmingrelations
with Yerevan – another Kremlin partner of the region – creates disap‐
pointment in Baku, which has been seeking to prevent Ankara’s growing
bargainingpowersincethelastprice‐relatedissue.Thisishowtheliquefied
gastradeideaemergedintheregion,makinguseofgaslandtransportation
infrastructure of Romania and Georgia and renting Norwegian LNG ships.
Such kind of a trade will also allow Azerbaijan to become an actor of the
emergingLNGworldarena,andthereforetoinfluencethefutureworldgas
market.
AGRI–THEGASSURPRISEINTHEBSREGION
At the beginning of 2010, surprisingly, the project of a new gas route
emerged, which will bypass both Russia and Turkey, being therefore per‐
ceivedasathreatforNabucco,aswell.AGRIrepresentsanabbreviationfor
Azerbaidjan‐Georgia‐RomaniaInterconnectorprojectanditisbasedonthe
idea of transporting Azeri gas to the Georgian port of Kulevi, from where,
after being liquefied, it will be transported to the Romanian port of Con‐
stanţa.AfterregasificationinConstanţathegascanbetransportedtoCen‐
tralEuropeancountries,usingRomaniangasinfrastructure.
IftheprimaryprojectfounderswereRomania,GeorgiaandAzerbaijan,
inSeptemberlastyear,Hungaryalsojoinedtheproject.Moreover,Bulgaria
–whichsignedanagreementwithAzerbaijanforcompressednaturalgas–
isalsoconsideringtheideaofbecomingapartnerofAGRI,sincetheneeded
technology is easier to implement in the existing ports. Also, a part of the
RomanianandGeorgianLNGcargoscouldbesenttoOdessa,afterUkraine’s
declaredwillingnessofjoiningthesameproject.
In January 2011, the AGRI LNG Project Company – joint venture was
created,soastopreparefeasibilitystudiesandincaseofapositivereport
toinitiatethebuildingoftheterminalsfromnolaterthanthesecondhalfof
theyear.SomeoftheRomanianexpertsconsiderthatAGRImayberealized
evenfasterthanNabucco.However,untilnowtherehasbeennoclearsup‐
portreactionfromBrussels.GunterOetinger–the EUenergycommissary
mentioned–beforeHungary’sdecisiontojoinAGRI,thatNabuccoremains
thetoppriorityintheSouthernCorridor,aswellastheGreece‐ItalyInter‐
connector.
6
Romania:ANewGeopoliticalActorInTheBlackSeaEnergyGame
However, technical assumptions of AGRI show that it doesn’t make
competition for Nabucco. AGRI will transport four times less gas than
Nabucco–7vs31bcm,whilethemostimportantwillbetofindalternative
sources of Caspian gas for supplying both projects. Of capital significance
will be to get Turkmen and maybe Iranian gas to cover the cumulated ca‐
pacityofbothofthem.Theoretically,bothNabuccoandAGRIareplannedto
bebuiltin1‐3years’time,startingfrom2012,butthedeadlineforNabucco
hasbeendelayedseveral times.Once againonMay 6th2011,thedeadline
was delayed for construction by one year, for 2013, and for the first gas
flowby2years,for2017(see„ProblemyNabuccozwiększająszansenafuzjęwramachpołudniowego
korytarza” 2011). However, AGRI is cheaper than Nabucco, with an estimated
costof2‐4billioneuros,whichrepresentshalforevenaquarterofNabuc‐
co’s.
ThankstoAGRI,Romaniacouldbecomethesecondtransitplatformfor
Caspiangas,afterTurkey,andthereforeinthenearfuturethemainEUen‐
ergy player of the region. In contrast to Romania, its southern neighbor,
Bulgaria,averyimportantcountryonthewayofdifferentenergyprojects,
cannotplaytheroleofanalternativetoRussianenergy,becauseitisRus‐
sia’s main partner for gas – through South Stream – and oil– through the
Burgas‐Alexandropoulis pipeline – to southern European markets. Moreo‐
ver, Bulgaria’s disadvantage is represented by its geographical position
beneaththeDanube;itdoesnotpossessdirectaccesstoCentralEuropean
countriesthatarethemostinterestedinenergydiversification–becauseof
theirhighdependenceonRussianhydrocarbons.
