Pragmatics 6
Irony
Origins
• The word irony originates in the eironi, which describes the
main features of the characters in classical Greek comedies,
revolving around the conflict between two characters:
– the ‘imposter’ versus
– the ‘ironical man’.
• The imposter was depicted as the pompous fool who
pretended to be more than he actually was, while his
antagonist was the cunning dissembler who posed as less
than he was. The denouement always displayed the victory
of the ironical man. Feigning ignorance, the speaker asked
a number of ironical questions in order to direct the
attention towards his interlocutor’s genuine ignorance.
Some definitions of Irony
• The definition of irony given by DuMarsais
(1981 in Lesovici 1999) is an extension of the
principles of irony established in classical
rhetoric:
• “Irony is a figure through which we wish to
imply the opposite of what we are saying;
consequently, the words we use in the case of
irony are not understood in their literal
meaning.”
Some definitions of Irony
• Classical approaches to irony claim that the
distinction drawn between literal and
figurative meaning underlines the perception
of the literal meaning as the norm and of
figurative meaning, including irony, as
deviation from the established norm.
Contemporary approaches to irony:
Verbal vs. situational irony
• A basic distinction in the field of irony is that between:
• verbal irony, a linguistic phenomenon defined by
Gibbs (1994) as the strategy of using incongruity
between reality and expectation, and
• situational irony, a state of the world which is
perceived as ironical.
• Gibbs points out that in the case of verbal irony, the
speaker intentionally creates a juxtaposition of
incompatible actions or words, whereas situational
irony reveals events which are ironic irrespective of the
speaker’s implication.
Contemporary approaches to irony:
Verbal vs. situational irony
• Both verbal and situational irony involve a
confrontation
or
juxtaposition
of
incompatibles.
• However, while with verbal irony an individual
evokes such a confrontation by their
utterance, situational irony simply happens to
be noticed as ironic.
Contemporary approaches to irony:
Verbal vs. situational irony
• In his ‘Concept of Irony’ Kierkegaard regards it as allpervasive and therefore representative of human nature:
• “As philosophers claim that no true philosophy is possible
without doubt, by the same token, one may claim that no
authentic human life is possible without irony”.
• Famous examples of situational irony testify to the
presence of an ironical mode of thought:
• the man who invented the guillotine was beheaded by it;
• The man who built the Bastille was imprisoned in it;
• The bishop who invented the iron cage (a torture chamber
so small that the victim could neither stand nor lie in it) was
the first to be confined in it.
Contemporary approaches to irony:
Verbal vs. situational irony
• All these uncanny happenings can be viewed
as unexpected, anomalous twists of fate. If we
intend to make this unexpectedness explicit,
we may express our attitude by employing
clear semantic markers and say: “Ironically or
The irony of fate is that the man who invented
the guillotine was beheaded by it”.
One stage vs. two stage theories
• Recent contemporary theories, both linguistic
and psychological, have increasingly focused
on the processing of irony. Some theorists
(Grice 1975, Dews and Winner 1999) claim
that irony presupposes a two-stage
processing, which involves the processing of a
meaning of an utterance, the rejection of this
interpretation on pragmatic grounds and a
subsequent reinterpretation of the text.
One stage vs. two stage theories
• A partially contrastive approach (Sperber and
Wilson 1986) claims that the processing of
irony is not distinct from that of the literal
meaning of an utterance and that ironic
meaning is arrived at directly, without the
mediation of a rejected interpretation.
The Gricean account.
• Grice’s account differs from other irony theories in that
it is based on an analysis of irony in the context of
everyday communication.
• In Grice’s view, irony is a case of conversational
implicature, generated by the ironist’s flouting of the
Quality Maxim: the speaker implicates the opposite of
what is said. The ironist says something he does not
believe to be true while having no intention to tell a lie.