EASTERNPARTNERSHIPANDECONOMICINTEGRATIONWITHTHE
WEST
LikeitwasshownbythecountriesthatjoinedtheEUin2004and2007,the
success of the transformation process in economy and society was deter‐
minedbyaveryimportantsignificanceofcontinuouscommercialcoopera‐
tionbetweenthemand theEU15 and betweenthemselves,as well.Inour
opinion, in order to make the Eastern Partnership become effective, it is
absolutely necessary to create and develop projects that are supporting
suchcooperation.ThebestprojectfromthePolishperspectiveandfromthe
regionalcooperationperspectivecouldberepresentedbyaPartnershipof
Central‐EastEuropeancountries,ontheWarsaw‐Budapest‐Bucharestaxis.
Commoninterestscouldbeattainedthroughcommonprojectsandacom‐
monapproachintheBSregionandintheBalkansinordertocreateareal
energyalternativetoRussianenergypowerintheregion.Fromthispointof
view,togetherwithNabucco,AGRIcouldencouragethefoundingcountries
toenhancefurthertradebetweenthemandtolookforothersectorsofpo‐
tentialeconomiccooperation.
7
Alin‐DoruCodoban
Poland,whichduringthesecondhalfof2011willfollowtheHungarian
presidencyoftheEU,isboundtoencourageandsupportallpossibleinstru‐
mentsthatcouldstrengtheninitiativesfortheEasternPartnershipsuccess,
including AGRI. Romania expects Poland to support its own projects con‐
cerningtheBSregion,sincetherealitiesconcerningtheconcretecoopera‐
tion with these countries, as well as investments, can be better realized
herebyBucharest.Itshouldbenotedandemphasized–thingsthatmaybe
unknownforPolesorHungarians–thatatthemomentthemajorityofEU
tradewithGeorgiaisbeingdonethroughouttheRomanianports,asaresult
ofdifficultiesconnectedwiththetransitthroughRussianterritory.Forthe
realsuccessofoneoftheEasternPartnership’sobjectives,whichwemen‐
tioned before, Poland should find a partner that would like to be further
engagedtotheEast, and notonlyinUkraineorBelarus.A partnerforthe
realizationofsuchanidea,withPolandandHungary,couldbeandmustbe
Romania.
WeconsiderthatPolishdiplomacyandpoliticiansshouldbelookingat
theRomanianpartner– withwhom aStrategicPartnershiphasbeencon‐
cluded – through the Eastern Partnership perspective, which creates, to‐
getherwiththeHungarianpartner,acommonblockforfurthersuccessful
actionsmainlyintheCaucasus.
Asignalthatnewprojectswillbedevelopedistheagreementsignedin
February 2011 between the Romanian and Turkish ministry of economy
and energy for cooperation on third markets in the Caucasus and Middle
East.Agroupofexpertswascreated,whichhastofindpotentialinvestment
opportunities.ApartfromNabuccoandthesubmarinecablethatisintend‐
edtoenableRomanianenergyexportstoTurkey,RomaniansandTurksare
planningcommonexplorationandextractionofoilandnaturalgasinthose
regions,aswellastheconstructionofhydroelectricplantsinGeorgia.Such
kindofpartnershipsshownottheRomanianweaknessofactingalone,but
itsopennessforcooperationandengagementnexttopartnersthatarefa‐
miliarizedwiththeareawherenewinvestmentsaretobemade.
INSTEADOFCONCLUSIONS
InthecontextofanactivePolishengagementinissuesconcerningenergy
security, the Warsaw‐Budapest‐Bucharest axis could be the best solution
forAGRItobeaccepted,asapartofthesouthernEUenergycorridor.Inthis
way,thereisanopengateforfurthercommonregionalprojectsinthefield
ofenergy,whichcouldprovideinthefutureasolidbackgroundforanold
projectofthePolishMarshalPilsudskiregardingaunionofstatesfromone
sea to another (from the Baltic to Black Sea). In the present context, the
binderforsuchanambitiousprojectcouldbethosecountries’needforen‐
ergysecurity.
8
Romania:ANewGeopoliticalActorInTheBlackSeaEnergyGame
Finally,itisworthwhiletorecallFriedman’sbook,whichpredictsafu‐
turePolish‐Turkishwarinthe Balkansforinfluencezones (Friedman 2009: 202‐
205),mainlyforeconomicones.Aconditionforsuchawarnottobecomea
realityistheemergenceofanewbufferingplayerintheBalkansandBlack
Searegion,followingthesamelogicusedinthe19thcenturytoblockRus‐
sia’sexpansionintheBalkans,whichwiththeEuropeanempiresagreement
allowed Romania to emerge as a state. Such a Romanian energy player is
nowpreparingtoassumeitsrolewhilehavingitsownsolutionsforenergy
problemsintheeasternEUregions.Inordertodoso,itneedsconfidence
andsupport.
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