Thus, the hearer is compelled to look for an additional
meaning, which, in Grice’s view, is “some obviously
related proposition. The most obviously related
proposition is the opposite”
The Gricean account.
• Grice proposes a model of the processing of irony,
illustrated by:
• Context: A is building a house. B offers to help A. For
two hours, B has done nothing but drinking beer and
playing with the dog. At this point A says:
‘You’re a big help!’
• According to Grice’s theory, A utters something untrue,
thus failing to observe the quality maxim. At the same
time, the implied meaning of A’s utterance is the
opposite of what is said, namely that B is no help at all.
The Gricean account.
• As to the processing of this ironical remark, the model
proposed by Grice is as it follows:
– A says <B is a big help>;
– There is no reason to suppose that A is not observing all
the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle;
– A could not be doing this unless he thought that<B is no
help at all>;
– A knows that the audience can see the supposition <B is
no help at all>;
– A has done nothing to stop the audience from thinking
that <B is no help at all>;
– A has implicated that <B is no help at all>.
The Gricean account.
• Grice claims that irony is a way of pretending
and, consequently, of adopting an attitude
towards a state of affairs.
• To be ironical is among other things, to
pretend (as the etymology suggests) and while
one wants the pretence to be recognized as
such, to announce it as pretence would spoil
the effect.
The Gricean account.
• Grice formulated the ‘two-stage’ hypothesis of
processing non-literal language:
– a first literal and mandatory stage, and
– a second non-literal optional stage.
• In the Gricean view, the initial stage in irony
comprehension involves identifying non-observance of
the Quality Maxim, which signals the addressee that
they should reject the literal meaning and
subsequently derive the implied meaning. Since the
initial interpretation is contextually incompatible (B
does not actually help A), it is discarded and replaced
by the appropriate meaning (B is no help at all).
Searle’s account: the three-stage model
• Like Grice, Searle is concerned with the way in which
people grasp the extra meaning attached to one’s literal
and non-literal utterances.
• Assuming the distinction between literal and non-literal
utterances, he asserts that
“in non-literal utterances, speakers do not mean what they
say, but instead mean something else”
• The three-stage model involves three successive stages:
1) Derive the literal meaning
2) Test this meaning against the context
3) If the literal meaning fails to make sense, seek an
alternative non-literal meaning.
Searle’s account: the three-stage model
• For instance, the ironic criticism “Good move!”
in the context:
Bill is carrying a batch of heavy files in his
arms. Entering his office, he stumbles over the
threshold and falls to the ground, scattering
the files all over the place. Watching him from
his desk, his colleague John says to him:
• “Good move!”
Searle’s account: the three-stage model
• According to Searle’s model, the hearer understands
the above ironic criticism, by first analysing the positive
literal meaning of the ironic utterance. Bill first takes
John’s utterance literally and thinks his colleague
meant to say that he had made a good move. Then, Bill
checks this meaning against the context. Realising that
the literal meaning is not appropriate in the context,
Bill seeks for an alternative meaning.
• Thus, the derivation of the conveyed meaning is
optional. Searle argues that addressees infer a nonliteral meaning by assuming the opposite of the literal
interpretation.
Searle and Gice’s accounts
• Searle’s model tries to explain the way in which hearers
understand what is beyond a literal utterance in a more
concise way and using more general terms than Grice does.
• Yet, both Grice and Searle rely on the same assumption
that analysing the initial, literal meaning of an utterance is
a mandatory stage in reaching the implied, non-literal
meaning.
• According to both Grice and Searle, the search for a nonliteral meaning starts when the hearer realises that the
speaker’s utterance is context-inappropriate. In Grice’s
framework, a non-literal utterance blatantly flouts a maxim,
while in Searle’s, such an utterance fails to make sense
against the context.
• In both theorists, the intended meaning is necessarily the
opposite of the literal one.
Critiques to the Gricean account.
• The main criticism brought to Grice (Sperber and
Wilson 1986) was that, despite his focus on language in
use, his view is still tributary to traditional rhetoric
approaches.
• Viewed as a conversational implicature, irony is dealt
with in terms of the sheer contrast between what is
said and what is meant.
• Moreover, Grice’s theory is considered not to have
sufficiently explained the hearer’s processing of irony.
• Sperber and Wilson show that irony need not be
restricted to implying the opposite of what is said.
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• They provide several counterexamples to Grice’s
claim, such as:
– ironical understatements,
– ironical quotations and
– ironical interjections,
• proving that such utterances cannot be
successfully analysed as instances in which the
Quality Maxim fails to be observed and which
solely communicates the opposite of what is said.
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• Ironical understatements are not analysed as
communicating the opposite of what is said, but
less than what is meant.
• For example, Mercutio’s ironical comment on his
death wound
“No, ‘tis not so deep as a well, nor so wide as a
church door; but ‘tis enough, ‘twill serve” (Romeo
and Juliet, III)
• does not communicate the opposite of what is
said, namely that the wound is as deep as a well
or that it would not serve.
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• Ironical quotations are used for the purpose of
expressing a speaker’s attitude towards an utterance.
“Oh, to be in England
Now that April’s there”
(Robert Browning - “Home thoughts from abroad”)
• This quotation does not express the desire to leave
England but rather asserts the idea that Browning’s
romantic view of England in spring does not
correspond to reality.
• Sperber and Wilson maintain that for such utterances
to be successfully understood as ironical, they must
first be recognized as quotations.
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• Sperber and Wilson argue that ironical interjections
have no obvious opposite meaning: they simply exploit
the background knowledge of the speaker in relation to
specific information. For example, the utterance
‘Ah, Tuscany in May!’
• said while visiting Tuscany on a rainy day has no
opposite meaning.
• Moreover, Sperber and Wilson claim that since ironical
interjections are not complete propositions, they
cannot be analysed as instances in which the Quality
Maxim is not observed.
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• Even the examples which fit the traditional definition
of irony are not adequately described by the claim that
they communicate the opposite of what is said.
• For instance, the ironical utterance
‘What a wonderful party!’ could be pragmatically
equivalent to the literal counterpart ‘What an awful
party!’.
• Yet, the two utterances differ as to the speaker’s
motivation and the attitude conveyed.
• Moreover, the effects on the hearer by each of the
utterances are likely to be very different.
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• Their account is based on a distinction between the use and
the mention of words and sentences.
• Words and sentences are used when they describe a
certain state of affairs, and mentioned when they are selfreferential or self-designating.
• Thus, in direct or indirect quotations a sentence or other
linguistic expression is mentioned.
• In the following example, Mary simply mentions what
Susan said.
Peter: What did Susan say?
Mary: I can’t speak to you now.
or
Mary: ‘She couldn’t speak to me then’
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• Our analysis of irony… crucially involves the
evocation of an attitude – that of the speaker
to the proposition mentioned
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• Irony does not necessarily imply a negative
critical attitude towards its object.
• ‘genteel irony’ (Fontanier in Attardo 2000) is
defined as praising or flattering someone under
pretense of blaming or criticizing.
• Irony can occasionally be ‘playful and
affectionate’, such as in:
‘I love you, you idiot’ kind, recurrent in dramedies
(such as Rory’s reply to Dean in ‘The Gilmore
Girls’)
Sperber and Wilson’s view on irony
• To conclude with, Sperber and Wilson argue that
speakers do no keep detached from the propositions
they mention and they invoke attitudes in order to
contribute to the dynamics of the exchange.
• Any utterance presupposes the speaker’s informative
intention to modify the hearer’s cognitive environment,
that is to make a certain set of assumptions manifest or
more manifest to him/her.
• The hearer, in his/her turn, guided by the criterion of
consistency with the principle of relevance, has to
decide which set of assumptions the speaker wanted to
make manifest to him.